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Abstract 
 
 Leibniz analyzes contingency in terms of a range of different notions: hypothetical 
necessity, per se contingency, infinite analysis, possible free decrees of God, and moral 
necessity.  These have been interpreted as attempts to retreat from the neccesitarian view he 
adopts in his early work, but I defend the view that Leibniz’s commitment to 
necessitarianism—the claim that all truths are necessary—is an important and unwavering 
feature of his system. 
The core of Leibniz’s modal theory is the thesis that the denial of a necessary truth is 
contradictory. Leibniz thinks that if we take all necessary truths into account, including the 
nature of God, God’s understanding of essences, and his will to do what is best, then all 
things considered all truths are necessarily true.  All truths are necessarily true because the 
denial of any truth contradicts some necessary feature of God. Instead of understanding 
Leibniz’s subsequent theories of contingency as abandoning necessitarianism, I treat them as 
attempts to account for distinctions his interlocutors draw. Rather than eschew all talk of 
contingency, Leibniz offers and liberally invokes proxies for this notion.   
 I trace the development of Leibniz’s various accounts of contingency from his early to 
mature work in order to illustrate that they are best understood in a necessitarian 
framework.  I develop versions of his various accounts of contingency, including per se 
contingency and hypothetical necessity (Chapter 1), infinite analysis and possible free decrees 
of God (Chapter 2), and moral necessity (Chapter 3). The outcome of my project is a 
systematic treatment of Leibniz’s surrogate or proxy theories of contingency within his 
necessitarian framework. It also establishes the character of Leibnizian possible worlds, which 
are key for the grounding of contingent truths in the goodness of God’s will.  Instead of 
representing all logical space, possible worlds represent alternative plans for God’s world 
creation, and are thus constrained by metaphysical principles informed by God’s nature.    
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Introduction 
 
There is a vast, thorough, and rich literature detailing Leibniz’s modal theory, 
invigorated by contemporary investigations into possible worlds and reductive 
accounts of modality.  Leibniz’s battery of notions of necessity and contingency—
including absolute necessity, hypothetical necessity, per se necessity, imaginability, 
conceivability, infinite and finite analysis, God’s possible free decrees, metaphysical 
necessity, and moral necessity—have each received careful analysis regarding their 
details and development.  My aim is not to directly rehash the controversies in the 
secondary literature detailing each of these views, although I will take a stand on 
interpretations of each of them.  Instead, my aim is to examine these views within 
the broader context of Leibniz’s intellectual development throughout his work from 
the 1670s to 1716.  Daniel Garber writes that in investigating Leibniz’s views, 
It is always tempting to ask what Leibniz really thinks, and to try to set out in clear 
and simple terms just what the Leibnizian philosophy comes to.  And given the small 
number of texts that Kant and his contemporaries had available, this seems like a very 
reasonable project.  But when we look at the larger context, the full complexity of his 
literary remains, Leibniz comes out as a very different kind of thinker.  The project of 
reconstructing the doctrine that Leibniz held, explicitly or under wraps is 
fundamentally misguided.  What we should be doing, instead, is trying to capture the 
complexity of his thought, its twists and turns, its hesitations and its affirmations.  
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What, then did Leibniz really think?  On some issues, such as the relation between 
monads and bodies, perhaps that question does not even make sense to ask.1  
Our discussion will follow the twists, turns, hesitations and affirmations of Leibniz’s 
modal theorizing.  What emerges, or so I will argue, is that Leibniz is 
conscientiously and consistently a kind of necessitarian throughout his work.  That 
is, Leibniz really thought that all truths are necessary because the origin and causes 
of all features of the world could not have failed to be just as they are. Establishing 
the character and justification of Leibniz’s necessitarianism, which he maintains not 
only in the 1670s but also through to 1716, establishes a framework in which to 
reinterpret many of Leibniz’s modal notions.   
Despite his necessitarianism, he embraces talk of contingency and confirms its 
importance in philosophical and theological contexts. I will argue that Leibniz’s 
many modal notions are attempts to make sense of talk of contingency within a 
necessitarian framework, which influences the aims, character, and criteria of 
successful notions of ‘contingency’ for Leibniz. He accepts that given all features of 
the world it could not be otherwise (and thus no truths are contingent) but our 
modal terms do not always track this feature of the world, and his modal theories 
are part of his strategy to explain what we are, in fact, talking about when we 
describe things as “contingent”.  The broader aim is to explore Leibniz’s 
sophisticated necessitarianism that is distinct from the early modern 
necessitarianisms of, for instance, Spinoza and Hobbes, by his systematic treatment 
of quasi-modal notions of contingency.   
                                         
1 Garber 2009, 78. 
   
 
 
3 
 
The central idea of Leibniz’s necessitarianism is that the content and truth-value of 
our contingency claims are relative to which considerations we restrict our attention 
to when conceiving of propositional terms.  Leibniz thinks all things are necessary 
when we consider all fundamental features of God and the world but that in many 
contexts we are not, and should not, consider all things when we use modal 
language.  I describe these notions as quasi-modal notions and not merely modal 
notions because they do not track modality at the most fundamental level, that is, 
they do not track the feature of reality that Leibniz himself ultimately picks out as 
modally fundamental: whether things could have failed to be as they are and 
whether their denial entails a contradiction.  In examining Leibniz’s various quasi-
modal notions, it becomes clear that Leibniz is not all that permissive when 
considering candidates for explicating quasi-modal notions.  In fact, we will see cases 
where Leibniz revises, restricts and rejects quasi-modal notions because they fail to 
carve out the right notion of contingency for his given purposes. The aim of 
following chapters is to establish that Leibniz accepts two theses: 
1. Necessitarianism: All conditions considered, all truths are necessarily true. 
2. Modal Variantism: Modal truths depend upon how we conceive of the terms and 
relations in the proposition.  
To clarify each of these views, I will first turn to the argument for necessitarianism 
from Leibniz’s texts, and then characterize the various quasi-modal notions that 
Leibniz recommends in light of necessitarianism.   
1 Necessitarianism  
According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), for every truth there is a 
reason that explains why it is true. For Leibniz, this is grounded in treating features 
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of reality as conditional upon and determined by other guaranteeing conditions.  
Explanations for truths about the world thus appeal to the conditions that 
determine and guarantee the features of the world are as they are.  It is not 
particularly radical to adopt an ontology that posits that mathematical, natural and 
divine truths are born out of dependency relations between properties and the 
subjects they adhere in, and the relations those subjects have to one another.  
However, when we examine Leibniz’s detailed treatment of the nature of those 
sufficient conditions, and the conditioning relations, what emerges is that Leibniz is 
committed to necessitarianism.  Necessitarianism certainly is a more radical view 
than substance-accident ontology.  
With respect to the PSR, Leibniz’s necessitarianism stems from his notion of 
sufficiency and also his notion of reason.  First, sufficient reasons are sufficient 
conditions, and there is a necessary connection between a sufficient condition and its 
outcome.  Leibniz treats conditionals expressing sufficient conditions as a matter of 
strict implication. However, postulating that for every feature of the world there is 
some set of sufficient conditions that guarantee those features does not yield 
necessitarianism.  For even if the laws of nature, initial conditions and subsequent 
series of events are sufficient to produce the current state of the world, it does not 
follow that the current state of the world is necessary.  The modal status of the laws 
of nature and initial conditions are importantly relevant, because if the laws of 
nature and initial conditions are contingent, then the current state of the world 
follows necessarily, but is contingent.   
The additional notion that yields necessitarianism is Leibniz’s notion of a reason.  
At the core of Leibniz’s metaphysics are notions of natures or essences.  These 
essences not only spell out the requisite features a substance must have to be a 
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creature of a particular type, but also constrain how properties and substances can 
be related to one another.  The different ways that the world can be are a function 
of the different ways essences can be instantiated and related to one another.  
Essences, and their compatibilities and powers, offer reasons for features of the 
world.  However, the collection of essences of creatures—or various possible series of 
things—does not contain the sufficient reasons for their own existence.  Leibniz 
grapples with this issue when considering versions of the cosmological argument for 
the existence of God.2 Even if previous states of the world can explain current states 
of the world, and even if there is an infinity of world-states in the past, we are left 
without a sufficient reason for the existence of this particular series of things as 
opposed to another.  Having a coherent essence makes something a prima face 
candidate for existence and Leibniz’s commitment to the PSR includes stating that 
for every prima face candidate for existence there must be some reason why it exists, 
or does not exist.  Leibniz recognizes that it seems as though there are different 
coherent series of things, and this world is merely one of them.3 Why this series of 
things and not another is not addressed, according to Leibniz, by merely appealing 
to the initial conditions and laws of nature (or an infinite chain of natural causes).   
Because the features of the world are insufficient to explain why this world exists 
and not another, Leibniz appeals to God’s essential existence and nature to ground 
                                         
2 For example see LOC 117. 
3 In his comments on Spinoza, “…Since the whole series can be imagined or understood by 
other means, a reason must be provided from outside t why this should be so.  From these 
considerations a truly memorable thing also follows, that what is earlier in the series of 
causes is not nearer to the Reason for the universe, i.e., to the First Being, than what is later 
nor is the First Being the reason for the later ones as a result of the mediation of the earlier 
ones; rather it is the reason for all of them equally immediately” (LOC 117). 
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the dependent truths about the world.  According to Leibniz, God’s creation of this 
particular world is a function of divine intellect and will, and a comparison to other 
possible worlds.  God’s omniscience guarantees God knows all coherent ways of 
combining essences into worlds, and a comparison of the features of these worlds 
allows God to determine which of them is best.  God’s perfectly good will responds 
to the best of all options, subsequently willing the best of all worlds into existence.  
So the reasons sufficient for explaining features of the world that exists is a function 
of essences, how they can be combined, and God’s features, including his existence, 
will and understanding.   
What is distinctive about appealing to these reasons as sufficient conditions is 
that essences and how they can be combined couldn’t be otherwise.  For example, it 
is impossible for something that is a human to fail to have the capacity for 
rationality, because rationality is an essential feature of humans. Possible worlds 
exhaust the various different ways essences can be combined.  Which of those worlds 
exists is a function of God’s understanding and will.  God’s will is good essentially, 
it could not be otherwise, and God’s understanding is a function of is omniscience, 
which could not be otherwise,4 and essences and their combinations similarly cannot 
be otherwise.  Thus the sufficient reasons for features of the world ultimately are 
conditions that cannot be otherwise, rooted either in the essences of creatures or 
God’s essence.  So not only are the connections between features of the world 
necessitating, but also the ultimate reasons themselves could not be otherwise.  To 
summarize, the current state of the world couldn’t be different unless the laws and 
                                         
4 God could not fail to be omniscient, however, it seems possible that the content of God’s 
knowledge could be otherwise.  As we will see Leibniz considers and rejects this possibility. 
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initial conditions were different, and those laws and initial conditions could not be 
different unless either they did not produce the best of all worlds compared to others 
or God is not perfectly good, but neither of those conditions could fail to happen, so 
the current state of the world cannot be different. So all truths are necessarily 
true—all reasons or conditions considered.   
When Leibniz discusses modality, his most consistent claim is that the denial of 
a necessary truth entails a contradiction.5  The connection between this notion, and 
the above description of necessitarianism, is that Leibniz treats a conflict of essence 
as a contradiction.  Leibniz thus describes a non-rational human as a contradiction. 
He builds the notion of rationality into the notion of the term ‘human’, so that the 
claim that there is a human who fails to be rational entails a contradiction.  
Leibniz’s system of definitions and concepts thus takes into account the nature and 
ontological relations of essences. Similarly, Leibniz treats God’s non-existence as 
contradictory because God essentially exists.  Put in this way, Leibniz accepts a 
version of necessitarianism because the denial of any truth entails a contradiction 
when we include information about all essences, including God’s. 
In his 1671 letter to Wedderkopf, Leibniz affirms that whatever follows from 
God’s creative activity “is best and also necessary.”6 Sleigh, in his translation of the 
“Confession of a Philosopher” notes that Leibniz introduces new notions of modality 
to “ward off the dreaded doctrine of necessitarianism,”7 and Adams notes that in 
Leibniz’s letter to Wedderkopf he has already “gone over the precipice” and affirmed 
                                         
5  “The Confession of a Philosopher,” CP 69; “Discourse on Metaphysics” §13, AG 45;  “On 
the Radical Origination of Things,” L 488;  “Le Cause De Dieu” §21, J 368;  “Letter 5 to 
Clarke” §4, LC 36.   
6 L 227. 
7 CP xi. 
   
 
 
8 
 
necessitarianism.8 However, both Adams and Sleigh read Leibniz as subsequently 
rejecting necessitarianism by developing modal accounts that make room for 
contingency. My suggestion is that none of these theories is meant to refute the 
argument for necessitarianism given above, but instead mitigate some of the 
consequences that seem to undermine theological and philosophical claims.  That 
is—according to the fundamental structure of reality—God, creatures and the 
relation between the two, render all aspects of reality so that they couldn’t be 
otherwise.  But Leibniz does not want to say that what follows from that is that all 
talk of contingency is misguided.  We can develop notions of contingency that 
vindicate our claims about contingent facts within a necessitarian framework.  Of 
course this will not satisfy someone looking to reject the notion of necessitarianism 
presented above, but I don’t think that was Leibniz’s aim. Michael Griffin makes a 
similar observation in his recent work, reading Leibniz as a necessitarian in his early 
work through to the early 1680s.9  Griffin, however, does not offer an account of 
Leibniz’s modal views beyond the early texts, leaving the status of Leibniz’s 
necessitarianism after the 1680s, along with his theories of contingency, unexamined. 
Thus there is much work to be done in developing Leibniz’s early views on 
necessitarianism, so that we can follow them past the 1680s through to 1716.  On 
my view, Leibniz offers, develops, and revises surrogate notions of contingency, and 
by following his intellectual development we can see what Leibniz thought made for 
a viable surrogate modal notion.  Leibniz assigns different notions of contingency to 
different ways features of the world are necessitated.  Some features are necessitated 
                                         
8 Adams 1994, 11. 
9 Griffin 2013, 3-6, 51-82. 
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by the essences of creatures, some by the combinations of essences into worlds, some 
by God’s essence.  Some of these conditions are infinitely complex, while others are 
finite; some depend on the goodness of God’s will, while others are independent of 
God’s goodness.  We can develop notions for our modal language that latch on to 
features of the world that account for the differences between necessity and 
“contingency.”  Thus our modal claims depend upon how we conceive of the world, 
or relative to which conditions we take into account when asking whether something 
could be otherwise.  This leads us to the second claim, modal variantism and 
Leibniz’s quasi-modal notions. 
2 Modal Variantism and Leibniz’s Quasi-
Modal Notions  
Leibniz would likely treat being called a ‘necessitarian’ as an accusation. His 
dissent would stem from his view that our modal terminology is ambiguous, and 
different instances of modal terms—possible, necessary, contingent and impossible—
call for different analyses.  The adherence to necessitarianism and the ambiguity of 
modal terminology are importantly related, for by maintaining that there are various 
meanings of modal terminology Leibniz can deny that all truths are necessary for all 
meanings of ‘necessary’.  So, properly speaking, Leibniz is committed to a form of 
necessitarianism, one that maintains that once we trace all the conditions sufficient 
to render a proposition true, and all the conditions sufficient to make those true and 
so on, we will see that all truths are grounded in features of reality that cannot be 
otherwise. However, this does not stop Leibniz from affirming, genuinely, that there 
are non-actual possible worlds (whose nonexistence is ‘contingent’), for often our 
investigations do not require the complete set of conditions that necessitate the 
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features of the world, but merely a subset of them.  If we restrict the conditions we 
consider as part of our explanations, then not all truths are necessary. They are 
hypothetically necessary given their sufficient conditions, but often we are not 
considering the full set of jointly sufficient conditions.  Thus, it does not follow that 
all truths are necessary on a more narrow consideration of conditions.   
This second thesis, that modal truths depend on how we conceive of the relevant 
terms, captures how Leibniz develops modal notions that make room for the truth of 
contingent truths.10  Whether necessitarianism is true, on Leibniz’s view, depends on 
the meaning of ‘necessity’, which Leibniz treats as sometimes picking out something 
other than whether things could be otherwise all things considered. However, if our 
conception of the terms is restricted, there is room to render many of our claims 
about contingency intuitive and true.  This raises the question of exactly what are 
the legitimate ways of conceiving of terms for the purpose of rendering modal truths, 
and the developmental story that I will examine in the next few chapters advances 
an answer.  For each of the legitimate ways of conceiving of objects and their 
properties, we can examine whether and to what extent they vindicate our modal 
judgments. Our investigation is thus not merely one that enumerates Leibniz’s 
various modal notions, but for each such notion we will evaluate whether it does the 
job Leibniz wants it to do: does it divide propositions in the relevant areas in the 
ways he wants to for philosophical and theological purposes?  
 There are three criteria that I will develop from Leibniz’s views for evaluating 
the success of quasi-modal notions of contingency.  The first is whether the notion 
                                         
10 See Newlands 2010 for a comparison of Leibniz and Spinoza on this point.  I borrow the 
‘all things considered’ terminology from Newlands.   
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captures the extension of ‘necessity’ and ‘contingency’, correctly dividing necessary 
and contingent propositions.  Identity statements, arithmetical truths, truths about 
essences are all necessary propositions, while truths concerning the free actions of 
creatures, the laws of nature, and the non-existence of possible worlds are 
‘contingent’.  The second is the extent to which a quasi-modal notion captures the 
content or meaning of contingency in a satisfying way.  Articulating what makes an 
account “satisfying” is not a straightforward task, but the contexts in which we use 
the word ‘contingent’ and its conceptual relation to free actions, laws and possible 
worlds gives us some clues about better or worse renderings of the conceptual 
content of contingency.  The third criterion is the extent to which Leibniz’s system 
has the resources to supply a quasi-modal account.  
3 Summary of Chapter 1 
In the 1670s we find the introduction of the argument for necessitarianism, 
Leibniz’s increasing awareness about the problematic features of modal language, as 
well as a concerted effort to develop and clarify modal terminology.  Here Leibniz 
first investigates the nature of necessity and possibility, identifying necessary truths 
with those truths that could not fail to be true, and whose denial entail a 
contradiction.  This period also witnesses a number of Leibniz’s attempts to engage 
problematic features of necessitarianism.  Here, hypothetical necessity and per se 
necessity are Leibniz’s central conceptual tools that he uses to distinguish necessary 
truths from so-called contingent ones.   
In this Chapter I will trace four major developments in Leibniz’s thought, 
starting with the origin and nature of Leibniz’s necessitarianism.  Here, I will argue 
this view stems from Leibniz’s views on essences, and that essences limit what 
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conditions are relevant.  Essences play a key explanatory role, and Leibniz makes 
use of them when appealing to the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  As noted earlier, 
there is a close connection between Leibniz’s acceptance of the PSR and 
necessitarianism. 
Second, in response to concerns about what necessitarianism entails, Leibniz 
actively develops modal notions needed for philosophical and theological discussions 
of God’s creation of the world, the origin of sin, and the nature of moral 
responsibility.  At the core of Leibniz’s modal theory is the idea that necessary 
truths are those that could not be otherwise, or those whose denial entails a 
contradiction.  However, Leibniz will emphasize that whether a contradiction can be 
reached varies depending on how robust or extensive our concepts are when we 
consider how features of the world necessitate particular truths.  We thus see the 
origin of the suggestion that the modal status of propositions is relative to how we 
conceive of the world.  
Third, different ways of conceiving of subjects and predicates of propositions, 
lead to an examination of what the modally relevant ways of conceiving of objects 
and their properties are.  Early on, Leibniz identifies whatever is possible with what 
is imaginable or conceivable.  He also acknowledges, however, that conceivability is 
often too broad a method of conceiving of substances, for it does not track their 
natures.  Leibniz ultimately develops his per se modal account, which analyzes 
necessity in terms of essentiality.  What it means to say that that a proposition is 
necessary, for example, that it’s necessary that God exists, is to say that God 
essentially exists. Contingent truths are ones that predicate an accidental property 
of a subject; because existence is an accidental property of horses, horses 
contingently exist.  However, per se modality is not Leibniz’s primary notion during 
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this period, for, as noted above, Leibniz accepts that all truths are ultimately 
grounded in essences.  While existence is an accidental property of horses, it is 
necessitated by God’s essence and the combination of essences into worlds.  Leibniz 
thus views the conditions sufficient to guarantee that horses exist as necessitating 
the fact that horses exist (and thus calls existence a necessary accident).  This 
requires additional modal notions, such as all things considered necessity and 
hypothetical necessity. 
Leibniz employs the notion of hypothetical necessity to capture the necessary 
connection between antecedent and consequent.  This allows Leibniz to consider the 
modal status of propositions that are more complex than subject-predicate form, 
and further allows him to examine propositions that include distinct subject-terms, 
such as “If God exists, then Judas sins.”  There are texts where hypothetical 
necessity is entailment, so that hypothetical necessity is necessity of the 
consequence.  And once we understand it as such we can see that Leibniz is 
interested in exploring whether different kinds of necessity are transmitted through 
entailment.  He takes necessity all things (or sufficient reasons) considered to 
transmit, so that if it’s hypothetically necessary that B, given A, and it is impossible 
for A to be otherwise then it’s similarly impossible for B to be otherwise. So there is 
a type of necessity that is closed under entailment.  However, as we shall see, per se 
necessity is not closed under entailment.  Even if God’s existence entails the 
existence of this world, the fact that God’s existence is essential to God does not 
entail that the world’s existence is an essential feature of the world.  Much of our 
discussion will thus focus on the interaction between hypothetical necessity and per 
se necessity, and how these notions relate to Leibniz’s necessitarianism.  I will 
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emphasize that Leibniz develops these notions to help mitigate some of the 
counterintuitive aspects of necessitarianism, but not to reject all forms of it.   
4 Summary of Chapter 2 
In the 1670s Leibniz emphasizes the distinction between those properties that are 
essential, or result from intrinsic features of the nature of a substance, and those 
that result from additional external factors (which are per se contingent).  This 
would serve as an acceptable rendering of ‘contingency’ if Leibniz’s views of the 
essence of individual creatures didn’t change.  However, by the 1680s Leibniz 
became convinced that what makes an individual substance an individual is that it 
is a unique collection of properties, and that all a substance’s properties are required 
to distinguish it properly from all other possible substances.  The result is that the 
essences of individuals are the totality of all of their properties.  The necessary, and 
jointly sufficient, conditions to make a being Caesar are the totality of all of Caesar’s 
properties.  Per se modality is only a viable quasi-modal notion of contingency if it 
can distinguish necessary from contingent properties of substances, and Leibniz’s 
new account of individual natures renders the per se account incapable of fulfilling 
that task.   
Put another way, if the concept of an individual includes all of its necessary and 
jointly sufficient identity conditions, then denying any one of its features entails a 
contradiction.  The result here is that Caesar, for example, has all of his properties 
necessarily.  In Leibniz’s exchange with Arnauld he discusses this issue, and develops 
two accounts of how to distinguish necessary properties from contingent ones relative 
to the nature or essence of an individual.  On the one hand, he emphasizes those 
truths that have finite proofs compared to those that would require an analysis that 
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requires an infinite number of steps to complete the proofs.11  On the other hand, 
Leibniz distinguishes those truths that are based on God’s possible free decrees from 
those that are not.  This modal account takes advantage of the possible worlds 
framework introduced to explicate God’s decision process in creating the world.  
Although the infinite analysis account has received more discussion both by Leibniz 
and in the secondary literature, I argue that the possible free decrees account 
renders a better quasi-modal notion of de re modal properties of substances.  The 
evidence for this is bolstered within the necessitarian framework; neither the infinite 
analysis view nor the possible free decrees view offer a satisfying analysis of modality 
in general for Leibniz, but the possible free decrees view offers a superior quasi-
modal notion.  The main focus of this Chapter is thus Leibniz’s account of the 
necessary and contingent properties of individuals, or de re modal claims.  There are 
also texts during this period that re-affirm Leibniz’s necessitarianism, and there is 
thus an emphasis and defense of Leibniz’s necessitarianism in the wake of his infinite 
analysis and possible free decrees accounts.  We will also touch upon Leibniz’s 
developing views of hypothetical necessity, which do not play a prominent role in 
this period, but become very important in Leibniz’s later work, especially in the 
Theodicy. 
5 Summary of Chapter 3 
This Chapter focuses on Leibniz’s modal notions in his seminal work the 
Theodicy.  This text, published during Leibniz’s lifetime, is the culmination of his 
views of on God’s creation of the world, freedom, and the origins of evil.  This work 
                                         
11  This solution is emphasized more extensively in Leibniz’s works “On Contingency,” 
“Primary Truths,” and “On Freedom.” 
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also offers a variety of modal terminology, including absolute necessity, logical 
necessity, geometrical necessity, physical necessity, moral necessity, hypothetical 
necessity, blind necessity, and possible worlds.  However, this is also a challenging 
text, for my view, because it features aspects of Leibniz’s system that seem 
distinctively anti-necessitarian.  There are four such features I focus on: 
1. Leibniz develops an account of freedom that includes contingency as a requisite 
condition. 
2. Leibniz distances his view from those of notorious necessitarians, including 
Spinoza, Wycliffefe, Abelard, and Hobbes. 
3. Leibniz discusses “determining” reasons in place of “sufficient” reasons 12  and 
emphasizes that reasons incline without necessitating.  
4. Leibniz explicates “contingency” in terms of hypothetical and moral necessity, and 
contrasts these notions with real necessity.  Further he emphasizes that God’s will 
is merely morally necessary, which invites interpretation of God’s creation of the 
world as inevitable but not necessary.   
My approach to Leibniz’s modal notions in the Theodicy is two-fold: first, 
I will reconstruct a necessitarian argument from Leibniz’s commitments in the 
Theodicy.  Although Leibniz does not acknowledge that these views entail a 
necessitarian position directly, I will argue that he is cognizant of these results, 
particularly when divine and human freedom.  Secondly, I will examine each of the 
plausibly anti-necessitarian claims 1-4 to show that none of them require the 
rejection of the necessitarianism all things considered that I attribute to Leibniz.  
Moreover, his treatments of divine and human freedom, reasons as inclining without 
necessitation, his emphasis on moral necessity, and criticisms of contemporary 
                                         
12 Although not in all places, Leibniz continues to discuss sufficient reasons and the Principle 
of Sufficient reason in the Theodicy. 
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necessitarians can and should be interpreted according to notions of quasi-modality 
that do not require the rejection of necessity all things considered.  We will see that 
Leibniz extends his accounts of de re modality, including infinite analysis and 
possible free decrees, to accommodate notions of ‘contingency’ in divine and human 
action.  The outcome is a consistent reading of Leibniz as a necessitarian in what is 
arguably one of his least necessitarian-friendly works.  It gives us the opportunity to 
see the development and implementation of Leibniz’s quasi-modal notions to do 
important work in his philosophical system.   
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Chapter 1: Necessitarianism & 
Modality 1670-80 
Per se Modality, Hypothetical Necessity 
 
1 Introduction 
For our purposes, the key text in Leibniz’s “early period” is “Confession of a 
Philosopher”—hereafter “Confession”—which chronicles the development of Leibniz’s 
modal theory over the fruitful years he spent in Paris (1672-77). The “Confession” 
was first written in 1672, and later revised by Leibniz as early as 1677.13 These 
revisions include additions to the main text as well as comments made by Steno—a 
Danish scientist and theologian—and responses to those comments by Leibniz.  This 
grants us access to changes and clarifications Leibniz made to the main body of the 
text over time, in addition to the insights we gain from his specific responses to 
Steno’s concerns.  To trace the origin of necessitarianism in the 1672 version of the 
“Confession” we will turn to texts written in the year before Leibniz travelled to 
Paris.  First, we will look at his letter to Wedderkopf, which includes (although does 
not fully address) a statement of necessitarianism. There, Leibniz’s necessitarianism 
is closely tied to essences, and how essences condition what is and what could be. I 
                                         
13 The exact date of the revisions, and even whether they were all done at the same time is 
not clear.  They were clearly influenced by his interactions with Steno, which can be dated to 
1677.  See Sleigh’s editorial remarks in CP Preface.  
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will clarify just what essences were for Leibniz during this time, and what he thinks 
the relevant essences are for yielding truths about reality.   
Second, we will examine “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and 
Human Freedom,” where Leibniz begins to explicitly engage with some of the 
problematic features of necessitarianism, and introduces a first-pass account of 
modal notions. He develops the view that there are different ways of conceiving of 
subjects, and that modal language is sensitive to these considerations. Even though 
things could not have failed to be as they are (according to necessitarianism) we can 
conceive of subjects and their features in different ways, and these ways of 
conceiving of things render different modal truths. Leibniz’s texts also give us insight 
into which ways of conceiving of things are the legitimate ones for the purpose of 
modal theorizing.  That is, although we can conceive of things in different ways, 
Leibniz thinks that not all ways yield tenable modal notions.   
Finally we will examine the two versions of the “Confession,” particularly the 
later 1677 edition that includes Leibniz’s most developed account of per se necessity 
and possibility.  Per se necessity is a variant of Leibniz’s view that the denial of a 
necessary proposition entails a contradiction.  Leibniz identifies different ways a 
contradiction might arise, some internal to the subject of the proposition (as a result 
of its essence), and these are per se necessary, and others involving external factors 
(accidental features).  My aim is to show that while per se necessity allows Leibniz 
to deny that all truths are (per se) necessary he maintains that all truths are all 
things considered necessary.  This later suggestion, that Leibniz has multiple modal 
notions and that there is a robust version of necessitarianism that Leibniz accepts, is 
the topic of the final sections of the Chapter.  I defend the view that on at least one 
of his notions of necessity all truths are necessary.  I will draw on various texts from 
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this period, “Confession of a Philosopher,” “De Summa Rerum,” and Leibniz’s 
comments on Spinoza to evidence Leibniz’s continued affirmation of 
necessitarianism.  Together these works depict the development of Leibniz’s 
necessitarianism, which remains throughout this period and ultimately throughout 
Leibniz’s late works. 
2 Leibniz’s Letter to Wedderkopf 
Leibniz’s letter to Wedderkopf14 introduces key features of his early thought on 
modality, including a commitment to necessitariansim, the grounding of necessity in 
God’s nature and relation to the world, and the compatibility of necessity with 
God’s freedom.  However, Leibniz’s presentation of each of these issues is 
problematic in the letter, and recognizing and addressing these shortcomings is an 
important task of Leibniz’s work on modality in the 1670s.   
2.1 Leibniz’s Commitment to Necessitarianism 
In this letter Leibniz struggles with the origin of sin in God’s creation of the 
world.  In the process of explicating God’s role in the creation of the best world, 
Leibniz claims that because this world is necessarily the best and God cannot create 
something other than the best, God had to create this world.15  This leads Leibniz to 
the necessitarian conclusion that “…whatever has happened, is happening, or will 
happen is the best and, accordingly, necessary”.16 However, Leibniz does not clarify 
                                         
14 Magnus Wedderkopf (1637- 1721) was a professor of jurisprudence in Kiel.   
15 Although this assertion of necessitarianism is restricted to the created world, Leibniz 
claims truths about God’s features and essences are necessary, which exhausts the domains 
of truth for Leibniz. 
16 CP 3-4. 
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the notion of necessity that is at stake, leaving it an open question as to what the 
necessity the bestness of the world and God’s good actions amount to.  Early in the 
discussion he notes that what is necessary coincides with fate or what God decrees, 
but this does not clarify the nature of the necessity of God’s creative activities.  
Offering an analysis of necessity, and its varying meanings, is a task left for Leibniz’s 
subsequent work, the outcome of which will allow him to articulate and specify 
exactly what he is committing himself to when he claims that all truths are 
necessarily true.  However, in the letter Leibniz locates the source of God’s goodness 
and the bestness of the world in the natures or essences of God and creatures.   
What renders this world (necessarily) the best and God’s actions (necessarily) good 
are the fundamental natures of God and creatures.  The origin of possibility and 
necessity stems from the essential natures of beings, which we will turn to now. 
2.2 Divine Creation and Necessity 
God’s knowledge of essences—the natures of creatures—and different ways of 
combining those essences gives God knowledge of possibilities.  A comparison of 
alternative possibilities allows God to cognize which option is best. Because God is 
perfectly good and God always does what is best, God actualizes the best of these 
alternative possibilities. Subsequently “since God is the most perfect mind, it is 
impossible that he is not affected by the most perfect harmony and thus must bring 
about the best by the very ideality of things.”17  Possible existence is a function of 
coherent combinations of essence, and actual existence is a function of both what is 
best (or the most perfect harmony) and God’s perfect mind and will. God’s nature 
                                         
17 CP 3. 
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and the essences of creatures (and various combinations of them) are the ground for 
not just what’s true about the world, or actual, but what is necessarily true.18   
Leibniz’s reasoning on this point is guided by his commitment to the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason.  He explains, “everything must be reduced to some reason, which 
process cannot stop until it reaches a primary reason.”19  Primary reasons are ones 
that depend directly on essences themselves.  Leibniz is thus committed to the view 
that in investigating the reasons for the existence of the world, we must examine the 
sufficient reasons for the existence of this particular series of events (or the details of 
the world), and the reasons for those reasons until we see how those reasons are 
grounded in essences.  
What, therefore, is the ultimate basis of the divine will?  The divine intellect.  For 
God wills those things that he perceives to be the best and, likewise, the most 
harmonious; and selects them, so to speak, from the infinite number of all the 
possibles.  What, therefore, is the ultimate basis of the divine intellect?  The harmony 
of things.  And what is the ultimate basis of the harmony of things?  Nothing…this 
depends on the essence itself, i.e. the idea of things.  For essences of things are just 
like numbers, and they contain the very possibility of entities, which God does not 
bring about, as he does existence, since these very possibilities—or ideas of things—
coincide rather with God himself.20 
The primary reason for the existence of the world is its perfection, which depends 
upon the essences of things and their combinations (which determine how 
harmonious the world is).  The world’s perfection is not sufficient for its existence 
because God must know that it is the best of all worlds in order to select it.  And 
further, because creation is a free action and not merely a divine cognition, the 
                                         
18 Leibniz has still not clarified the sort of necessity he has in mind, but it seems to be the 
necessity of God’s existence and nature (whatever that may turn out to be).   
19 CP 3. 
20 CP 3. 
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world’s perfection and God’s understanding of its perfection are insufficient for this 
world’s existence.  Additionally, God’s will must be perfect and select what is best.  
Thus the jointly sufficient reasons for this world’s existence are its harmony that 
renders it the best of all possibles, God’s understanding of this world as the best, 
and God’s perfect will. 
Notice too that God’s understanding is not sufficient to explain the necessity of 
truths about the world.  The modal status of God’s knowledge is dependent on the 
content of that knowledge.  Just as the fact that God knows that 2 + 2 = 4 does not 
explain why this proposition true, the fact that God knows 2 + 2 = 4 does not 
explain why it is necessarily true.  For an explanation we must examine the nature 
of numbers and addition.  So it is necessary that God understand all truths, and all 
essences (in virtue of God’s necessary omniscience), but what renders or explains the 
necessity of God’s knowledge are the essences themselves.  The ideas of essences 
coincide with God’s understanding, so God’s essence grounds these truths insofar as 
God’s essence coincides with and includes the essences.  Appeal to God’s knowledge 
alone does not ground the necessity of what God knows, without further information 
about why God knows it (i.e. based on the nature of essences).21   
Just as Leibniz’s notion of necessity in this letter is not explored, his notion of 
possibility is elusive too.  On the one hand, Leibniz claims that God selects what to 
                                         
21 In the letter to Wedderkopf Leibniz notes, “For example, no reason can be given for the 
fact that the ratio of 2 to 4 is that of 4 to 8, not even from the divine will.  This depends on 
the essence itself, i.e., the idea of things.  For the essences of things are just like numbers, 
and they contain the very possibility of entities, which God does not bring about…” (CP 3).  
In “Middle Knowledge” Leibniz says, “According to true philosophers and St. Augustine, the 
reason God knows the actions of things, necessary or free, absolute or conditional, is his 
perfect cognition of the nature of these things…” (CP 130).  
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create among the possibles, or ideas of essences and their different coherent 
combinations.  This suggests that what is possible is exhausted by the vast array of 
different ways of combining essences.  Something is thus possible if it is among 
groups of essences arranged in coherent series of things or worlds.22  On the other 
hand, God’s perfect will necessitates the existence of the best, “it is impossible that 
[God] is not affected by the most perfect harmony,” and what is best is necessarily 
the best because it is a function of essential properties.23 If possibility is a matter of 
which combinations of essences are coherent, then any possible world other than the 
best is impossible because it does not cohere with God’s perfect nature.  In light of 
God’s perfect nature, the world could not be otherwise—another world could not 
have existed in its place—and in this sense non-actual worlds are not possible.  If we 
include the compatibility of all essences, including that of God, the only possibles 
are those that actually exist.  Thus there is a problem: there is a tension between 
the idea that possibles are those coherent essences that God considers creating, 
ultimately creating the best one, and the idea that what is possible is what God 
does, for the only world that is possible is the one that coheres with God’s perfect 
will.  Thus it is unclear whether possibility is a matter of creaturely essences and 
combinations thereof, or whether it includes the coherence with the divine essence as 
well.   
                                         
22 Leibniz says that  “essences of things…contain the very possibility of entities” and that “the 
harmony of things” is a function of essence (CP 3-5).  Different ways of combining entities is 
a matter of what Leibniz terms “compossibility”.  He does not mention compossibility here in 
the Letter, but the notion might very well be in the background when he discuses the 
compatibility of essences.  We will examine compossibility in depth in Chapter 2. 
23 CP 3. 
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2.3 Necessity and God’s Freedom 
The necessity of this world’s existence is seemingly at odds with God freely 
creating the world, for God is forced or compelled to create the best world, and 
compelled or forced action is not free.  In his letter to Wedderkopf Leibniz reassures 
us, however, that the necessity of God willing the best does not impede God’s 
freedom.  Immediately after Leibniz confirms that God “must bring about the best,” 
he acknowledges, “this does not detract from freedom.  For it is the highest form of 
freedom to be forced to the best by right reason; whoever desires another form of 
freedom is a fool.”24  If what necessitates the existence of the best world, or what 
compels God’s perfect will, is “right reason,” then the necessity does not interfere 
with God’s freedom.  According to this notion of freedom, the character of one’s will 
and one’s reasons to act necessitates free action. Thus, the existence of the world has 
“a necessity that takes nothing away from freedom because it takes nothing away 
from the will and the use of reason.”25 Leibniz is asserting a notion of freedom where 
free action is compatible not only with determinism, but also necessitation.  
To summarize, the key modal issues raised but not fully addressed in the Letter 
to Wedderkopf are: 
1. An affirmation of necessitarianism, although not a precisification of what 
“necessity” means. 
2. A tension between what is possible for the purposes of world creation and 
what is possible given God’s will and possible essences (with the former 
suggesting a plurality of possible worlds and the latter suggesting the actual 
world is the only possible one).   
                                         
24 CP 3. 
25 CP 5.   
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3. The affirmation that as long as the sufficient reasons for the existence of the 
world are God’s good will and God’s understanding of the perfection of the 
best world, then the fact that these reasons are necessary does not interfere 
with God’s freedom.  
There is one last important feature of this letter, which explains why there are a 
number of unanswered questions regarding Leibniz’s modal notions.  Leibniz’s focus 
is not directly on modality.  Instead, Leibniz’s aim is to discuss God’s role in and 
responsibility for the creation of sin.  Leibniz offers a solution to the problem of evil 
regarding sin, according to which sin is not absolutely evil, but only relative to the 
sinner. Leibniz argues that relative to God sins are not bad because they contribute 
to the greater good or harmony of the universe.  Leibniz arrives at this solution by 
noting that if sins were absolutely evil, then God would want to eliminate sin.  This 
is so because if an essentially good God wants to eliminate evil (including sin) but 
fails to, it must be either because God fails to be omnipotent, or because God fails 
to be omniscient.  But, God cannot fail to be either of these things, so sin must not 
be absolutely evil. This is not tantamount to the denial that sin is bad, for Leibniz 
thinks that sin is bad, but only relative to the sinner.  All things considered from 
God’s perspective, sin is not evil (it does not prevent this world from being the best) 
and thus relative to God sins are not evil.26 This approach to sin is important for our 
purposes because it is one Leibniz will ultimately apply to modal notions in his early 
work.  That is, Leibniz will come to think of necessity and possibility as relative in 
                                         
26 Leibniz also maintains this solution in the next text we will examine, “On the Omnipotence 
and Omniscience of God and Human Freedom”: “Now because the All-knowing God wills 
what he holds to be the best, and because he, as omnipotent being, does what he wills, it 
follows that sins must cease to exist, if he holds that to be best.  But because they have until 
now remained in the world, this is a sign that God holds this to be best, and therefore wants 
to have them remain, and therefore wants to have sins in the world” (CP 21).   
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some cases, where something is possible relative to some object or agent, but not all 
things considered. This relativity is a function of how we conceive of truth and its 
sufficient reasons.   We first see this approach in a fragment written at a similar 
time as the Letter, titled “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human 
Freedom,” to which we will turn now.    
3 On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of 
God and Human Freedom  
In an unfinished piece from 1671, “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God 
and Human Freedom,” Leibniz reflects on the origin of the claim that all truths are 
necessarily true. Leibniz’s initial strategy here is to further develop notions of 
necessity and possibility so that he can clarify the proper entailments of statements 
employing modal language, including the claim that all truths are necessarily true.27     
…what does this mean: ‘it must be’?...it means, it is not possible otherwise or cannot 
be otherwise.  What then does ‘possibility’ mean, or what does this mean: ‘can be’? 
What do we human beings understand by these words? They certainly mean 
something.28  
                                         
27 “Now the possibility of a thing which needs no explanation, as, for example, the number 
three, is manifest; but the possibility itself must be explained in such a case, thus, in itself be 
able to be explained” (CP 11). The other conclusions Leibniz worries about have to do with 
free will, the status of sin as evil, God as the author of sin, and whether the fact that events 
in the world are determined by previous events and the laws of nature warrants the 
conclusion that events in the world are inevitable no matter what we do.  God’s omniscience 
is related to arguments regarding necessity, and whether necessity is compatible with 
freedom, whereas God’s omnipotence is related to arguments regarding whether God is the 
author of and responsible for sin. The discussion of the latter issue is incomplete, and as a 
result how necessitarian arguments are related to issues of God’s power are not directly 
addressed.  Leibniz will take up this line of thought in the “Confession” and address questions 
about necessitarianism, and its different forms, head on. 
28 CP 11. 
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At the core of Leibniz’s modal theory is the idea that what is necessary couldn’t be 
otherwise.  The guide to what couldn’t be otherwise is whether the denial of 
something entails a contradiction.  Whether the denial of a proposition entails a 
contradiction depends on the content of the concepts we use when we analyze the 
proposition.  How we fill in the details of conceivability forms the basis of our modal 
theory, and also Leibniz’s treatment of modal language as relative to our conception 
of terms.   
Beyond providing an account of modal notions, Leibniz wants to establish that 
the argument from God’s omniscience fails to establish the necessitarian conclusion, 
if by “necessary” we mean “unimaginable otherwise.”29 Leibniz’s concern here, is 
whether God’s knowledge renders those truths necessary: “God sees all future states 
beforehand, sees that I shall be saved or damned; one of the two must be true, and 
so seen by him.  If he sees it beforehand, then nothing else is possible—it must 
happen; if it must happen, then it will happen…”30  
Leibniz formalizes the argument that leads to necessitarianism from God’s 
omniscience as follows: 
1. Whatever God foresees must happen or cannot not happen. 
2. God foresees that I shall be damned (saved). 
3. Therefore, my damnation (salvation) must happen or cannot not happen.31  
                                         
29 This serves as an example of a strategy whereby Leibniz fills in the details regarding 
concepts, in a way that shapes just which propositions are necessary and contingent.  Despite 
the title of his work, Leibniz does not directly consider God’s omnipotence as a ground for 
necessity, which is in part the topic in his subsequent work the “Confession.” 
30 CP 9. 
31 CP 11. 
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Call this the omniscience argument for necessitarianism. According to this 
argument, God’s knowledge of my damnation (or salvation) entails the truth of that 
outcome.  However, because God is omniscient, he knows all true propositions, and 
thus the conclusion generalizes beyond damnation and salvation.  On this reasoning, 
from God’s omniscience it follows that for any feature of the world, it must happen 
or cannot not happen.32   
Leibniz does not accept this argument, and examining exactly why he rejects it is 
instructive for his later discussion in the “Confession.” Leibniz offers two strategies 
for criticizing the argument.  The first strategy concedes that the conclusion follows 
from the premises, but claims that we need not accept the conclusion because the 
first premise, that whatever God foresees must happen, is false.  Leibniz offers a 
definition of ‘must’ or necessity that renders the premise false.  The second strategy 
is to argue that the inference from the premises to the conclusion is an invalid modal 
inference.  He claims that the modal status of the second premise is not strong 
enough to render the necessitarian conclusion.  I will turn to the first strategy first, 
because it exemplifies Leibniz’s sentiments about the importance of properly 
defining necessity.   
3.1 Strategy One: Possibility and Imaginability 
Leibniz’s attempt to defuse the omniscience argument for necessitarianism is 
instructive because it illustrates both what Leibniz takes to be at the problematic 
root of misleading claims about necessity, and how we should go about addressing 
                                         
32 This is in part bolstered by Leibniz’s notion of omniscience introduced in the letter to 
Wedderkopf.  There, Leibniz confirms that what God’s omniscience amounts to is the for any 
true proposition p, God knows p. 
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the main problem.  He identifies part of the problem as a failure to settle on an 
account of modal terms and phrases like ‘must’ and ‘cannot not be’: 
…one has to attribute all the darkness of the sciences to the manufactured or 
idiosyncratically used names of the philosophers, which they call terms.  So, in the 
end, there is no other way of getting away from this problem than this: rather than 
invoking such words, which only renew the debate, embitter spirits, recall old 
squabbles, give rise to countless, embarrassing, incomprehensible distinctions, a person 
must use the simples, most common and clearest expressions, which the poorest 
peasant, constrained to give his opinion on the subject, would use, and a person must 
try to determine whether in such a way it is possible to say something that would be 
sufficient to explain the issue that nevertheless cannot be contradicted by anybody.33  
…this sophism [viz., the omniscience argument for necessitarianism] is based on an 
ambiguity prevalent in all nations and languages, an ambiguity resulting from such 
common and seemingly clear terms as ‘must’ and ‘cannot be otherwise’ and the like.34  
The first passage in particular emphasizes that it is not just a matter of 
disambiguating modal language, but doing so in a way that does not introduce 
further complications.  Offering a rendering of modal terminology to capture what is 
true about everyday discourse is notable because it echoes Leibniz’s sentiment one 
year earlier in his introduction to his edition of Marius Nizolius’s “Anitbarbarus 
philosophicus”.35 In this introduction, Leibniz is concerned with how to appropriately 
introduce technical terminology when philosophizing.  He comments on the way 
philosophers should develop terms: “Our judgments are thus rendered more reliable 
by this process of analyzing technical terms into merely popular ones; hence a 
                                         
33 CP 9. 
34 CP 11. 
35 Marius Nizolius was an Italian philosopher whose “Antibarbarus philosophicus” (original 
1553) was edited by Leibniz in 1670.  “On the philosophical style of Nizolius,” Leibniz’s 
introduction for the new edition, explains that philosophical endeavors should seek to 
capture the meaning of the way terms are used in everyday discourse (with some caveats).  I 
understand his efforts in “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human 
Freedom” as carrying out this strategy as applied to modal terms.   
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perfect demonstration merely carries out such analysis to the ultimate and best-
known elements.”36  Leibniz thinks that the philosophical terms we develop should be 
beholden to commonsense terms.  However, this is not merely a suggestion about the 
words we use, but is a further suggestion about the meanings we capture and 
characterize in our philosophical endeavors.  “The greatest clarity is found in 
commonplace terminology with their popular usage retained.  There is always a 
certain obscurity in technical terms.”37 Philosophers are not reflecting on subject 
matters inherently foreign to common discourse. “Therefore philosophers often think 
just what other [people] think but with attention to what others have neglected.”38  
Leibniz continues: 
…it is obvious that the norm and measure for selecting terms should be the most 
compendious popularity or the most popular compendiousness.  Hence wherever 
equally compendious popular terms are available technical terms are to be avoided.  
This is indeed one of the fundamental rules of philosophical style, though violated 
frequently, especially by metaphysicians and dialecticians.39  
Leibniz acknowledges that capturing the common usage will not always be 
possible, for there are some investigations involving terms that “the common people 
either do not understand…or dismiss it from their attention…as happens most 
frequently in mathematics, mechanics and physics or the matters dealt with in these 
sciences are not directly obvious to the understanding or in frequent common use.”40  
These investigations contrast with metaphysical subjects, which “occur commonly in 
the utterances, writings, and toughest of uneducated people and are met with 
                                         
36 L 191. 
37 L 190; emphasis added. 
38 L 192. 
39 L 194. 
40 L 194-5. 
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frequently in everyday life.  Spurred on by this frequent demand, the people have as 
a result designated these subjects by special words that are familiar, very natural 
and economical.”41  The subject matter of metaphysics is not outside the scope of 
everyday discourse.  Given this, Leibniz’s terminology and use of that terminology 
should capture, to some extent, common-usage.  I take this to include issues of 
modal terminology.   
However, Leibniz identifies possibility with imaginability in order to defuse the 
omniscience argument for necessitarianism: 
Now we wish to apply such an explanation of possibility to our syllogism.  The first 
premise runs thus: “Whatever God foresees must happen or cannot not happen.”  If 
now our explanation of possibility is substituted for possibility, it runs thus:  
“Whatever God foresees, I cannot imagine not happening, that is, I cannot imagine it 
even if I want to.”  But in this formulation the sentence is false.  If I wish, I can 
imagine that not I but someone else is damned or saved; indeed I can imagine, if I 
wish, that there is neither heaven nor hell, which is also possible, for God can abolish 
them if he wishes.  Therefore, though it is true that what God foresees will happen, it 
is not permissible to say that what God foresees must happen.42   
Leibniz rejects the first premise of the necessitarian argument from God’s 
omniscience because God’s knowledge, though guaranteeing the truth of what he 
knows because of the factivity of knowledge, does not render all false propositions 
unimaginable.  We can deny that “Heaven exists” is necessary because I can imagine 
there not being a heaven.  It’s possible (because we can imagine there is a heaven), 
but not necessary (because we can also imagine there not being a heaven).43   
                                         
41 L 194. 
42 CP 13. 
43 An account of possibility in terms of imaginability does not analyze modal terms using 
non-modal terms, because “imaginable” is implicitly modal.  Thus Leibniz is not offering a 
reductive analysis of modality, but is clarifying the character of modal terms.    
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On this reading, the omniscience argument for necessitarianism fails because the 
first premise is false when we substitute a definition of possibility in terms of 
imaginability.  Leibniz’s clarifying modal language thus leads to a restating of the 
omniscience argument from necessitarianism: 
1. Whatever God foresees I cannot imagine not happening.  
2. God foresees that I shall be damned (saved). 
3. Therefore, I cannot imagine my damnation (salvation) not happening.   
Call this new argument the omniscience argument for necessitarianismUNIM.44 The 
necessitarian conclusion is now specified according to a particular brand of modal 
notion, namely, modality in terms of imaginability.  This renders the 
necessitarianUNIM claim: for any true proposition p, it is unimaginable that p is false.  
We can distinguish this flavor of necessitarianism—necessitarianism qua 
unimaginability (or necessitarianismUNIM)—as a specific brand of necessitarianism 
that treats possibility it terms of non-contradiction.  So Leibniz argues that we can 
reject necessitarianism interpreted as necessitarianismUNIM. 
This is a somewhat problematic strategy, however, because although Leibniz 
offers an analysis of possibility in terms of being consistent or not self-contradictory, 
he focuses on the cognitive aspect of imaginibility to reject the necessitarian 
conclusion from God’s omnipotence.  The difficulty is that if I can imagine 
something that is contradictory (it need not be explicitly contradictory), then this 
notion of possibility as imaginibility is at odds with his suggestion that what is 
                                         
44 The subscript indicates that necessity is understood in term in what is unimaginable 
otherwise (necessaryUNIM). 
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possible is not self-contradictory. What is imaginable is in part a function of 
cognitive ability, and sensitive to individual differences in capacity to imagine.  If an 
idea is not obviously contradictory I might very well imagine it successfully, and 
similarly I might not be able to imagine a 1000-sided polygon but chiliagons are 
nevertheless possible objects.  Moreover, we cannot just build in any assumptions 
into our conception of relevant terms, or else we might draw a stronger conclusion 
than we are entitled to.  For example, suppose I conceive of myself as a violin 
enthusiast, so much so that I do not have the capacity to imagine myself otherwise.  
According to necesssityUNIM it follows that it is impossible that I fail to be a violin 
enthusiast.  Leibniz cautions us against confusing reasons for thinking something is 
true with reasons for thinking something is necessarily true, and thus in determining 
which truths are necessary, we need to restrict ourselves to concepts that are 
themselves necessary.  Deriving a contradiction from some supposition should involve 
only those propositions that are necessary in some specified sense.45   
Leibniz needs some guarantee that imaginability tracks non-contradiction.  
Further, we might accuse Leibniz of failing to address the original worry, because he 
has asserted that my salvation is imaginable but failed to show it’s not self-
contradictory.  Accordingly, Leibniz rejects the omniscience argument for 
necessitarianismUNIM, but has not addressed necessitarianism qua non-contradiction. 
However, Leibniz offers a more restricted notion of imaginibility, closer to that of 
non-contradiction: 
                                         
45 Looking ahead to our discussion of the “Confession,” Leibniz will treat those features that 
are essential to a subject as those that are necessary.   
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How, then, does one show impossibility? Pay attention to the thoughts and speech of 
the people, and you will find out.  That is to say, they concern themselves with 
explaining a matter whose possibility is in doubt. If something is now clearly 
explainable, and conceivable in all its intricacy, then one holds it to be possible; if one 
comes upon something that is in itself confused and self-contradictory, then one hold it 
to be impossible…Thus something is possible that allows itself to be clearly explained 
without confusion and without contradiction.46  
Leibniz’s treatment of possibility in terms of non-contradiction does not require 
naively accepting that imaginability is always a good guide to what is possible.47  
This is underscored by Leibniz’s discussion of the ontological argument for the 
existence of God. 48  According to Leibniz, Descartes’s version of the argument 
presents God’s existence as following from the fact that God is essentially the most 
perfect being.  Leibniz notes that the problem with this argument is that Descartes 
has not yet show that the most perfect being is possible.  Leibniz articulates this 
complaint clearly in a 1676 passage: 
Descartes’ argument for the existence of a most perfect being assumed that a most 
perfect being can be understood, or, is possible…But the question is, if it is in our 
power to suppose such a being, or, if such a notion really exists, and can be 
understood clearly and distinctly without contradiction.  For opponents will say that 
such a notion of a most perfect being, or of a being that exist through its essence, is a 
chimaera.49   
                                         
46 CP 13; emphasis added. 
47 Leibniz does not always explicitly distinguish merely imagining something from clearly 
imagining it.   
48 Leibniz comments on both Spinozistic and Cartesian versions of the ontological argument.  
In his work around the time of “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human 
Freedom,” Leibniz accuses Descartes of begging the question in arguing for God’s existence.  
According to Leibniz, Descartes infers that it’s possible that God exists from the fact that 
God does exist, then uses the possibility of God’s existence to establish the actuality of his 
existence.  Leibniz is not satisfied that Descartes has established the possible existence of the 
most perfect being without begging the question.  See “An example of Demonstrations About 
the Nature of Corporeal Things, Drawn from Phenomena,” L 225.   
49 “Whatever Can Exist Exists,” DSR 103. 
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Leibniz thinks that the possibility of an idea or whether a proposition harbors a 
contradiction is not always obvious, even when that proposition is imaginable or 
conceivable in some broad sense.  The most perfect being might seem conceivable, 
but that does not mean that it is possible, or not contradictory. This is because we 
can imagine and suppose things that entail contradictions.  Some propositions 
initially seem plausible such as “there is a greatest number”, but turn out to be 
contradictory.50  In fact, reductio ad absurdum argumentation proceeds by starting 
with some supposition or hypothesis that is conceivable (in some broad sense), and 
showing that it nevertheless entails a contradiction.  This is why, when Leibniz offers 
an account of possibility in “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and 
Human Freedom,” he adds the qualification that conceivability must be understood 
in terms of being clearly explained and free from (even implicit) contradiction. So 
although in “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human Freedom” 
Leibniz speaks of possibility in terms of imaginability, he develops imaginability 
using a technical notion of “conceivable” that involves vetting a proposition through 
analysis and explanation to ensure that neither it nor its denial entails a 
contradiction.  In fact Leibniz employs this notion too when he affirms that we must 
understand possibility in terms of the rational grounds:  
But if you want to prove that something that neither is nor was can be or cannot be, 
then you employ not feeling but rather distinct rational grounds.  Now if “possibility,” 
or “can be,” is something that is demonstrable by rational grounds, then it is 
something that ought to be so explained.  For every demonstration that is not based 
on a perception or an experience, but rather illuminates even him who does not have 
                                         
50 See Leibniz’s treatment of this example in “On Mind, the Universe and God,” P 3. 
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experience of the matter by means of rational grounds, requires an explanation either 
of what one wants to demonstrate or how one wants to demonstrate it or both.51  
This is a revisionary picture of imaginability as it is used in everyday discourse.  
Imagining, in the modally relevant sense, is not a matter of picturing a certain set of 
circumstances, but cognizing the core features of the relevant ideas and investigating 
the ground for their truth.  However, if Leibniz presents a stricter notion of 
imaginability to ground possibility, he does not do enough to refute the omniscience 
argument for necessitarianismUNIM, for he has not established that the denial of all 
truths fail to entail contradictions.  Perhaps Leibniz is really trying to employ a 
broad notion of imaginability to address the omniscience argument for 
necessitarianism because he takes that to be the common notion when non-
philosophers use modal terminology.  But then necessitarianism remains 
unaddressed, since, for example, Leibniz has only given us reason to think we can 
imagine (in the broader sense) that there is no heaven, but he has not shown that 
this is non-contradictory, or imaginable in the restricted sense.   
So Leibniz offers reasons to reject the omniscience argument from 
necessitarianismUNIM, but does so using modal notions of imaginability that are not 
strict enough by his own lights.  Leibniz needs to clarify what the modal constraints 
are for how we conceive of or imagine the relevant concepts.  
3.2 Strategy Two: Necessity of the Consequence 
However, Leibniz offers a second argument against the omniscience argument for 
necessitarianism.52  Here, he does not attack the conclusion of the argument, but 
                                         
51  CP 11. 
52 CP 11-17. 
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instead the inference to the conclusion.  When Leibniz says that he must be saved, 
based on God’s knowledge that he will be saved, what he means is that it is true he 
will be saved or inevitable. However, Leibniz notes that sometimes we (incorrectly) 
conclude that the “must” is a modal one relating to non-contradiction.  If we 
interpret the first premise of the argument for God’s omniscience as employing the 
‘must’ of future contingent truth, then it reads, “What is foreseen by God, must 
happen” (where ‘must happen’ means “will happen”).  Leibniz notes that while it is 
true that what God foresees will happen, it is not true that God’s foreseeing some 
event necessitates it (in the sense that its denial entails a contradiction).53 
Here, Leibniz’s notion of hypothetical necessity is important.  Hypothetical 
necessity governs the connection between the antecedent and consequent of the 
conditional, and indicates whether the connection between the two is necessary, or 
impossible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent false.54 He accepts that 
it is hypothetically necessary that I will be saved, if God knows I will be saved.  
That is, 
                                         
53 Leibniz also notes that it does not follow that because something is true, it will occur no 
matter what I do.  Leibniz is committed to the view that truths are fixed by antecedent 
events, and if those events include my actions then behaving otherwise would prevent the 
true outcome. “If God has foreseen the end, he has also foreseen the means; if he knows that 
I shall be saved, then he also knows that I live a God-fearing life; if I am foreseen to be 
damned, then I am foreseen to sin.  So, do I then have to sin?  No, you sin and will sin, but 
you do not have to sin” (CP 11).  
54  Traditionally this is known as necessity of the consequence, and can be formally 
represented as, B is hypothetically necessary given A = ☐(A ⊃ B).  Hypothetical necessity is 
informed by Leibniz’s treatment of conditionals, and his work on legal supposition in the 
1665. Leibniz wrote “De Conditionibus” in 1665, which was later included in “Specimin Juris” 
in 1669 (A VI.i 367).   
   
 
 
39 
 
 (If God knows that I will be saved, then I will be saved).55 
The necessity of the proposition, “I will be saved,” is dependent upon the necessity of 
the proposition, “God knows that I will be saved.”  Without evidence that it is 
necessary that God knows that I will be saved, I cannot conclude that it is necessary 
that I will be saved.  The fallacious inference that Leibniz is identifying is: 
1.  (If God knows that I will be saved, then I will be saved). 
2. God knows that I will be saved. 
3. Therefore, (I will be saved.)   
Leibniz’s point is that from the considerations presented to us, I can at best 
conclude that I will be saved, and not that necessarily that I will be saved.  This 
naturally leads to the question of the modal status of the claim that God knows that 
I will be saved.  Perhaps Leibniz would here argue that it is not necessary that God 
knows I will be saved, because it is not necessaryUNIM that God knows I will be 
saved.  I can imagine God knowing that I will not be saved, because, for example, I 
can imagine sinning without repenting.  On the other hand, perhaps Leibniz thinks 
it is sufficient to show that the inference is fallacious by showing that the modal 
status of the consequent depends on the modal status of the antecedent, which is 
still open for debate. As long as we do not have a demonstration of the modal status 
of the claim that God knows I will be saved, the inference does not succeed.  As we 
                                         
55 Leibniz offers similar examples of hypothetical necessity in texts from this period (although 
from 1677, roughly 6 years later): “Hypothetical necessity is when a thing can be understood 
to be otherwise in itself, but per accidens, because of other things already presupposed 
outside itself it is necessarily such and such.  For example: it was necessary for Judas to sin, 
supposing that God foresaw it…” (“Conversation with Steno Concerning Freedom,” CP 119).   
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shall see, in the Confession the necessity of God’s knowledge will depend on the 
necessary features of the content of that knowledge.  Because the content of God’s 
knowledge could not be otherwise, God could not have failed to know that Judas 
sinned, and thus it will follow from God’s omniscience plus the modal status of the 
proposition known that it is necessary that Judas sinned.  But the important point 
will be that this derives from the essences or natures of things, and not God’s 
knowledge alone.56  
So there are two fallacious sources of the claim that all truths are necessarily true 
from the argument from God’s omniscience.  The second one is that we use the term 
‘must’ to describe events with fixed future truth-values. In this case it’s true that 
what God foresees happening will happen, but from this premise it does not follow 
that what God foresees must (in a modal sense) happen. Thus sometimes we use 
‘must’ non-modally and we have to take care not to confuse truth with necessary 
truth.  Leibniz’s first diagnosis is that we might accept the conclusion that all truths 
are necessary if we fail to appreciate that what we mean is that all truths are 
unimaginable otherwise.  Because we can imagine those things that do, in fact, 
happen as not happening, they are not necessary, and so we should reject both the 
premise that claims that what God foresees is unimaginable otherwise, and the 
                                         
56 This point is not novel to Leibniz.  For example, Boethius distinguishes what follows from 
God’s knowledge from that which is non-hypothetically necessary  “For that which is known 
cannot indeed be otherwise than as it is known to be, and yet this fact by not means carries 
with it that other simple necessity.  For the former necessity is not imposed by the thing’s 
own proper nature, but by the addition of a condition.  No necessity compels one who is 
voluntarily walking to go forward, although it is necessary for him to go forward and the 
moment of walking.  In the same way, then, if Providence sees anything as present that must 
necessarily be, though it is bound by no necessity of nature.” (Boethius 2008, V.vi)  Boethius 
will go on to suggest that God’s knowledge is, in fact, contingent, whereas Leibniz’s 
necessitarianism leads him to claims that there is a sense in which it is not.   
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conclusion that my damnation is unimaginable otherwise.  Thus if we properly 
clarify our modal notions, we can undermine the omniscience argument for 
necessitarianism.   
Leibniz also returns to his discussion of the origin of sin from the letter to 
Wedderkopf, and once again touches on some of the points that lead him to the 
necessitarian conclusion in that letter—that is, the fact that God is the causal basis 
of “the whole chain of causes back to the beginning of the world.”57 However, the “On 
the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human Freedom” fragment ends 
before Leibniz can address the necessitarian claim stemming from the necessity of 
God’s good will as the ground of the existence of the world—a topic he takes up in 
the Confession.  Moreover, Leibniz does not explain whether he accepts or rejects 
the necessitarian conclusion, which is something to which he devotes a large portion 
of the Confession.   
4 The Confession of a Philosopher 
The Confession was first written in 1672-3, then later revised by Leibniz as early 
as 1677.58   The main difference between the two versions (excluding marginalia) is 
the addition of per se modal terminology in the second version, although I will argue 
that a less-refined version of per se necessity is present in the first edition. 
Nonetheless, Leibniz’s treatment of necessitarianism clearly evolves (as he identifies 
different strains of necessitarianism) along with his understanding and 
acknowledgement of the problematic entailments of various types of 
                                         
57 CP 21. 
58 The exact date of the revisions, and even whether they were all done at the same time is 
not clear.  They were clearly influenced by his interactions with Steno, which can be dated to 
1677.  See CP Preface. 
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necessitarianism—which multiply in the second version. Between the first and 
second versions, Leibniz acknowledges an increasing number of threats from various 
necessitarian views and develops responses to address the threats.   
4.1 First Version (1672) 
In the Confession Leibniz seemingly commits himself to the necessitarian 
conclusion that all truths are necessarily true.  If all truths follow from God’s 
existence, and God necessarily exists, then all truths about the world  are 
necessarily true.  Leibniz re-affirms the claim that necessary propositions are those 
whose denial entails a contradiction: 
I will designate that as necessary, the opposite of which implies a contradiction or 
cannot be clearly conceived.59  
Much like in “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human Freedom,” 
Leibniz is treating necessity and possibility in terms of non-contradiction and 
conceivability.  Those truths that are contingent can be consistently conceived in 
affirming or denying the predicate of the subject.  A truth is necessary if and only if 
its denial implies a contradiction.  He subsequently presents a new necessitarian 
argument, which we can understand by employing his notion of necessity qua non-
contradiction (necessityNC): 
1. The existence of God is necessary. 
2. The series of things and all its details follows from the existence of God. 
3.  Whatever follows from something necessary is itself necessary. 
                                         
59 CP 55. 
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4.  Therefore, the series of things and all its details are necessary.60  
I’ll call this the necessitarianNC argument. 
Given Leibniz’s philosophical commitments, he has reason to accept each of the 
premises, and the argument is valid.  According to Leibniz, premise 1 is verified by 
his ontological argument for the existence of God.  God—considered either as a 
necessary being or a perfect being—exists necessarily because denying existence is 
truly predicated of God contradicts God’s nature.61  God exists necessarily because 
denying his existence entails a contradiction. 
Premise 2 results in part from Leibniz’s examination of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason in the Confession.  He begins by focusing on the PSR applied to existence 
claims.62   
Whatever exists, at any rate, will have all the requisites for existing; however, all the 
requisites for existing taken together at the same time are the sufficient reason for 
existing.  Therefore, whatever exists has a sufficient reason for existing.63  
What renders some proposition about existence true is that all of the reasons or 
requisites for the existence of the being in question obtain.  “Chloe exists” is true 
because the jointly sufficient conditions for my existence came to be.  The 
connection between the totality of reasons and the existence of a being is very 
strong, for if those reasons obtain the being is guaranteed to exist. According to the 
necessitarian argument, God’s existence is necessary for the existence of the 
particular world: 
                                         
60 CP 55. 
61  For further discussions of Leibniz’s treatment of the ontological argument for God’s 
existence, see Griffin 2013, and Blumenfeld 1995. 
62 Congruent with his approach in the letter to Wedderkopf.   
63 CP 34. 
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Take away or change the series of things, and the ultimate ground of things, that is, 
God, will be done away with or changed.  It is not more possible that from the same 
ground—and a ground sufficient and entire, such as God is with respect to the 
universe—there should result opposed consequences, that is, that diverse things should 
follow from the same thing, than it is possible that the same thing should be different 
from itself.64   
According to Leibniz’s view, the sufficient reason (the totality of requisites) for 
the existence of the world are all grounded in God, whose essence and existence are 
both necessary.65  What’s more, the version of the PSR that Leibniz accepts seems 
to be implicitly modal: it is necessary that if the totality of reasons for the existence 
of some being X obtains, then that being exists.66  When put together with God’s 
necessary existence, the result is that this world exists necessarily.  Thus premise 2 
(“The series of things and all its details follows from the existence of God”) stems 
from Leibniz’s claim that the sufficient reasons for the existence and features of the 
world are contained in God.  When the sufficient reasons for some result are 
themselves necessary, the result is also necessary (premise 3).  What this reasoning 
reveals is that Leibniz thinks of the “follows from” relation as at least as strong as 
strict implication.67 The connection between the sufficient reasons (or God) and the 
                                         
64 CP 45. 
65 Although Leibniz has not clarified what ‘necessary’ means, beyond that the denial of what 
is necessary implies a contradiction.   
66 Again, however, Leibniz has not told us more about what sort of necessity this is.   
67 There is some evidence that Leibniz does not automatically assume that all conditionals 
are cases of strict implication.  In his “Specimen Juris” he examines various conditionals 
including conditional rights and promises, see A VI.i 367.  However, it seems that in the 
“Confession” Leibniz takes the relevant conditionals to involve strict implication. This is 
suggested both by the reasoning below, and from Leibniz’s 1671-2 text “On the 
Demonstration of Primary Propositions”.  There, in offering a demonstration of the PSR, 
Leibniz argues that the sum of sufficient requisites constitute a sufficient reason for a specific 
outcome, and that the only way that outcome could fail to occurs is if one of those requisites 
failed to occur.  I take it that if the only way the conclusion could fail to follow is if the 
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world is so strong that a difference in some feature of the world would require a 
change in God. Given all the features of God, this world must exist exactly as it 
does, and were anything about this world different (including its existence), God 
would have to be different, but God can’t be different; thus, all truths about the 
world are just as necessary as truths about God.  If Leibniz accepts the definition of 
necessity in terms of that which whose denial entails a contradiction, it follows that 
all true propositions are necessarily true and all false propositions are necessarily 
false (for the denial of any truth will contradict either God’s will, God’s 
understanding of possibilities, or truths about creaturely essences.  We can thus 
further shorten the necessitarianNC argument: 
1. Necessarily, God exists 
2. Necessarily, if God exists, then this series of events exists.68 
3. Therefore, necessarily this series of events exists. 
In the original version of the Confession Leibniz concedes, “it follows that sins are 
necessary.  Since the existence of God is necessary and sins are a consequence of the 
existence of God, i.e., of the ideas of things, even sin will be necessary.”69 The first 
problem is that not only are sins necessary, but all features of the world are 
necessary:  
                                                                                                                   
antecedent fails to be true, then the connection is one of strict implication (the connection 
could not fail). (“On the Demonstration of Primary Propositions,” A VI.ii 483, translated in 
Dascal 1987, 151).  
68 We derive this premise from premises 2 and 3 of the previous version of the argument 
stating that the existence of this series follows from God’s existence and further that this 
sort of “following from” is best represented as a necessary hypothetical statement. 
69 CP 49.   
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...you would conclude that all things are necessary, even that I am speaking and you 
are listening, for these situations also are included in the series of things, and 
accordingly, you would conclude that contingency is removed from the nature of 
things, contrary to the manner of speaking accepted by all mankind.70   
Nonetheless, this conclusion, that sins and the precise series of things are all 
necessary “must not be conceded, for it is contrary to the use of language.”71  Much 
like in “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human Freedom,” Leibniz 
identifies the source of the (seemingly) problematic necessitarian conclusion to be 
terminological, due to 
a twisted sense of words.  From this source arises the labyrinth from which one cannot 
escape; from this source arises the calamity of our estate because the languages of all 
people have twisted into different meanings the words for necessity, possibility, and, 
likewise, impossibility, will, author, and others of this kind by a certain universal 
sophistry.72  
Ambiguous terminology can be cleared up by defining terms, but not any definitions 
will do, for Leibniz wants to rescue the fact that we do not describe  sin and other 
features of the world as ‘necessary’.  Leibniz notes that God’s existence is necessary, 
but we do not speak of the existence of the world as necessary, so we need some way 
to distinguish the modality of the proposition “God exists” from that of “this world 
exists.”   
Leibniz seeks to make room amongst the necessary propositions for contingent 
propositions (or at least develop an account of this apparent distinction).  
Paradigmatic necessary truths include “three threes is nine” and “God exists”, in 
contrast with paradigmatically contingent truths  “This world exists,” “Judas sins” 
                                         
70 CP 49. 
71 CP 49; emphasis added. 
72 CP 51. 
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and “Leibniz speaks”.  According to Leibniz’s definition of modality in terms of non-
contradiction, necessary truths are those whose opposite implies a contradiction, 
while the contraries of contingent truths do not entail a contradiction.  This 
suggestion is consistent with his suggestion in “On the Omnipotence and 
Omniscience of God and Human Freedom,” where possibility is understood in terms 
of not entailing a contradiction when clearly and distinctly perceived.   
In the Confession, however, Leibniz connects how we conceive of things with the 
concepts of those things “in themselves”: 
Now I have defined the necessary as something whose contrary cannot be conceived; 
therefore, the necessity and impossibility of things are to be sought in the ideas of 
those very things themselves, not outside those things.  It is to be sought by 
examining whether they can be conceived or whether instead they imply a 
contradiction.73 
If we treat beings as having concepts, then not implying a contradiction is a matter 
of having a coherent concept, and subsequently being a candidate for possible 
existence.  Thus Leibniz continues: 
Therefore if the essence of a thing can be conceived, provided that it is conceived 
clearly and distinctly (e.g., a species of animal with an uneven number of feet, also a 
species of immortal beast), then it must already be held to be possible, and its 
contrary will not be necessary, even if its existence may be contrary to the harmony of 
things and the existence of God, and consequently it never will actually exist, but will 
remain per accidens impossible.  Hence all those who call impossible...whatever neither 
was nor is nor will be are mistaken.74 
Possible things are beings with coherent concepts or natures; an incoherent nature 
makes it impossible for such a creature to exist.  Propositions attributing existence 
to impossible beings are necessarily false.  Propositions attributing existence to 
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possible beings can be contingent or necessary.  Necessary existential propositions 
result when their denial contradicts the nature of the subject in question.75 We can 
generalize beyond existence claims, as Leibniz does in the above passage, noting that 
a species of animal with an uneven number of feet is possible but not actual, and 
thus contingently false.  A clear and distinct understanding of the concept “animal” 
is consistent with both the concept of odd-footedness and the concept of even-
footedness. Implying a contradiction is something we determine by analyzing 
concepts embedded in propositions.  We can analyze the concept of the subject term 
and predicate term of a proposition to determine whether denying that predicate of 
a subject contradicts those features of concepts.  In the above passage, Leibniz 
claims that animal species with an odd-number of feet are possible even though they 
may be contrary to the harmony of things and the existence of God.  Leibniz 
describes those things that are not part of the best of all worlds, and whose 
existence is thus inconsistent with God’s will as impossible per accidens.   
How does this help with the necessitarianNC  argument? God’s understanding—
grounded in the essences of things—plus God’s will are the sufficient reason—the 
sum total of reasons—that determine that this world (or “series of things”) exists.  
Leibniz notes that if anything were different in the series of things, it would have to 
be reflected in a difference in the collection of sufficient reasons.  This totality of 
reasons necessitates every feature of the world.  If we base our modal distinctions on 
all of these sufficient reasons, then we get two categories of propositions (or of 
beings), necessarily true and necessarily false.  A species of immortal beast is 
                                         
75 The sole necessary existential proposition is “God exists,” while contingent existential 
propositions do not imply a contradiction, nor does their contrary. 
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impossible if we take into consideration which world is the best, and that God wills 
the best necessarily (for such beasts are sadly not part of the best of all worlds).  In 
this sense, it is necessarily false that there are species of immortal beasts, or 
necessarily true that immortal beasts do not exist.   
However, Leibniz wants to offer an account of necessity and contingency that 
renders these sorts of propositions contingent, and his suggestion is that if we 
restrict which reasons we can consider in determining whether a contradiction is 
entailed, then we might be able to offer a greater variety of modal categories.  That 
is, which reasons, in the totally of reasons, do the determining will make a difference 
for Leibniz. 
I will designate that as necessary, the opposite of which implies a contradiction or 
cannot be clearly conceived.  Thus it is necessary that three threes are nine, but it is 
not necessary that I speak or sin.  For I can be conceived to be myself even if I am not 
conceived as speaking, but three threes which are conceived not to be nine are three 
threes which are not three threes, which implies a contradiction, and a calculation, i.e., 
a reduction of both terms in the definition to unities, shows it.  Those things are 
contingent that are not necessary; those are possible whose non-existence is not 
necessary.  Those are impossible that are not possible, or more briefly: the possible is 
what can be conceived, that is (in order that the word can not occur in the definition 
of possible), what is conceived clearly by an attentive mind; the impossible what is not 
possible; the necessary that whose opposite is impossible; the contingent that whose 
opposite is possible.76  
Recall from Leibniz’s discussion of sin in his letter to Wedderkopf the view that sins 
are evil only relative to the sinners but not absolutely evil because they fail to be 
evil relative to God.  Here, Leibniz is making a similar distinction, where something 
can be truly predicated of a subject, and is necessary, depending on how we limit 
which features we include in the consideration of the truth of the proposition.  Thus 
“Horses exist” is contingently true relative to horses, because it can be clearly 
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conceived that the non-existence of horses is possible.  Relative to the concept horse, 
“horses exist” is contingent.  However, if we include considerations beyond the 
concept horse, including that horses are part of the best of all worlds, and God must 
create the best world, denying that horses exist does entail a contradiction, 
ultimately with God’s nature.  When everything is considered, the non-existence of 
horses is not possible, but relative to the notion horse non-existence is possible. 
Here, I want to draw upon terminology that Samuel Newlands introduces in “The 
Harmony of Spinoza and Leibniz.”77 Newlands argues that for Spinoza and Leibniz, 
“the modality of objects...can vary relative to how those objects are conceived.”78  
The concept of the subject of a proposition governs how we are conceiving of the 
being in question.  That concept determines the range of reasons that ground truths 
about the subject.  These reasons also influence whether we can derive a 
contradiction when trying to determine whether a proposition is possibly but not 
necessarily true. On the view that Leibniz is presenting, if we exclude considerations 
of which world is the best and of the fact that God wills what’s best, supposing 
three threes is not nine does yield a contradiction, while conceiving of myself not 
                                         
77 Newlands 2010. 
78 Newlands 2010, 64.  Newlands’ discussion is in terms of the modal properties of beings or 
objects, whereas I am phrasing my discussion in terms of the modal properties of 
propositions and how the subjects and predicates are conceptually represented therein.  I 
think that the suggestion that modal properties vary depending on how we conceive of he 
subject of a proposition is the right way to understand Leibniz’s development in the 
“Confession.”  Newlands describes this position as “anti-essentialist” but I am reluctant to 
attribute this view to Leibniz.  Leibniz is an anit-essentialist insofar as he claims that modal 
truths depend upon how we conceive of a subject (which is in line with Quine’s sentiment in 
“From a Logical Point of View”). However Leibniz does this while affirming that there are 
essences, and those essences are modally relevant (which is contra Quine’s view).   
   
 
 
51 
 
speaking does not entail a contradiction.79 I like the all things considered terminology 
because ‘all’ can be contextually influenced to have a wider or narrower scope.  If I 
say that “all the chocolate is gone” the ‘all’ can be restricted to the original candy 
bar I purchased, or all of the chocolate on my person, or all the chocolate at my 
home, or all the chocolate in Ann Arbor etc.  Similarly, when considering the 
sufficient reasons that necessitate “horses exist”, ‘all’ the things I consider when 
determining whether this truth is necessary can be restricted to features of the 
concept “horse”.  If all the features of “horse” are insufficient to guarantee the truth 
of “horses exist” then (as long as the notion of a horse is not itself contradictory) this 
truth fails to be necessary in a restricted sense.80 So sometimes the ‘all’ in ‘all things 
considered’ is restricted to a particular subset of features of the relevant concept. 
When I claim that Leibniz is a necessitarian “all things considered” I mean “all” in 
the broadest sense, including the totality of reasons sufficient to render a truth.  
However, as we will see, Leibniz develops modal terminology that tracks subsets of 
the sufficient reasons for a truth, narrowing the scope of ‘all’ according to particular 
conceptions of creatures in the world.  These restricted notions of necessity are not 
closed under entailment, so that even if one proposition necessary follows from 
another, it does not mean that the modal status of the first proposition transfers to 
the second proposition.  If Leibniz can articulate a coherent notion of restricted 
necessity, then he can block the central inference in the necessitarianNC argument.   
                                         
79 Thus Leibniz says “…it is necessary that three threes are nine, but it is not necessary that I 
speak or sin.  For I can be conceived to be myself even if I am not conceived as speaking, but 
three threes which are conceived not to be nine are three threes which are not three threes, 
which implies a contradiction...” (CP 55).  
80 Newlands himself does not focus on essences but instead characterizes the per se features 
of beings as excluding information about other worlds.   
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Thus Leibniz says: 
I reply [to the necessitarian argument] that it is false that whatever follows from 
something necessary is itself necessary.  Certainly it is evident that nothing follows 
from truths except what is true; nevertheless, since a particular proposition can follow 
from purely universal propositions…why not something contingent from something 
necessary?81   
Leibniz explains that he can define necessity to block the inference that what follows 
from something necessary is itself necessary, 
Now I have defined the necessary as something whose contrary cannot be conceived; 
therefore the necessity and impossibility of things are to be sought in the ideas of 
those very things themselves, not outside those things.82   
Returning to the necessitarianNC argument: 
1. Necessarily, God exists. 
2. Necessarily, if God exists, then this series of events exists.83 
3. Therefore, necessarily this series of events exists. 
On the version of all things considered necessity, this argument goes through.  
However, suppose we restrict considerations to the concept of the subject of the 
proposition and its content.  On this restricted notion what “necessity” means is that 
a truth is guaranteed by what is contained in the concept of the subject.  For 
example, we can conceive of God as the most perfect conceivable being.  Leibniz 
thinks that denying God’s existence entails a contradiction with the notion of being 
                                         
81 CP 55-57. 
82 CP 57. 
83 We derive this premise from premises 2 and 3 of the previous version of the argument 
stating that the existence of this series follows from God’s existence and further that this 
sort of “following from” is best represented as a necessary hypothetical statement. 
   
 
 
53 
 
the most perfect being, so “God exists” is necessary.  However, even if God’s 
existence does entail the existence of this series of events, it does not guarantee that 
the reasons for the world existing are contained within the notion of the world.   So 
the above inference is invalid, when we restrict our notion of modality, because 
existence following from the concept of the world is not entailed by God’s existence 
following from the concept of God.  In that way Leibniz rejects the conclusion of the 
argument, on the restricted notion of necessity, because although the existence of the 
world follows from the existence of God, its existence does not follow from its 
concept alone.  Thus the inference is invalid when we employ the restricted notion of 
necessity. 
The main challenge that Leibniz faces in spelling out this view is to offer a 
principled or non ad hoc means of determining which considerations to exclude and 
which to include in determining whether the contrary of a proposition entails a 
contradiction. Leibniz needs to develop his theory of concepts relevant for modal 
theorizing.  That is, if we can consider different sets of reasons when evaluating the 
ground of the truth of some proposition, what guides how we conceive of some 
subject?  What guides the subset of reasons we consider in making our modal 
determinations?  Leibniz makes it clear that he wants to exclude God’s good will, 
and which world is best, however in the first version of the “Confession,” he does not 
offer an explanation of why those factors are excluded.  Leibniz supplies such a 
theory in his second version of the “Confession”, through per se modality. 
4.2 Second Version (1677?) 
The relevant additions to the later version of the “Confession” are, first the 
systematic introduction of the term ‘per se’ to Leibniz’s description of the sort of 
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necessity and contingency that follows if we restrict which considerations must come 
into play when considering what entails a contradiction.  I will treat this as a 
precisification of Leibniz’s solution to the earlier view, and I will try to develop this 
view as an account of per se properties as essential properties.   
Leibniz can concede that all truths are necessaryNC,84 but we can nevertheless 
distinguish truths according to what makes them necessary.  Some are necessitated 
merely by features internal to the essence of the subject, while others require 
additional factors external to the essence to guarantee truths (these fail to be per se 
necessary and are instead necessary per accidens).85   I think the most salient 
suggestion for a non ad-hoc way to guide how we conceive of objects is to 
extrapolate from Leibniz’s example of God.  “God exists” is per se necessary because 
all of the sufficient reasons for God’s existence (according to Leibniz) are internal to 
God’s essence.  The fact that Leibniz, in the first version, already contrasts this with 
impossibility per accidens seems to suggest that he is already considering essences to 
be a principled way to guide how we conceive of the subject of propositions when 
trying to determine its modal properties.  So, moving forward to the second version 
of the “Confession”, the challenge for Leibniz is, given that our modal judgments 
vary according to how we conceive of the subject of the proposition in question, to 
spell out a non-ad hoc principle of how we ought to conceive of beings when making 
modal judgments. 
Per se modality is born out of Leibniz’s recommendation that we conceive of 
substances in terms of their essences.  Essences spell out features that could not be 
                                         
84 This is not Leibniz’s own terminology; I have added this for clarity. 
85 Per se contingency is equivalent to per accidens possibility; see CP 57. 
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otherwise without destroying the nature of the object. On this view “necessary” is 
equated with “essential”.86  Those propositions that are necessary are those that 
predicate an essential feature to a subject.  Contingent truths are those that 
predicate an accidental property of a subject.  Thus, for example, God exists is 
necessarily true because God essentially exists.  On this view, relations of necessity 
and contingency reduce to the relations substances bear to their essential and 
accidental properties, respectively.  We restrict our considerations to those essential 
to the subject of the proposition when considering contingency, on this view. 
This coheres nicely with the role of sufficient reasons in motivating the 
necessitarianNC view in Leibniz’s system.  The sufficient reasons for all truths are 
ultimately found in God’s will and intellect, so all things (reasons) considered all 
truths are necessary.  However, of those truths some are true just in virtue of 
features internal to the concept or essence of the subject.  If the sufficient reasons 
for some truth are all contained within the concept or essence of the subject of a 
proposition, then that proposition is per se necessary, and is otherwise per accidens 
necessary.   
The origin of this view is in Leibniz’s letter to Wedderkopf where he describes 
sins as evil relative to the sinner, but not absolutely evil because they are not evil to 
God when considering which world is the best.  When sins are considered in 
themselves, God appreciates that they are evil and can further appreciate that they 
are evil relative to the sinner.  However, relative to the best series of things, or the 
                                         
86 Leibniz’s views here are very close to contemporary views that reduce modality to essence.  
See Fine 1994 and Dasgupta 2014 for contemporary views that are close to Leibniz’s 
(particularly Dasgupta’s in connection to the Principle of Sufficient Reason).   
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best of all worlds, sins are not evil, and God’s will is disposed towards them qua 
essential features of the best of all worlds. 
This use of the per se terminology gives us some insight into how he employs the 
idea of considering something “in itself.”  Here, Leibniz treats an item as per se if it 
abstracted away from the particulars that result from it being embedded in the 
series of things, or a particular world.  This is relevant for our discussion of the 
“Confession” because it gives some clues about how he’s using ‘per se’ specifically 
applied to modal notions.  
Let’s stipulate that the modal view Leibniz is developing distinguishes the per se 
features of a subject from those that are per accidens.  A proposition is per se 
necessary if and only if what is attributed to a subject is either a per se feature of 
the subject or entailed by only per se features of the subject.  However, a 
proposition is per accidens necessary if and only if what is attributed to a subject is 
not entailed by the subjects per se features alone.  On this view, the relevant modal 
features when deriving a contradiction are the per se features of a subject.  What we 
are thus looking for as we develop a per se modal theory is an explanation of which 
features of a subject are per se.  As we will see those features turn out to be the 
essential features of the subject, or those features that are intrinsic to the essence of 
the subject.   
Leibniz introduces per se necessity into the second edition of the “Confession”, 
which he develops, refines, and utilizes to render commonplace claims about 
contingency true.87 First, Leibniz aims to develop a notion of contingency that 
                                         
87 To supplement the 1677 version of the “Confession,” I will examine some of Leibniz’s 
correspondence with Spinoza and his 1675 work on the arguments for the existence of God. 
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confirms that at least some features of the world are contingent.  He claims that 
those theories that deny that there is any sense in which some truths are contingent 
necessarily destroy the difference between truth and possibility, necessity and 
contingency, and, having twisted the meaning of the words, they oppose themselves to 
the ordinary use of words.  Therefore sins, damnations, and the other elements of the 
series of contingent things are not necessary...88 
Leibniz’s primary modal goals in the “Confession” are to explain how the existence of 
the actual world is contingent, how non-actual worlds possibly exist, and how certain 
elements of the series of worldly events are not themselves necessary.  In “On the 
Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human Freedom,” Leibniz offers an 
account of possibility in terms of imaginability, but, as we saw, while this might 
conform to common usage of modals, it does not meet Leibniz’s more rigorous 
standards of conceivability.  In the “Confession” Leibniz works towards a notion of 
possibility that is different from imaginability but that nevertheless captures the 
sense in which some truths are contingent.  In Leibniz’s earlier work, he focuses on 
the relation between necessity and God’s foreknowledge. However, in the 
“Confession” he focuses on the question of whether features of the world are 
necessary because they are grounded in God’s necessary nature.  This allows him to 
formulate the necessitarian argument from God’s nature: 
Take away or change the series of thing, and the ultimate ground of things, that is, 
God, will be done away with or changed.  It is not more possible that from the same 
ground—and a ground sufficient and entire, such as God is with respect to the 
universe—there should result opposed consequences, that is, that diverse things should 
follow from the same thing, than it is possible that the same thing should be different 
from itself.89   
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Any change or difference in the truths of the actual world would require that God is 
other than he is—“different from himself”—but God cannot be different from 
himself, so the world cannot be otherwise.  Let’s examine this argument more closely 
against Leibniz’s development of modal terminology in the first version of the 
“Confession”. 
As in the case of his strategy in “The Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and 
Human Freedom,” Leibniz offers an account of “necessary” that renders false the 
claim that all truths are per se necessary. Recall the necessitarian argument: 
(i) That which follows from something necessary is necessary. 
(ii) The existence of the world follows from God’s existence. 
(iii) God’s existence is necessary. 
(iv) Therefore, the existence of the world is necessary.   
 Leibniz argues that according to the per se view of necessity we can deny premise (i) 
by realizing that the necessity here is per se: 
(i)’ Everything that follows from something [per se] necessary is [per se] 
necessary: 
I reply that it is false that whatever follows from something that is necessary <per 
se> is itself necessary <per se>.90  
According to Leibniz, even though God’s existence is necessary (both per se 
necessary and necessary all things considered), and the existence of the world follows 
from God’s existence, we can deny that the existence of the world is per se 
necessary. 
                                         
90 CP 55. The “<...>” indicate that texts that were added to the original 1672 version. 
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<For in this place we call necessary only what is necessary per se, namely, that which 
has the reason for its existence and truth in itself.  The truths of geometry are of this 
sort.  But among existing things, only God is of this sort; all the rest, which follow 
from the series of things presupposed---i.e., from the harmony of things or the 
existence of God---are contingent per se and only hypothetically necessary, even if 
nothing is fortuitous, since everything proceeds by destiny, i.e., from some establish 
reason of providence.>91  
Per se necessity is a matter of the idea or concept of the subject of a proposition 
containing the reason(s) for the truth of that proposition.  A natural suggestion is 
that what the concept of a subject contains is that subject’s essential features.  This 
reading is encouraged by the fact that Leibniz treats our concepts of beings as 
representing their essence: 
if the essence of a thing can be conceived, provided that it is conceived clearly and 
distinctly...then it must already be held to be possible, and its contrary will not be 
necessary...92 
So a proposition is per se necessary if the concept of the subject of that 
proposition, which represents the subject’s essence, entails that the predicate of the 
proposition applies to the subject.  Applied specifically to the case of God’s 
existence, it’s per se necessary that God exists because existence follows from God’s 
essence. However, it is not per se necessary that this world exists, because its 
existence isn’t determined by its concept (or the series of things) alone.  
Additionally, to show this world exists we must appeal to the fact that it’s better 
than the other conceivable worlds and that God wills the best.  So if we restrict our 
considerations to the concept of this world alone, we cannot show it is best (because 
that requires a comparison to other worlds) and we cannot show God must will the 
best (because the concept of the world does not include the requisite information 
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about God’s nature).  Thus it is per se contingent that the world exists.  So Leibniz 
continues to accept that the existence of the world follows from the existence of 
God, but argues that just because God’s existence follows essentially it doesn’t mean 
that the world’s existence follows essentially (from the concept of this world).   
4.3 Per se Necessity and the Dreaded Doctrine of 
Necessitarianism93 
4.3.1 Per se Modality and Essences 
Leibniz’s usage of per se, “in itself”, roughly captures the sort of 
necessity/contingency distinction he is developing in the first version of the 
“Confession”.  The issue I highlighted is whether there is some principled way to 
think about things per se.   Although Leibniz focuses on existence claims in the 
above passages, he also mentions the truths of geometry (which are per se necessary 
on this view), including propositions like “triangles have three-sides”.  So this 
account of per se necessity can generalize to propositions other than existential ones.  
Leibniz does not restrict his talk of requisites to those things required for the 
existence of a being, but includes also those things part of a being’s definition, “....a 
definition is nothing but an enumeration of requisites”.94   The suggestion that per se 
modality is the modality of essences represented by the concepts in God’s 
understanding offers one such principle to determine which features we must include 
when considering whether a proposition is impossible, necessary or contingent.  
                                         
93 Sleigh explains that Leibniz uses “the per se modalities to ward of the dreaded doctrine of 
necessitarianism” in the Introduction to his translation of the “Confession,” CP xxv.  I am 
much indebted to Sleigh’s discussion here. 
94 CP 69. Thus the Principle of Sufficient Reason does not merely state that there is a reason 
why each being exists, but a reason for every truth.  
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Moreover, because essences constitute the natures of beings, they are things that 
could not be otherwise, and which Leibniz takes to be characteristic of modal 
necessity.  Per se modality offers a principled distinction that makes room for 
contingent propositions, and delivers many of intuitively correct modal judgments: 
it’s (per se) necessary that God exists, and that the angles of a triangle add to 180 
degrees, while it’s (per se) contingent that this world exists, and, importantly (per 
se) contingent that other worlds don’t exist. Just as existence does not follow from 
the concept of this world, non-existence does not follow from the concept of other 
worlds.  Thus per se contingency offers a way to render it true that other worlds are 
possible.  They are possible because their concepts in God’s understanding do not 
imply a contradiction (excluding considerations of features outside the concept of 
those worlds).  This is consistent with the goodness of God’s will, and the resulting 
fact that he will create the best of all worlds, from rendering non-actual worlds 
impossible (or per accidens impossible).   
This view puts a lot of pressure on Leibniz’s notion of an essence, and the 
connection between concepts in God’s understanding and the essences of creatures.  
This is particularly interesting in the case of individuals, such as Judas and Caesar, 
and even individual bodies.  For it raises the question of whether individuals qua 
individuals have distinct essences, or more generally how we conceive of the essences 
of individuals.  After all, they certainly are the subjects of propositions, and we will 
need an account of their essences to render our modal theory.  Importantly, Leibniz’s 
views on individuals, what individuates them and how to conceive of them, 
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undergoes a number of changes in his early work.95 In the “Confession”, Leibniz 
treats the world, or series of things, as individuals as embedded in spatial and 
temporal relations (among other relations) that Leibniz treats describes as ‘external’ 
to these individuals.  Here, my suggestion is that ‘external’ means non-essential: 
There you have it, what may amaze you, the principle of individuation, outside the 
thing itself.  For between these eggs no difference can be assigned either by an angel 
or, I have the audacity to say, by God (given the hypothesis of the greatest similarity 
possible) other than that at the present time this one is at place A, and that one is at 
place B...  
[Theologian]: But what do you infer from that concerning souls? 
 [Philosopher:]  ...Just this: souls, or as I prefer to call them, minds, are also 
individuated, or, as it were, become these, by place and time.  This being posited, the 
entire question vanishes.  For to ask why this soul rather than another is subjected 
from the beginning to these circumstances of time and place (from which the entire 
series of life, death, salvation, or damnation arises), and why, consequently, it passes 
from one set of circumstances to others---the series of things external to itself bringing 
things forth in this manner---is to ask why this soul is this soul.  Imagine that another 
should began to exist in this same body (that is, a body located at the same time and 
place) at the same time and place as that in which this one had begun; then this very 
should that you call another will not be another but will be this one.96   
Place is sufficient for distinguishing the otherwise qualitatively identical eggs, which, 
according to Leibniz, places the principle of individuation outside the eggs in 
themselves.  Moreover, the circumstances that come with being embodied—relations 
of time and space, constitute the identity of a soul.  So propositions about Judas 
and Caesar, for example, for modal purposes, are evaluated according to the 
essences of Judas and Caesar which are not constituted by spatial and temporal 
relations, and relations  (for those are external to the individuals).  Thus the 
                                         
95 For thorough examinations of the development, and variation, in Leibniz’s views here see 
Mugnai 2001, Mare and Ariew 2015.    
96 CP 105-7. 
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conditions in which Judas and Caesar find themselves in are per accidens necessary 
and not intrinsic to their essences.   
However, there is an important complication here, for I have been treating 
‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ as terms relative to the essence of a being.  So my 
‘intrinsic’ features are my essential ones and ‘extrinsic’ ones are those that are not 
essential.  However, ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ lend themselves to an alternate 
definition, whereby an intrinsic property is one that is not merely essential but also 
a requisite for an individual’s identity.97 At least some spatial and temporal relations 
are intrinsic to individuals in this sense, so that there are some accidental or 
contingent features of individuals that make up their principle of individuation.  We 
see this result as Leibniz emphasizes that to ask why a soul should endure the 
material circumstances it does is to ask why that soul is that soul.  He goes as far as 
to say that had a different soul been placed in those very circumstances as the 
original soul, it would be identical to that soul.  So we here see Leibniz affirming 
both that the circumstances of time and place that a soul experiences are external to 
that soul and also that they constitute the soul’s identity.  
If someone is indignant that he was not born of a queen, and, on the other hand, that 
his own mother did not give birth to a king, then he is indignant that he himself is not 
another.98  
However, being in those circumstances might be sufficient to be that very 
individual but Leibniz does not commit himself to the view that all extrinsic 
properties are part of the individuating principle. (or necessary to be that person).  
                                         
97 This is how Sleigh defines ‘intrinsic’, which is appropriate for discussing Leibniz’s 1680s 
views but is a shift from is earlier views; see Sleigh 1990, 60, 68-72. 
98 CP 107. 
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Thus, for example, in a passage we saw earlier Leibniz notes that were he not 
speaking right now he would nevertheless still be himself:  
[F]or I can be conceived to be myself even if I am not conceived as speaking...99 
There are some features of individuals that an individual can lack and nevertheless 
be that very individual.  My point here is that we need to distinguish those 
properties essential to an individual from those that individuate the individual.  
When I describe Leibniz as offering an account of per se modality based on features 
intrinsic to a subject, I mean intrinsic to the subject’s essence and not individuating 
properties. 100 Leibniz describes the principle of individuation as external to the 
subjects, i.e., the result of the material conditions of the world and their subsequent 
relations. This is all to suggest that Leibniz treats per se modality as a matter of 
essential features of the subjects, and for subjects that are individuals this includes 
their essential properties, which do not exhaust their individuating properties.  So 
these passages are interesting because they suggest that Leibniz treats spatial and 
temporal relations as external to souls, but also as importantly individuating.  I take 
it that Leibniz is committing himself to an account whereby individuals have 
contingent or merely per accidens necessary properties that nevertheless ground 
their identities as individuals.  Leibniz is likely relying on a notion of essence similar 
to species, where Caesar and Judas thus have the same essence but differ in their 
spatial and temporal features.  
When Leibniz discusses the nature of concepts of individuals in the “Confession,” 
he highlights their essential features, so the concept of an individual need not specify 
                                         
99 CP 55. 
100 In the next chapter we will see Leibniz endorsing the collapse of these two categories. 
   
 
 
65 
 
all of its properties.  The notion of a substance need not extend to all predicates of 
that substance, and further what accounts for the numerical identity of subjects is 
their embodiment or circumstances of time and place.  Thus part of what makes 
Leibniz’s per se account viable is that it allows him to articulate how individual 
substances have contingent properties. Thus because Caesar is essentially human, 
“Caesar is human” is necessary, but because Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon is 
dependent on material conditions of the world (for example, there being a Rubicon) 
“Caesar crosses the Rubicon” is contingent.   
However, Leibniz’s per se account does not perfectly account for the necessity and 
contingency of propositions, for there are some intuitively necessary propositions it 
renders contingent.   For example, Leibniz claims that comprehending the number 
nine is merely a matter of comprehending nine units: 
If you consider nine units displayed before you, then you have comprehended 
completely the essence of the number nine.  However, even if you had knowledge of the 
material basis for all its properties, you would nevertheless not have knowledge of their 
form or reflection.  For even if you do not observe that three times three, four plus 
five, six plus three, seven plus two, and a thousand other combinations are nine, you 
have nonetheless thought of the essence of the number nine.101  
If I can grasp the essence of nine by clearly and distinctly perceiving nine units, then 
when I analyze the concept of nine and restrict it to considerations of essence I need 
not appeal to things beyond nine units.  Leibniz seems to suggest that the relations 
nine has to other numbers is external to its essence.  Yet if I deny that three times 
three is nine, Leibniz claims that here I will have a contradiction, one that renders 
this proposition necessary.  It seems that in order to derive that contradiction, I 
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must search outside the notion or essence of nine, making three threes are nine 
contingent.102  
So while essences offer a principled way to include or preclude considerations 
from entering into our determinations about necessity, they may not capture the 
intuitive pattern of modal predicates for all propositions.  Non-essential but 
necessary features of subjects (such as nine being identical to three threes) pose 
problems for Leibniz’s view.  Leibniz does not develop a notion of essence in the 
“Confession” that gets him the division of contingent and necessary propositions that 
he’s looking for.  So we can understand the development of per se necessity and 
contingency as resulting from Leibniz looking for a principled way to exclude and 
include consideration of the sufficient reasons for a truth when making modal 
determinations.  While essences offer one such principle, they do not do so 
unproblematically.  Perhaps this is what encouraged Leibniz to further develop his 
notion of conceptual containment, so that he might account for necessary 
relationships between notions other than those between the concepts of essences and 
the predicates included therein.  In fact, in many of Leibniz’s logical works during 
this time he emphasizes that a proof that a proposition is necessary is a matter of 
reducing it to an identity statement.  Such a reduction is achieved by substituting 
definitions to analyze the key terms, and some of those definitions could go beyond 
the mere relations between essential properties.  If this is so, then Leibniz’s 
development of conceptual containment can be understood as a way to capture 
                                         
102Perhaps Leibniz treats nine as essentially 3 x 3 because the essence of 3 is 3 units, making 
the essence of 3 included in the essence of 9.  This works for this example, but I’m not sure it 
will work in cases where the essence of one of the numbers is beyond that of the subject, for 
example 9 = 12 - 3.  The essence of 9 doesn’t include the essence of 12.   
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necessary relationships other than those internal to an essence, perhaps including 
the relationships between essences, such as God’s essence including knowledge of all 
possible essences. 
4.3.2 Per se Modality and the NecessitarianNC Argument 
The introduction of per se necessity is an augmentation of necessityNC and 
contrasts with necessity all things considered (necessityATC). Per se modality is not 
meant to be the univocal interpretation of necessityNC.  Leibniz seems to 
acknowledge as much in some of his work between the two versions of the 
“Confession”. For instance, in a 1675 text, Leibniz says: 
 “Impossible” is a two-fold concept: that which does not have essence, and that which 
does not have existence, i.e., that which neither was, is nor will be because it is 
incompatible with God, or, with the existence or reason which brings it about that 
things exist rather than do not exist.103  
Leibniz treats modal notions as ambiguous: sometimes something is “impossible” 
based on consideration of its essence alone, and other times something is impossible 
not because of its essence, but because of some incompatibility with beings external 
to its essence. Our discussion of Leibniz’s pre-”Confession” work illustrates the 
connection between these two notions; when considering necessityNC, there is 
unrestricted consideration of sufficient reasons (or requisites), while per se necessity 
results from restricting consideration to requisites internal to the essence of the 
subject.  If the requisites that render a proposition true include features external to 
the essence of the subject, then the truth is per accidens necessary, or contingent. 
                                         
103 “On Mind, the Universe, and God,” SR 7. 
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According to this reading there are (at least) two versions of the necessitarianNC 
argument: 
Per se necessity 
(i) That which follows from something per se necessary is per se necessary.  (False) 
(ii) The existence of the world follows from God’s existence. 
(iii) God’s existence is per se necessary. 
(iv) Therefore, the existence of the world is per se necessary.  (False) 
 
Leibniz rejects the conclusion of this argument by rejecting that the “follow from” 
relation preserves per se necessity.  However, this leaves the all things considered 
necessitarian argument unaddressed.   
All things considered Necessity 
(i) That which follows from something all things considered necessary is all things 
considered necessary. 
(ii) The existence of the world follows from God’s existence. 
(iii) God’s existence is all things considered necessary. 
(iv) Therefore, the existence of the world is all things considered necessary.   
 
Leibniz accepts the conclusion of the all things considered necessary and concedes 
that all truths are necessaryATC.  That is, Leibniz does accept the necessitarian claim 
when it is interpreted all things considered, but rejects the per se conclusion.  
Leibniz thus distinguishes two kinds of necessity: there is per se necessity restricted 
to the essence of the subject of the proposition, and there is all things considered 
necessity.  This is what Leibniz is expressing in the passage regarding two notions of 
impossibility:  
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“Impossible” is a two-fold concept: that which does not have essence, and that which 
does not have existence, i.e., that which neither was, is nor will be because it is 
incompatible with God, or, with the existence or reason which brings it about that 
things exist rather than do not exist.104  
Leibniz is an all things considered necessitarian but not a per se necessitarian.  My 
interpretation features two claims that require defense, first, that Leibniz introduces 
per se necessity to supplement his modal theory and not to function as his sole 
modal analysis.  Second, that Leibniz maintains necesssitarianism all things 
considered.105   
These suggestions face a textual challenge that comes from Leibniz’s later 
reflections on his views at this time. In 1689 Leibniz, considering his early work, 
acknowledges: 
I was very close to the view of those who think that everything is absolutely necessary, 
who judge that it is enough for freedom that we be uncoerced, even though we might 
be subject to necessity, and close to the view of those who do not distinguish what is 
infallible or certainly known to be true, from that which is necessary.   
But the considerations of possibles, which are not, were not, and will not be brought 
me back from this precipice.  For if there are certain possibles that never exist, then 
the things that exist, at any rate, are not always necessary, for otherwise it would be 
impossible for others to exist in their place, and thus, everything that never exists 
would be impossible.106 
Robert Adams offers a careful reading of these passages, arguing that “Leibniz has 
already slipped over the edge of the precipice in this letter [to Wedderkopf].  He 
states flatly and without qualification that everything that ever happens is 
necessary”.107  Adams claims that the Letter to Wedderkopf commits Leibniz to a 
                                         
104 “On Mind, the Universe, and God,” DSR 7. 
105 Examples of authors that deny both of these claims include Adams 1994, Sleigh 1990 and 
2012.  Michael Griffin endorses and defends both of these claims in Griffin 2013, 58-82. 
106 “On Freedom,” AG 94. 
107 Adams 1994, 11. 
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necessitarian view, which Leibniz subsequently seeks to rescind.  Sleigh agrees, 
noting that on the letter to Wedderkopf Leibniz added “I subsequently corrected 
these remarks, for it is one thing for sins to occur infallibly, another for them to 
occur necessarily.”108 All this lends plausibility to the narrative that Leibniz was once 
a necessitarian but, in his efforts in the “Confession,” sought to reject this view.  
This is bolstered by Leibniz’s preoccupation in “On the Omnipotence and 
Omniscience of God and Human Freedom” with demonstrating that God’s 
knowledge does not generate legitimate necessitarian conclusions.  Leibniz’s 
comment about coming back from the precipice, especially since he offers criticisms 
of the necessitarian argument from omniscience, is suggestive of the view that 
Leibniz was once close to claiming that all truths are absolutely necessary but then 
thought better of it. 
However, there is a reading of the above passage that Leibniz does not commit to 
the claim in his letter to Wedderkopf that all truths are necessary, simply to retract 
this claim later.  The place to start is Leibniz’s comment that “he was very close to 
the view of those who think that everything is absolutely necessary.”  The claim that 
all truths are absolutely necessary is the necessitarian doctrine Leibniz is rejecting.  
I think there are two plausible readings of what ‘absolutely necessary’ means here.  
First, Leibniz could treat absolute necessitarianism as the view that all claims 
attributing contingency to events are false.  Thus when Leibniz retracts his claim 
about absolute necessity, he is claiming that there is at least one legitimate notion of 
“necessity” according to which the argument in the “Confession” fails to go through.  
On this reading, when Leibniz says he was close to the view of absolute necessity, he 
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is saying that he was close to the view that there is no legitimate sense of 
‘contingency’ that renders claims about contingency true. Leibniz’s precipice is 
having a modal account that commits one to revise all modal language, that he was 
pulled back from by developing a viable notion of possibility, per se possibility, that 
can capture the fact that non-actual worlds exist merely contingently.  
The second plausible explanation of what ‘absolute necessity’ is, is the view that 
all propositions are necessaryNC regardless of how we restrict the considerations of 
requisite conditions that ground the truth. This reading is encouraged by Leibniz’s 
denial that sin is absolutely bad in his Letter to Wedderkopf.  If sins fail to be 
absolutely bad because there are some agents relative to which the sins are not bad 
(for example, relative to the bestness of the actual world) then similarly what it is 
for a truth to be absolutely necessary is for it to be per se necessary. On this view, 
Leibniz is pulled back from the precipice by successfully articulating a non-ad hoc 
way of distinguishing per se properties in such a way that he can characterize the 
sense in which non-actual worlds and creatures are possible.  Because there are ways 
to qualify our modal claims by restricting our considerations to essence, and because 
not all truths follow from the essential features of the subject of the proposition, this 
version of absolute necessitarianism fails.  
On either reading, Leibniz is not renouncing the view that all truths are 
necessaryATC. He is instead observing that he can salvage modal language (rendering 
some of our claims about modality true) by developing a viable notion of 
contingency in terms of accidental properties.  Leibniz accepts that “it is impossible 
that God create another world,” so searches for ways to mitigate some of its 
undesirable consequences.  If we closely examine the above passage we will see that 
necessitarianismATC is not Leibniz’s immediate target.   
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Returning to the passage from “On Freedom”: 
I was very close to the view of those who think that everything is absolutely necessary, 
who judge that it is enough for freedom that we be uncoerced, even though we might 
be subject to necessity, and close to the view of those who do not distinguish what is 
infallible or certainly known to be true, from that which is necessary.   
But the considerations of possibles, which are not, were not, and will not be brought 
me back from this precipice.  For if there are certain possibles that never exist, then 
the things that exist, at any rate, are not always necessary, for otherwise it would be 
impossible for others to exist in their place, and thus, everything that never exists 
would be impossible.109  
Leibniz identifies three claims to which he does not want to commit: 
1. The view that freedom is merely a matter of being uncoerced; 
2. The view that what is infallible or known certainly is necessary; and   
3. The view that everything that never exists is impossible. 
The challenge is to explain how Leibniz comes to reject each of these claims without 
rejecting the all things considered necessitarian claim.  In order to see how he 
addresses numbers 1 and 3 we will have to return to his discussion in the 
“Confession”.  However, his discussion in “On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of 
God and Human Freedom” already gives us insight into how to reject 2, that is, how 
he might distinguish what is known certainly from what is necessary. Leibniz thinks 
that part of what is problematic about the omniscience argument for 
necessitarianism is that it treats God’s knowledge as not merely entailing truth but 
entailing necessary truth.  God’s foreknowledge of p ensures that p is true, but—
without further argumentation—does not guarantee that p is necessarily true.  
When Leibniz notes that he failed to properly distinguish necessity from certainty, it 
is not a retraction of the necessitarianATC conclusion, but an expression of the fact 
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that he failed to appreciate that the necessitarian conclusion cannot be reached by 
appealing to God’s omniscience alone.  Put another way, accepting that the world is 
deterministic does not entail accepting that all truths about the world are necessary. 
Acknowledging that what is certain is distinct from what is necessary need not 
require Leibniz’s rejection of all things considered necessitarianism.   
4.3.3 Returning to the “Confession” 
Now, we can examine Leibniz’s rejection of claims 1 and 3, the former being the 
view that freedom is merely a matter of being uncoerced, and the latter being the 
view that everything that never exists is impossible.  In the “Confession”, Leibniz 
characterizes freedom as “spontaneity with choice”.110  Spontaneity ensures that the 
actions of the agent originate in the agent, so that the “principle of action is in the 
agent”.111  However, not just any principle of action will do.  Leibniz emphasizes that 
the principle of action must involve a rational and deliberative process, which is 
sensitive to reasons.  Such reasons are a function of the various outcomes of the 
actions available to the agent.  It is important for Leibniz’s account of God’s 
freedom that God choose to create this world because it is the best of all worlds.  If 
all non-actual worlds are impossible, then God created this world because it was the 
only possible world and not because it is the best of all possible worlds (or it is the 
best of all worlds only in the trivial sense that it is the only world).  According to 
Leibniz, this threatens God’s freedom because it threatens choice.  To characterize 
God’s free creation of this world, Leibniz wants to find a way to reconcile the 
necessaryATC existence of the actual world with the fact that God made a choice to 
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create this world out of all the possible worlds.  In this sense, per se contingency can 
vindicate the notion of possibility for the purposes of God’s choice.  For what is 
required for God to make a choice is that God understand the array of options that 
are possible per se and that God’s will be inclined towards one of those options 
because of the relative goodness of that option.  So all we need is a way of spelling 
out how worlds are possible, before we consider the fact that God must choose what 
is best.  Each world, considered by itself, is a coherent or non-contradictory 
collection of substances.  These worlds are possible because they have coherent 
concepts, and are merely per accidens impossible given that God will only create 
what is best.  Each world is thus per se contingent, even though the actual world 
exists with all things considered necessity, and non-actual worlds are all things 
considered impossible.  So the internal consistency of different ways the world could 
be represented in God’s understanding is sufficient to ensure the reality of God’s 
choice in creating this world.  We can understand the sense in which possible worlds 
are possible if we understand that their non-existence is per se contingent, i.e. 
determined by factors beyond consideration of their features.   
Now, we can also see how claims 1 and 3 are related to God’s freedom and the 
status of non-actual worlds.  Leibniz is acknowledging that in the letter to 
Wedderkopf he failed to see how the necessitarian conclusion threatens God’s 
freedom, for in the letter he maintains that God is free as long as God is not coerced 
by external factors. 112   We see in the “Confession” that freedom from external 
compulsion is insufficient, for free acts further require deliberating and acting to 
                                         
112  Here “external” factors include essences even though they coincide with God’s 
understanding of them.   
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produce what appears to be best.  Acknowledging that God’s freedom requires more 
than the absence of coercion is not a retraction of the necessitarian view.  And 
finally, the notion of per se necessity helps to explain the sense in which possible 
worlds are possible.  Possible worlds are only impossible per accidens, so even 
though they will never exist they are not per se impossible because, considered in 
themselves, there is no sufficient reason guaranteeing their non-existence.  The 
necessity of their non-existence does not follow unless we consider factors external to 
each world, like the relative goodness of other worlds and the nature of God’s 
creative will.  So the development of per se modal notions need not replace the 
notion of all things considered necessity in Leibniz’s system.  Instead, we can 
understand that it is derived from his notion of necessityATC by restricting which 
necessitating reasons we are considering to render our modal judgments.    
5 Conclusion 
According to my narrative, Leibniz diagnoses many of the problems surrounding 
necessity and free will as terminological.  He sets out to resolve the disputes by 
defining ‘impossible’, ‘possible’, ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’.  His goal in defining 
modal terms is to capture our intuitive and everyday use of such terms, but also 
render viable terms for philosophy and theology.  He starts by developing an 
understanding of possible and impossible in terms of imaginable and unimaginable.  
These definitions required further refinement, however, to avoid problematic 
reasoning regarding conditionals, and to avoid things that are imaginable in some 
broad sense but are ultimately contradictory.  Leibniz wants to develop the idea that 
what is possible is that which is coherent or non-contradictory, and that which is 
impossible is contradictory, but we need a principled way of determining which 
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factors are important when determining whether something entails a contradiction.  
All things considered all true propositions are rendered necessary grounded in the 
will of God or the essences represented in God’s understanding.  In the “Confession” 
Leibniz offers a refinement and an addition: whether something is internal or 
external to the essence of the subject of a proposition offers a way to understand 
how some propositions are (per se) contingent while others are (per se) necessary.  
Understanding necessity in terms of what is determined by the essence of a being 
alone is an advancement on Leibniz’s original suggestion that we can restrict our 
considerations when trying to determine whether a propositions is true necessarily or 
merely contingently.  I think he sees this as a terminological advancement that can 
capture how we talk about modality because it rescues propositions like “this world 
exists” from being necessary (in the per se sense).  However, while Leibniz seems 
optimistic that this also designates “Judas sins” as (per se) contingent, it is less clear 
that Leibniz is successful in articulating a notion of essence that cleaves necessary 
and contingent truths in the right way.     
There are two important comments to make about the relation between different 
types of necessity, necessityATC and per se necessity.  First, I do not think that 
Leibniz saw per se modality as replacing all things considered necessity.  We should 
resist the conclusion that the per se account is Leibniz’s main account, because 
without the broader version of what implies a contradiction Leibniz cannot account 
for hypothetical necessity.  Hypothetical necessity is the necessity by which a 
consequent is necessitated by the antecedent of the conditional.  As I noted earlier in 
the chapter, all of the conditionals he describes as hypothetically conditional are 
those of strict implication.  According to strict implication, if the antecedent is 
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necessarily true, then the consequent is necessarily true.  However, if Leibniz’s main 
modal account is in terms of per se necessity, then he cannot make sense of 
hypothetical necessity, for, as he notes in the “Confession” what follows from 
something that is per se necessary is not itself per se necessary.  Because per se 
necessity is insufficient to account for hypothetical necessity, and yet Leibniz 
employs hypothetical necessity in his arguments, he did not replace (or he had 
reason not to replace) all things considered necessity. 113   Necessity all things 
considered is closed under entailment, and Leibniz understands hypothetical 
necessity in terms of entailment.  Moreover, Leibniz characterizes necessity in terms 
of what cannot be otherwise, if per se modality is his only modal notion then there 
are contingent truths that cannot be otherwise.  I take this to be the distinguishing 
feature of necessary truths, and thus per se modality is an insufficient account by 
Leibniz’s own standards.  
I do not take per se modality to be equally fundamental as all things considered 
necessity, and thus hold that the former is a quasi-modal notion, because all things 
considered necessity constitutes the connection that grounds created things to God’s 
being.  Because per se modality is about what is intrinsic to an essence, and the 
created world is extrinsic to God’s essence, all things considered necessity forms the 
central connection between God and his creations, which I thus take to be a more 
fundamental notion.   
                                         
113 Moreover, German logic textbooks from the early 1600s favored multiple definitions of 
contingency, and encouraged bifurcated theory of meanings of terms.  According to Roncalgia 
2003, Christoph Scheibler’s “Opus Logicum” contains at least a three-fold distinction in 
different notions of possibility, including one that overlaps with necessary truths.   
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Thus what I am attributing to Leibniz is a semantic reply to the necessitarian; if 
per se necessity is meant to undermine the necessitarianNC argument, Leibniz is 
guilty of changing the subject.  Leibniz, however, is not trying to change the subject, 
but acknowledge that our commitments regarding the existence and nature of God, 
as well as the Principle of Sufficient Reason, lead us to the conclusion that all truths 
are necessarily true all things considered.  Given that this notion of necessity does 
not make the familiar modal distinctions among propositions, and further does not 
offer a means of account for the sense in which non-actual worlds are possible, 
Leibniz looks to develop finer modal distinctions within the necessitarian framework.  
While Leibniz does accept some form of necessitarianism, he nevertheless makes 
progress in rescuing the usage of our everyday modal terms.  Thus we can accept the 
necessitarian argument without accepting that our everyday modal language is 
always mistaken.   
Leibniz develops a coherent account of per se features by treating those features 
as internal to the subject’s concept, or essence, as necessary, and those truths that 
depend on features external to a subject’s essence, including accidental features and 
the features of other beings, as contingent, or necessary per accidens.  This allows 
Leibniz to distinguish “God exists” from “This world exists,” because existence is a 
per se feature of God but a per accidens feature of the world.  I presented two main 
motivations for Leibniz’s development of this view: to articulate the sense in which 
those propositions we intuitively call contingent differ from those we treat as 
necessary, and to explain how non-actual worlds are possible to preserve God’s 
freedom.  Further, I argued that Leibniz does not offer per se necessity as a 
replacement of all things considered necessity, but instead employs it to supplement 
his modal theory.  I motivated this view by arguing that the negative consequences 
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of necessitarianism that Leibniz picks out are not direct consequences of 
necessitarianism, and can instead be resisted without resisting all things considered 
necessitarianism.  Despite this success, in the 1680s discussion of the per se view 
almost all but disappears, and Leibniz introduces the infinite analysis account of 
contingency.  These two views, per se and infinite analysis, are not incompatible 
with one another, but as we will discover, the infinite analysis view is developed in 
response to a crisis in the per se view brought on by changes in Leibniz’s views on 
substances and their individual concepts and nature. 
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Chapter 2: Necessitarianism & 
Modality 1681-99 
Substances, De re Modality, and Possible Worlds 
 
1 Introduction 
The textual evidence from the 1670s supports reading Leibniz as a necessitarian, 
all things considered, in his early work.  In Leibniz, God, and Necessity, Michael V. 
Griffin defends the view that Leibniz is a necessitarian. Griffin’s discussion is 
focused primarily on necessitarianism in relation to Leibniz's work in the 1670s, and 
does not consider Leibniz's accounts in the 1680s.114 In his review of Griffin’s book, 
Michael Futch emphasizes the importance of addressing the relation of Leibniz's 
middle period views, spanning the 1680s and ‘90s, to his  necessitarianism—if one is 
to successfully defend the view that Leibniz was consistently a necessitarian.115 The 
following discussion, aims to bolster the plausibility of this view by addressing 
developments in Leibniz’s thought during the 1680s.   
                                         
114 Griffin notes, “Leibniz bases this [the claim that this world is the best] on his ‘infinite 
analysis’ theory of contingency.  I will not pursue this theory here.” (Griffin 2013, 85). Griffin 
does not return to the infinite analysis view in his discussion but instead focuses on the per 
se account.   
115 Futch comments “Of even greater concern is [Griffin’s] book’s almost complete silence 
about much of the complex and varied conceptual repertoire of which Leibniz avails himself 
in explicating the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. For example, 
beginning with texts from the 1680s, Leibniz avers that metaphysically necessary truths can 
be demonstrated in finitely many steps and are grounded upon the principles of identity and 
contradiction, whereas contingent truths cannot be demonstrated, even by God, because they 
involve an infinite analysis.” See Futch 2013.  
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In the late 1670s, Leibniz develops his logic of categorical propositions, and 
accordingly turns his attention to his theory of truth.  In “General Inquiries about 
the Analysis of Concepts and Truths”, Leibniz defines a true proposition as that 
which can be reduced to an identity statement (such as A = A), or whose denial 
entails a contradiction. 116  Later, in the same work, Leibniz similarily defines a 
necessarily true proposition as one that can be reduced to an identity (or whose 
denial entails a contradiction. 117   Thus Leibniz renders truth coextensive with 
necessary truth, apparently leaving no room for contingent truths.  If my reading of 
Leibniz as a necessitarian, all things considered, is accurate, we should expect him to 
embrace this outcome, and offer a quasi-modal notion of contingency. However, there 
are many passages where Leibniz worries about how he might make room for 
contingency.   
Recognizing the contingency of things, I further considered what a clear notion of 
truth might be, for I hoped, and not absurdly, for some light from that direction on 
how necessary and contingent truths could be distinguished.  Now, I saw that it is 
common to every true affirmative proposition, universal and particular, necessary or 
contingent, that the predicate is in the subject, that is, that the notion of the 
predicate is involved somehow in the notion of the subject…but this seemed only to 
increase the difficulty, for if the notion of the predicate is in the notion of the subject 
at a given time, then how could the subject lack the predicate without contradiction 
and impossibility, and without changing that notion?118  
Instead of explicitly embracing necessitarianism, Leibniz offers what seems like a 
more optimistic solution to the problem, one that might make room for genuine 
contingency: 
                                         
116 P 57. 
117 P 70. 
118 “On Freedom,” AG 95. 
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At last a certain new and unexpected light shined from where I least expected it, 
namely, from the mathematical considerations on the nature of infinity…a most 
profound distinction between necessary and contingent truths was revealed…truths 
are, in turn, of two sorts, for some can be resolved into basic truths, and others, in 
their resolution, give rise to a series of steps that go to infinity.  The former are 
necessary, the latter contingent.  Indeed, a necessary proposition is one whose contrary 
implies a contradiction…[b]ut in contingent truths, even though the predicate is in the 
subject, this can never be demonstrated…but the resolution proceeds to infinity.119  
Leibniz emphasizes his infinite analysis account of contingency during this period, 
claiming that thinking about mathematical proofs leads to insight about why the 
denial of a contingent truth does not imply a contradiction.120  All this is suggestive 
of two important claims (that I want to resist): 
1. In the 1680s, Leibniz rejects necessitarianism. 
2. Leibniz makes room for genuine contingency through his infinite analysis 
account of contingent truth.121  
However, I will argue that Leibniz rejects each of these because he remains a 
necessitarianATC throughout this period.  Leibniz’s infinite analysis view is a quasi-
modal notion that Leibniz emphasizes in part for its ingenuity, and in part because 
it cleaves the distinction between necessary and ‘contingent’ truths, and explains the 
epistemology of necessary and contingent truths in a compelling way.  Furthermore, 
despite the frequent appeals to the infinite analysis view, this account is not 
                                         
119 “On Freedom,” AG 95-6. 
120 For other texts that express similar optimism see “On Freedom and Possibility,” AG 19; 
“The Source of Contingent Truths,” AG 98-99; “Discourse on Metaphysics” §13, AG 45; “On 
Contingency,” AG 28-29. 
121 Robert Sleigh makes a good case for treating infinite analysis as Leibniz’s solution to 
necessitarianism in connection with the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Sleigh 1983.  I 
nevertheless have reservations about the success of the infinite analysis view as an account of 
contingency, ones that Leibniz seemed to share, which I think is suggestive that Leibniz’s 
enthusiasm for this view is as a quasi-modal notion.   
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Leibniz’s primary notion of quasi-contingency in the 1680s.  Instead, Leibniz favors 
the possible free decrees account of “contingency,” particularly for distinguishing 
essential from accidental features of individual substances.   
The 1680s is an important period to examine Leibniz’s treatment of modal 
distinctions because it is marked by a change in the accounts of “contingency” he 
appeals to most frequently. As we saw in Chapter 1, in the 1670s he develops the per 
se account of contingency. The per se view treats necessary properties as those that 
are intrinsic to the concept or essence of the subject of a proposition. On this view, 
humans are per se necessarily animals because being an animal is included in or 
intrinsic to the essence or concept of being human. However, during the same period 
Leibniz develops an account of individual substances according to which all features 
of a substance are intrinsic to that substance's nature. When paired with the per se 
view, this renders all properties necessary or essential to an individual. This is 
unacceptable for Leibniz insofar as he wants to hold that there is a distinction 
between those properties a substance has necessarily and those it has “contingently.” 
The inconsistency of the per se view and Leibniz’s account of substances coincides 
with the disappearance in the 1680s of the per se view in Leibniz's discussion of 
modality and the introduction then of alternate accounts of de re contingency.  
In the 1680s, one of Leibniz’s primary aims is to account for de re modal 
distinctions, or the modal relationships between things and their properties. Having 
developed a new account of individual substances, Leibniz reflects on different ways 
predicates are contained in the concepts of substances or individuals. He wants to 
capture the intuitive distinction between those features an individual has to have, 
and those that an individual happens to have. In a necessitarian framework, this 
distinction seems to fall away. If all truths are necessarily true, then this includes 
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truths about all of the properties of individual substances. In his correspondence 
with Leibniz, Antoine Arnauld presses this issue, claiming that Leibniz is not able to 
distinguish the contingency of Arnauld's being a theologian from the necessity of 
Arnauld's being a thinking thing or something capable of rationality. Subsequently, 
Leibniz develops two accounts of de re quasi-modality in the 1680s. Arnauld’s focus 
is not on the necessitarian argument Leibniz considers in the early work, but instead 
on the necessitarian implications of the complete concept theory of substance. 
Leibniz develops two main notions of quasi-contingency in this period.  The first, 
more prominently featured in Leibniz’s texts, is modality based on analysis. On this 
view, a truth is contingent if its proof—i.e., analysis of the relevant concepts of the 
proposition—generates an infinitely long or non-terminating analysis. Necessary 
truths are those that can be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. 
The second account, which appeals to God’s possible free decrees, plays a 
prominent role in Leibniz's correspondence with Arnauld (1685-86). On this view 
there is a quasi-modal difference between those properties that depend on the laws 
of the world and those that do not. The former are “contingent” properties, and the 
latter are necessary. If we consider the range of possible worlds God considers when 
creating, the laws of nature at each world are represented as possible free decrees 
God would make if that world were actualized. Those features or properties that 
depend upon God's free decrees are contingent, and those that depend on essences 
rather than on God's free decrees are necessary. Some truths hold in virtue of 
essences, which do not vary depending on the laws of nature. On the possible free 
decrees account, Arnauld is necessarily a thinking thing because this follows from 
the essence of humanity, but he is only contingently a theologian because that 
property depends on the conditions of the world informed by the laws of nature. 
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The infinite analysis view has received more attention in the secondary literature, 
but I argue that the possible free decree view offers what, from Leibniz’s 
perspective, is a superior account of modal terminology compared to that of infinite 
analysis. 122   Moreover, the possible free decree view depends upon Leibniz's 
conception of possible worlds as hypothetical plans for world-creation. Thus in 
articulating why exactly the free decree view offers a better analysis of contingency, 
I will spell out the role of possible worlds in this analysis, and show how Leibniz's 
account of possible non-actuals is consistent with his necessitarianismATC.  The 
analysis of possible worlds will continue into Chapter 3, for Leibniz’s introduction of 
the complete concept account of substances not only fundamentally challenges his 
per se account of quasi-contingency, but also requires changes in his view of the 
structure and composition of possible worlds.  
In what follows, I trace the origin of Leibniz's attempts to account for de re 
modality, looking both at his early per se account as well as his Discourse on 
Metaphysics and related correspondence with Arnauld. We will see how his account 
of individual substances offers a number of challenges for accounting for de re modal 
terminology, and then examine Leibniz's two best attempts to account for the 
distinction between necessary and contingent features of substances. We will see that 
the infinite analysis view offers an epistemic explanation of contingency and 
                                         
122 For illuminating discussion of the infinite analysis view see Adams 1994, 25-30; Sleigh 
1990, 83-89; Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge 2011; Merlo 2012; Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne 
2000; Carriero 1993 and 1995; McNamara 1990; and Hacking 1974. While some of these 
authors discuss the free decrees view, for example in Adams 1994 and Sleigh 1990, they do 
not identify it as his most promising account. Carriero examines the promise of the possible 
free decrees view along side the infinite analysis view. His conclusions diverge from mine, in 
part because he does not claim that Leibniz is a necessitarian. 
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necessity, and does not offer a satisfying metaphysical analysis. Possible free decrees 
root “contingency” on what varies world-to-world. Although this view is not an 
account of metaphysical contingency all things considered, it is Leibniz's most 
promising route for explaining how, although all truths are necessary all things 
considered, and although all properties of an individual are intrinsic to its nature, 
necessary and contingent properties of substances can be properly distinguished.  
2 Transitioning Away from Per se Modality 
In the “Confession,” because God's existence, understanding of essences, and good 
will are sufficient for the existence of this world, and because God necessarily exists 
with this understanding and will, this world exists necessarily. How exactly God's 
existence entails the existence of this world is noteworthy. God's existence entails the 
existence of this world because of God's creative activity, which is founded in God's 
intellect and will. God's intellect includes an understanding of the internally 
consistent representations of series of temporally and spatially ordered substances 
(or worlds). The perfection or goodness of each of these worlds is a result of their 
organization,123 and by comparison one of these is the best. God's will necessarily  
chooses what is best, and accordingly God necessarily wills the best into existence. 
God's creation of this world thus depends, first, on his understanding of the features 
of each world that determine their goodness relative to one another, and thus that 
determine which world is the best, and second, on the fact that his will yields what's 
best. The nature of this world does not include the requisites for its existence (which 
                                         
123 The relevant organization is the harmony of the world, which is “unity in multiplicity, and 
it is greatest in the case where it is a unity of the greatest number of things disordered in 
appearance and reduced, unexpectedly, by some wonderful ratio to the greatest symmetry” 
(CP 45). 
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include the relative goodness of other worlds and the nature of God's will), whereas 
God's nature includes all the requisites for his existence (qua having all perfections). 
Leibniz develops the per se view to capture this distinction, namely, between those 
truths whose requisites are contained exclusively in the definitional concept or 
essence of the subject of that truth, on the one hand, and those that appeal to 
additional requisites beyond the subject, on the other. According to the per se 
account, necessity and contingency track the differences between truths with 
requisites solely internal to a subject, and truths with external requisites.124 Leibniz 
utilizes per se modality to make room for contingent truths. 
The existence or non-existence of worlds is determined by requisites found outside 
of individual world-concepts, so the existence of a world is per se contingent.125 Per 
se necessity is not closed under entailment, so even though God's existence entails 
that this world exists, God's per se necessary existence does not guarantee the 
world’s existence is similarly per se necessary. Leibniz nevertheless denies that non-
actual worlds are possible, in another sense (all things considered), because the 
existence of those worlds is incompatible with God's perfect will. Thus, the per se 
                                         
124 This raises some tricky questions about the dependency relations between God's intellect 
and the essences represented therein. There is a sense in which God's nature contains those 
representations, they constitute part of God's knowledge and understanding, but God's 
nature does not determine the content of those representations. Instead, God has those 
representations because they exhaust all the different ways to instantiate essences in worlds. 
So the content of God's knowledge in a sense depends upon those concepts but only because 
those concepts constitute God's knowledge. On the other hand, those concepts depend on 
God’s intellect for their existence. 
125  Here I do not mean “world-concept” as a technical term, but however a world is 
represented in God’s mind.  Leibniz describes worlds as series of things that can be conceived 
without contradiction (see Grua 390, and A II.ii 47) so I take it that worlds have concepts, 
at least in the mind of God.   
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account describes worlds as possible in that requisites for their existence are external 
to their concepts, but the all things considered account renders them impossible 
because those requisites obtaining are inconsistent with God's perfect will. The per 
se view accounts for the contingency of the existence of this world, and the non-
existence of non-actual worlds, which makes room for God's choice to create this 
world. The early Leibniz was optimistic that this vindicates our talk of the 
contingency of truths about human actions. He treats the essence of humans and 
their definitional concept, as the relevant factor in considering the requisites for 
action, which are contingent because those actions depend on requisites external to 
the individuals, such as their material circumstances and relations to other 
substances in the world. So although human action is not Leibniz's primary focus in 
the “Confession”, he suggests that the per se view can account for the contingency of 
properties, including actions.  
Despite Leibniz’s initial satisfaction with this view, in the 1680s and ‘90s it 
almost all but disappears.126 The exception is an early 1680 text “On Freedom and 
Possibility,” where Leibniz reaffirms that worlds are possible relative to their own 
natures but not relative to God's will: 
For things remain possible, even if God does not choose them. Indeed, even if God 
does not will something to exist, it is possible for it to exist, since, by its nature, it 
could exist if God were to will it to exist. “But God cannot will it to exist.” I concede 
this, yet, such a thing remains possible in its nature, even if it is not possible with 
respect to the divine will, since we have defined as in its nature possible anything that, 
                                         
126 Robert Adams describes the per se analysis of contingency as Leibniz's “principal (and 
most confident) solution to the problem of contingency” (Adams 1994, 12-20). According to 
Adams, this is not only Leibniz's primary account of contingency, but one he maintained 
throughout his lifetime. However, much of the evidence for this claim comes from later texts 
(including the Theodicy) and textual evidence in favor of this view during our period is much 
more scant (excluding “On Freedom and Possibility” above). 
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in itself, implies no contradiction, even though its coexistence with God can in some 
way be said to imply a contradiction. But it will be necessary to use unequivocal 
meanings for words in order to avoid every kind of absurd locution.127  
We see the foundation for Leibniz accepting the two-fold notion of impossibility, 
which distinguishes between those things that are per se impossible (or impossible in 
themselves) and those that are impossible because they are inconsistent with God's 
will (and thus impossible only all things considered). 
In this text Leibniz connects what counts as a subject's nature, or what it is “in 
itself,” to both essences and definitions: 
Except for the existence of God alone, all existences are contingent. Moreover, the 
reason [causa] why some particular contingent thing exists, rather than others, should 
not be sought in its definition alone, but in a comparison with other things.128  
Existences are contingent because existence does not follow from the nature or 
definition of created beings (existence is per accidens), but instead requires 
additional factors, including compatibility with other creatures and ultimately 
compatibility with God’s good will.  Here, Leibniz continues to treat ‘possible’ in the 
per se sense, with respect to what is contained in the concept of the subject.   
Therefore I say: a possible thing is something which some essence or reality, that is, 
something that can distinctly be understood.129  
Further, Leibniz continues to be committed to the view that all truths are 
necessary truths in the all things considered sense because it is necessary that God 
wills what is best. 
                                         
127 AG 21. 
128 AG 19. 
129 AG 21. 
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God produces the best not by necessity but because he wills it. Indeed, if anyone were 
to ask me whether God wills by necessity, I would request that he explain what he 
means by necessity by adding more detail, that is, I would request that he give a 
complete formulation of the question. For example, you might ask whether God wills 
by necessity or whether he wills freely, that is, because of his nature or because of his 
will[...]we must say that God wills the best through his nature. “Therefore,” you will 
say, “he wills by necessity.'' I will say, with St. Augustine, that such necessity is 
blessed.130  
The opening sentence of this passage seems to affirm that God does not will the best 
by necessity.  However, Leibniz goes on to qualify that claim: it is not because this 
world is necessary that it exists, but it exists because God wills it. However, he also 
affirms that God wills the best as a result of his nature, which means God 
necessarily wills the best. Because the best world has all of its best-making features 
necessarily, it follows that God creates that world necessarily.  Because this necessity 
is not derived from the essences of created things, or God’s understanding of them, 
but additionally stems from the goodness of God’s will, the necessary existence of 
the best world is “blessed”.  Leibniz continues to be committed to two modal 
accounts in this text, one according to which this world is necessary (all things 
considered, including God's nature), and the other quasi-modal account according to 
which this world exists contingently (per se). This latter notion of contingency he 
exploits to secure God's freedom, arguing that the requisites for the existence of the 
world are not solely contained in its concept and importantly include God's 
understanding and will working together to make a deliberative choice. The per se 
possibility of worlds is enough to secure an array of options for God's will.  
Despite the similarities, Leibniz's presentation in “On Freedom and Possibility” 
differs from his discussion in the “Confession”. First, Leibniz explicitly connects 
                                         
130 AG 20. 
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necessary truths to the principle of non-contradiction, “that whatever implies a 
contradiction is false” and contingent truths to the principle of perfection “whatever 
is more perfect or has more reason is true”.131 The principle of perfection is a specific 
instance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  It says that there is a reason for all of 
God’s actions, and that reason is that that action is the best. We can demonstrate 
that a truth rests on the principle of contradiction by showing that the denial of 
that truth implies a contradiction.132 Contingent truths, on the other hand, “are 
necessary only on the hypothesis of the volition of God or of some other being” and 
“rest on the latter principle”.133  
This can be assimilated into Leibniz’s all things considered and per se views. 
With respect to the former, the denial of any truth entails a contradiction if we 
include all considerations—God’s will and his understanding of possible worlds.  The 
principle of perfection is itself a necessary truth (grounded in the nature of God), 
and thus too based on the principle of non-contradiction.  With respect to the per se 
view, the key difference between necessary and contingent truth is whether the 
requisites are entirely internal to its essence or definitional concept of the subject of 
the truth. If the denial of a proposition results in a contradiction just by appealing 
to factors internal to the essence of the subject of the proposition, then it is 
necessary. However, if the denial of a truth results in a contradiction because of 
                                         
131  AG 19. Leibniz already identifies necessary truths as those whose denial entails a 
contradiction in his early work.  But formulating this claim in terms of what is based on the 
principle of non-contradiction in contrast with what is true in virtue of the principle of 
perfection is a change in comparison with his early work.   
132 As I indicate below, the contradiction must result from features that are themselves 
necessary. 
133 AG 19. 
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factors external to the subject of the proposition, then it is contingent. So the 
difference between per se necessary and contingent truths is not whether their 
denials entail a contradiction simpliciter, but instead, whether the source of that 
contradiction is internal or external to the essence of the subject in question. So the 
per se account is integrated into Leibniz’s comments about truths that rest on the 
principle of non-contradiction and those that also rest on the principle of perfection. 
Leibniz’s notion of a contradiction here is more robust than it might seem.  For 
example, denying that a human is rational is a contradiction, although it is not 
obviously of the form p and not-p.134  The notion of a human that is not rational is a 
contradiction, both because the concept of “human” includes rationality, and because 
humans are rational essentially.  Properties and property attributions that are 
contrary to essential properties thus express contradictions.   
The per se view is markedly absent from Leibniz's 1680s texts that explicitly 
address the notion of contingency. 135  This shift has not gone unnoticed in the 
literature, and the status of the per se account as part of Leibniz’s modal theory has 
come into question. For example, Robert Sleigh highlights the fact that the per se 
defense of contingency is almost non-existent in Leibniz's “Discourse on Metaphysics” 
and “Correspondence with Arnauld.” 136  According to Sleigh, “...once Leibniz 
convinced himself of the benefits of the doctrine of infinite analysis [to account for 
contingent truths] it is not clear to me that he continued to subscribe to the [per se] 
defense...it strikes me as plausible to suppose that Leibniz was eschewing the [per se] 
                                         
134 See McFarlane 2000, 102, for a discussion of how this notion of “formal” fits into the 
history of logic. 
135 These texts include “On Contingency,” “The Source of Contingent Truths,” “Primary 
Truths,” and “Discourse on Metaphysics.” 
136 Sleigh 1990, 80. 
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defense...”137 According to the infinite analysis view, contingent truths are those 
propositions whose demonstration through the analysis of concepts would continue 
indefinitely.  
The absence of the view in the 1680s and ‘90s is significant. As Sleigh notes, 
Leibniz primarily emphasizes his infinite analysis account of contingency, but this 
proclivity stems from a crisis that Leibniz faced in spelling out the per se view. This 
crisis is important to acknowledge if we are going to understand Leibniz’s appeal to 
a per se account in his early work, as well as his account of possibility in his later 
work. In the mid-1680s Leibniz settles on an account of individual substances 
whereby their definitional concept specifies all predicates that will ever be true of 
that substance. If a definitional concept specifies all features that will ever be true of 
a substance, then on the per se view all properties of a substance are per se 
necessary, or internal to the definitional concept of the individual substance. The 
disappearance of the per se view is a function of his changing views about individual 
substances and what they are “in themselves.” In the 1680s, Leibniz came to see 
individual substances as fundamentally constituted by all of their properties. This 
renders actions, including free actions, internal to a substance as much as essential 
properties. This leaves Leibniz without an account of the quasi-contingent properties 
of substances. Thus, the per se view disappears in the ‘80s and ‘90s because Leibniz 
thought it could not account for some contingent truths, namely the contingent 
truths about substances. 
                                         
137 Sleigh 1990, 82. 
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3 The Complete Concept Account, 1672-1686 
Leibniz’s views on substantial individuation, identity, and concepts all develop 
between the time of the “Confession” and that of the “Discourse on Metaphysics” and 
Correspondence with Arnauld. By examining the logical and metaphysical 
commitments that lead Leibniz to this view, we can see how he was limited in his 
recourse to address problematic features of the per se view, and thus was led to the 
infinite analysis account of contingent. The logical commitments, namely, Leibniz's 
theory of truth and examination of the formal properties of propositions, influenced 
his views about the concepts of substances. These considerations, however, are not 
sufficient to account for his views on individuation, which derive from his thoughts 
about substances and their attributes. I will trace the changes in each of these 
together from the “Confession” to the “Discourse on Metaphysics,” so we can see why 
Leibniz withdraws the per se account and how he thinks the infinite analysis view 
fares better.  
3.1 Logical Foundations 
I will start with the logical commitments that shape Leibniz’s complete concept 
theory.138 It is helpful to see the ways in which Leibniz's views about substance 
might follow from his views about the logical structure of propositions and his 
theory of truth, although ultimately I will argue that his views about substance are 
informed by his metaphysical commitments as well. This is also Adams’ view:  
                                         
138 These are emphasized by Robert Adams in tracing the development of Leibniz's complete 
concept theory. Adams observes that in “Discourse on Metaphysics” §8; “ …Leibniz uses the 
idea of completeness to provide a purely logical characterization of individual substance. He 
virtually defines an individual substance as a thing whose definitive concept is complete...” 
(Adams 1994, 72).  
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The richly deserved prestige of Bertrand Russell's and Louis Couturat's works on 
Leibniz set a fashion of trying to see his philosophy as principally derived from his 
logic and his philosophy of language. Much in Leibniz's own work seems to invite this 
approach. But the deductive order in which Leibniz presents his doctrines, especially 
in his writings of the 1680s, is misleading. An adequate foundation of the system---or 
even a fully adequate explanation of his having held it---cannot be found in his 
philosophy of logic.139  
Leibniz’s treatment of logic and the structure of propositions explains the 
development of his views on concepts, but leaves open the question of how those 
concepts related to the world, and those objects that those concepts are about.  
Leibniz treats propositions as the bearers of truth, where the truth of a proposition 
is a function of the relationship between the concepts that make up the proposition. 
This forms the core of his Conceptual Containment Theory of Truth: 
An affirmative truth is one whose predicate is in the subject; and so in every true 
affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the notion of 
the predicate is in some way contained in the notion of the subject.140 
Leibniz expresses the key relations between concepts in terms of containment, which 
is clearest in the case of affirmative universal statements of the form all As are Bs. 
In such cases the proposition is true if the concept of the predicate, B, is contained 
in the concept of the subject, A.  
[W]e can know whether some universal affirmative proposition is true. For in this 
proposition the concept of the subject, taken absolutely and indefinitely, and in 
general regarded in itself, always contains the concept of the predicate. For example, 
all gold is metal; that is, the concept of metal is contained in the general concept of 
gold regarded in itself, so that whatever is assumed to be gold is by that very fact 
assumed to be metal. This is because all the requisites of metal (such as being 
homogeneous to the sense, liquid when fire is applied in a certain degree, and then not 
                                         
139 Adams 1994, 75. Sleigh 1990, 90, makes a similar suggestion. 
140 “Necessary and Contingent Truths,” P 96. 
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wetting things of another genus immersed in it) are contained in the requisites of 
gold... 141 
Because the concept of A (e.g. gold) contains the concept B (e.g. metal), all the 
essential features of metal are also essential features of gold.  Moreover, this entails 
that all those objects that fall under the concept gold (or are gold) also fall under 
the concept metal (all gold-things are metal-things). However, the containment 
relation is a little more complicated for affirmative particular propositions. In the 
case of particular affirmative propositions, such as some As are Bs, the containment 
of the concept of B in the concept of A cannot be the same as in the case of 
universal statements.  This is because containment guarantees that all objects that 
fall under a concept exemplify all the contained properties, so it wouldn't be possible 
for it to be the case both that some As are Bs and that some As are not Bs are 
true. Instead, Leibniz says that the concept of B is “in some way” contained in the 
concept of A, although not when the concept is considered “itself and absolutely”: 
But in the particular affirmative proposition it is not necessary that the predicate 
should be in the subject regarded in itself and absolutely; i.e. that the concept of the 
subject should in itself contain the concept of the predicate; it is enough that the 
predicate should be contained in some species of the subject, i.e. that the concept of 
some instance or species of the subject should contain the concept of the predicate, 
even though it is not stated expressly what the species is.142 
 The containment involved in particular affirmative proposition, in contrast to 
universal propositions, is one where the containment is grounded in further 
specification of concepts in the subject. Leibniz continues to trade upon the 
distinction between what is contained in the nature of the subject “itself” versus 
what is external to it.  
                                         
141 P 22. 
142 P 23. 
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Consequently, if you say, ‘Some experienced man is prudent’, it is not said that the 
concept of the prudent man is contained in the concept of the experienced man 
regarded in itself. Nor again, is this denied; it is enough for our purpose that some 
species of experienced man has a concept which contains the concept of the prudent 
man, even though it is not stated expressly just what that species is.143 
Thus in the above passage Leibniz distinguishes what is contained in the concept 
EXPERIENCED MAN “regarded in itself” from what is included through some 
additional specification to yield the inclusion of the concept PRUDENT. This same 
distinction, which is also the foundation for the per se view, is based on the idea 
that beings have natures constituted by the essence and specified by the definitional 
concept, but these essential features do not exhaust all the features of a concept.144  
The conceptual containment theory of truth can be extended to negative 
propositions, such as no A is B and some A is not B, by treating the negated 
predicate as included in concepts. So in the universal case, no A is B means that the 
concept A includes the concept not-B, and in the particular case some A is not-B 
means that the concept A, with some further specification, includes the concept not-
B.145 
                                         
143 P 23. Also see P 19: “...thus the concept of gold, regarded in itself and taken absolutely, 
involves the concept of metal, for the concept of gold is ‘the heaviest metal’. But in a 
particular affirmative proposition, it is enough that the inclusion should hold with some 
addition. The concept of metal, regarded absolutely and taken in itself, does not involve the 
concept of gold; for to do so, something must be added. This ‘something’ is the sign of 
particularity; for there is some certain metal which contains the concept of gold.” 
144 Thus Leibniz offers an account of the definitional concepts of certain terms (often species 
terms) where the definitional concept is incomplete i.e. does not include every feature that 
objects falling under that category have.  See Rutherford 1995, 119-24, for an insightful 
discussion of the connection between incomplete and complete concepts. 
145 AG 11. Here Leibniz is not clear whether “not-B” is included explicitly as “not-B” or 
instead implicitly by including something that entails being not-B.  For example, if it is true 
that no emeralds are blue, then on Leibniz’s view this means that the concept of emerald 
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Later, in 1686, Leibniz considers whether propositions with terms picking out 
individuals in the subject position (singular propositions, such as Socrates is mortal) 
should be treated as universal propositions or particular propositions. These sorts of 
propositions are not obviously universal or particular in character, because universal 
and particular propositions treat the relationship between categories of things.  And 
it is not clear whether the concept of an individual subject is a type of category (for 
example, a category that has only one member).  Because Leibniz is committed to 
the conceptual containment theory of truth, he aims to integrate singular 
propositions using the logical resources he developed for universal and particular 
propositions.  One of the constraints is that affirmative and negative singular 
propositions are contradictories. For example, Caesar crosses the Rubicon, and 
Caesar does not cross the Rubicon are contradictories.  If Leibniz identifies singular 
propositions as universal statements, then they are of a special sort because 
universal affirmative and universal negative statements are not contradictories, 
because they can both be false. For example, all swans are black and no swans are 
black are black are both false. Leibniz is inclined to treat singular propositions as a 
type of universal proposition, but he does not want to concede that it is possible for 
both Caesar crosses the Rubicon and Caesar doesn’t cross the Rubicon to be false.  
For singular propositions to be formally treated as universal propositions where the 
affirmative and negative versions are contradictories, Leibniz must further develop 
the associated concept of the individual. Accordingly, the concepts of individuals 
must contain a predicate or the negation of a predicate for each possible predicate, 
                                                                                                                   
contains the concept “not-Blue”.  It’s not clear, however, whether the content of the concept 
it merely “not-Blue” or instead “green” which entails “not-blue”.   
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so that when the affirmative is true the negative is false, and vice versa. This means 
that for any predicate, no further specification is required to ensure that either the 
concept of a predicate or the negation of that predicate is included in the concept. 
The result is that singular propositions are a special type of universal proposition146, 
but because the concepts of individuals are fully specified, affirmative and negative 
versions of the same singular propositions are contradictory. As Leibniz explains the 
point:  
Some logical difficulties worth solution have occurred to me. How is it that opposition 
is valid in the case of singular propositions----e.g. ‘The Apostle Peter is a soldier’ and 
‘The Apostle Peter is not a soldier’---since elsewhere a universal affirmative and a 
particular negative are opposed? Should we say that a singular proposition is 
equivalent to a particular and to a universal proposition? Yes, we should[...]For ‘some 
Apostle Peter’ and ‘every Apostle Peter’ coincide, since the term is singular.147  
Thus in order to ensure that the concepts of individual subjects render the logic of 
conceptual containment consistent with universal and particular propositions, 
Leibniz treats the concept of an individual as complete not merely because it 
specifies properties of an individual subject, but because for any possible feature it 
specifies whether that feature is contained in it or not.148  So for any feature, a 
properly complete concept will indicate whether that feature is included in the 
concept or not.  The complete concept view thus allows singular propositions to be 
assimilated into the framework of universal and particular categorical propositions.  
                                         
146 There is a sense in which this analysis of singular propositions renders them a special type 
of particular proposition.  First, because the contradictory of a universal affirmative is a 
particular negative.    
147 P 115. 
148 For a further discussion of the logical basis for the complete concept view, see Adams 
1994, 60-63. 
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Individual concepts can be treated as a type of category, as long the inclusion or 
exclusion of each possible property in that category is specified.   
However, even if the logic of propositions explains why singular concepts are 
complete, it does not establish that the complete concepts must be the concepts of 
substances. If we concede that the conceptual containment that renders particular 
propositions true holds in virtue of further specifications of the subject term, we 
might also treat “Caesar crosses the Rubicon” as true in virtue of further 
specifications of Caesar. Now this would mean that “Caesar crosses the Rubicon” 
and “Caesar does not cross the Rubicon” are not contradictories without further 
specification of the concept CAESAR. But we need to know why, according to 
Leibniz, we shouldn't treat the concept of the substance CAESAR as something that 
requires further specification, so that crossing the Rubicon need not be included in 
Caesar’s concept.  Just as the containment involved in particular propositions is the 
result of conceiving of the subject not absolutely and in itself, but with further 
specifications, substance terms, such as “Caesar” could be conceived as concepts that 
require further specification.  However, Leibniz does not treat substance-terms like 
the subject-terms of particular propositions.  Instead, Leibniz identifies substances 
with complete concepts, or fully specified concepts. But the logic of propositions 
does not tell us why we should be committed to the view that denying and affirming 
the same predicate of a subject that is an individual must yield a contradiction from 
the content of the concept of the individual alone. So the logic of singular 
propositions is insufficient to explain why complete concepts should be adopted as 
an account of substances and their properties.  The answer to this question is that 
during the late 1670s to mid-80s Leibniz was developing not only his conceptual 
containment theory of truth, but also his theory of substances. To see why complete 
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concepts are appropriate definitions of substances, we must turn to that 
development. 
3.2 Metaphysical foundations  
In the Discourse on Metaphysics §8 Leibniz presents his account of substances.  
He endorses Aristotle’s account of substance, but claims it does not supply a proper 
definition of substances as individuals: 
It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributed to a single subject and 
this subject is attributed to no other, it is called an individual substance; but this is 
not sufficient, and such an explanation is merely nominal.  We must therefore consider 
what is to be attributed truly to a certain subject.149 
Nominal definitions, for Leibniz, are definitions that uniquely specify some object or 
category of objects, but fail to specify all of the necessary and sufficient conditions 
required to be that particular object or fall under that category.150  Put another way, 
nominal definitions offer ways to identify and distinguish objects that have a certain 
feature, but fail to capture the essence, or full nature of a being: 
The purpose of nominal definitions is to give marks sufficient for recognizing things.  
For example, assayers have marks by which they distinguish gold from any other 
metal, and even if a person had never seen gold, he can be taught theses infallible 
marks for recognizing it, should he encounter it one day.151    
                                         
149 ““Discourse on Metaphysics” §8, AG 41. Aristotle’s view is that “A substance—that 
which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither 
said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse” (Categories 
5.12). 
150 “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas,” AG 24-26; “Discourse on Metaphysics” §24, 
AG 57.   
151 “On What Is Independent of Sense and Matter,” letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of 
Prussia, AG 186. 
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Leibniz adds to Aristotle’s definition “the nature of an individual substance or of a 
complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to 
allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is 
attributed.”152 As we saw in the previous section, the logic of singular propositions 
alone does not explain why complete concepts should serve as the definition of 
individual substances.  Below, we will explore the metaphysical considerations that 
lead Leibniz to adding to Aristotle’s view. 
In the “Confession”, Leibniz claims that circumstances external to a substance 
serve as the principle of individuation. He entertains the possibility that there are 
two numerically distinct eggs that do not differ in any observable way except their 
spatial location.153 He extends these considerations to numerically distinct souls, 
treating their distinguishing features as a function of their material conditions in the 
world—or conditions of time and place.154 Leibniz emphasizes that to ask why a soul 
endures the material circumstances it does is to ask why that soul is that soul. He 
goes as far as to say that had a different soul been placed in those very 
circumstances as the original soul, it would be identical to that soul. This affirms 
both that the soul’s circumstances of time and place are external to the nature of 
that soul but also constitute the soul's identity. He suggests that (at least some of) 
these conditions are necessary for the identity of that soul: 
                                         
152 “Discourse on Metaphysics” §8, AG 41. 
153 Leibniz repeats this comment in his 1680 “Metaphysical Definitions and Reflections:” “Now 
with the aid of time and place we can also distinguish individuals, and decide which are the 
same and which are difference; for example, if I have two eggs in front of me that are similar 
and equal throughout, and I want to distinguish them…” (LOC 243). 
154 CP 106-7. 
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If someone is indignant that he was not born of a queen, and, on the other hand, that 
his own mother did not give birth to a king, then he is indignant that he himself is not 
another.155  
While this passage does not confirm that all of a subject's external circumstances or 
attributes are necessary for being that particular individual, it does confirm that at 
least some of them are. Moreover, Leibniz might well have committed himself to the 
stronger claim that all external material conditions constitute identity: 
For neither God nor anyone blessed would be blessed, nor would even exist, unless the 
series of things were as it is.156  
So Leibniz is operating with a notion of what is internal versus external to a 
subject, where the spatial and temporal relations and circumstances count both as 
external and individuating for subjects. When Leibniz discusses the nature of 
concepts of individuals in the “Confession”, he highlights their essential features, so 
the concept of an individual need not specify all of its properties. So, conceptually, 
the definitional notion of a substance need not extend to all predicates of that 
substance, and further need not extend to what accounts for the numerical identity 
of subjects—their embodiment or circumstances of time and place.  
Leibniz's views on individuation develop with his consideration of the causal 
histories of entities. In April 1676, he worries that if there can be numerically 
distinct entities that are intrinsically identical, we can have perfect knowledge of 
their intrinsic properties (i.e. perfect knowledge of the entities as effects) even 
though they have different causes. Such cases would violate the principle that 
                                         
155 CP 107. 
156 CP 101. 
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knowledge of the effect yields knowledge of the cause. 157  For example, we can 
construct intrinsically identical squares (squares with the same side-length), using 
different construction procedures: first by joining two triangles and second by joining 
two rectangles. In this case the effects (the squares) are intrinsically identical and 
yet their productive histories diverge, that is, they have different causes. The lesson 
he takes away from the consideration of the squares is that individuals, genuine 
individuals, must differ intrinsically in some way, for those individuals have distinct 
causes which cannot be discerned if they are intrinsically identical.  Leibniz 
concludes that there is some intrinsic feature of the nature of the individual that 
reflects its causal history, and serves as a principle of individuation.   
During Leibniz’s early work, he accepts that the principle of individuation can be 
external to an individual substance.  On my reading Leibniz associates the specific 
reason for an individual with what is per se necessarily true of it, but does not 
                                         
157 “We say that the effect involves its cause; that is, in such a way that whoever understands 
some effect perfectly will also arrive at the knowledge of its cause. For it is necessary that 
there is some connection between complete cause and the effect. But on the other hand there 
is this obstacle: that different causes can produce an effect that is perfectly the same. For 
example, whether two parallelograms or two triangles are put together in the appropriate 
way (as is evident here) the same square will, as is clear, always be produced. Neither of 
these can be distinguished from the other in any way, not even by the wisest being. So, given 
a square of this kind, it will be in the power of no one---not even the wisest being---to 
discover its cause, since the problem is not determinate. The effect, therefore, seems not to 
involve its cause” (DSR 51). The problem that Leibniz is raising here is that if what 
individuates a substance are features external to its nature, then knowledge of its nature will 
not yield knowledge of its cause.  
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include its full individual nature in its per se properties because that is founded in 
things external to the individual.158  
In my view a substance, or, a complete being, is that by which itself involves all 
things, or, for the perfect understanding of which the understanding of nothing else is 
required. A shape is not of this kind; for in order to understand from what shape of 
such and such a kind has arisen, we need to have recourse to motion. Each complete 
being can be produced in only one way; the fact that figures can be produced in 
various ways is a sufficient indication that they are not complete beings.159  
Leibniz's sentiments here are not immediately clear, but I think we can fill them out 
in a plausible way that foreshadows the view he holds in the Discourse on 
Metaphysics 10 years later. Originally, Leibniz treats the causal history as 
individuating, rending the individuating principle as external to the individual.  
Eventually, he came to assimilate the causal history of the substance into the very 
nature of that substance. Thus instead of an entity resulting from an external causal 
process, complete entities include and are constituted by (an internal) causal 
processes. Leibniz takes those processes to be unique, and the unique causal histories 
can in turn be understood to constitute the unique identity of the substance itself. 
Thus Leibniz continues to accept that causal histories individuate, but ultimately 
decides that those causal histories are internal to a substance and part of its nature 
as an individual, which is part of what it means to be ‘complete’.  
Leibniz develops his views of the concepts that correspond to substances as 
specifying the complete nature of those substances, capturing what individuates 
                                         
158 Cf. Leibniz’s claim: “It will also follow that the effect does not involve the cause in 
accordance with its specific reason, but in accordance with its individual reason, and 
therefore that one thing does not differ from another in itself” (DSR 51; emphasis added). 
159 DSR 115. 
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them. In propositions where a substance-term appears, the corresponding concept is 
a substance’s compete concept. As Leibniz explains in a 1679 text: 
[I]f the same thing is B and C and D and E, etc., and this is due to the fact that this 
very thing is A, then A will be a substance or a complete term. Therefore, in a 
complete term nothing inheres by accident, i.e. every predicate of it may be deduced 
from its nature ... From all this the principle of individuation, about which many 
scholastics have disputed in vain, becomes evident. Titius is vigorous, learned, 
handsome, fifty years old, a sentient being, rational, etc. But the concept from which 
there follow all those things that can be said of him is the concept of his singular 
substance.160  
By 1679, then, we have the development of a complete concept, which serves as 
the principle of individuation for substances.161 There is a distinctive development in 
Leibniz’s treatment of the concepts of individuals as complete, but the justification 
for treating those concepts as the defining feature of substances has to do with the 
development of his views on substances and their natures as complete. When Leibniz 
shifts from an external principle of individuation to an internal principle, the nature 
of that very substance comes to include explanations for all their features, which are 
all internal to the nature of the substance and necessary and sufficient for their 
individuation.162  
                                         
160 A VI.vi 306. 
161 In fact, there is evidence of the complete concept account of substance as early as 1676: 
“In my view a substance, or, a complete being, is that which by itself involves all things, or, 
for the perfect understanding of which the understanding of nothing else is required…each 
complete being can be produced in only one way; the fact that figures can be produced in 
various ways is a sufficient indication that they are not complete beings.” (“Notes on 
Metaphysics,” DSR 115) 
162 This is not a complete philosophical defense of Leibniz’s view here.  For Leibniz assumes it 
is the totality of extrinsic features that individuate, before he comes to understand those 
features as internal to a substance.  Here I have not offered a defense of why all of those 
features should be individuating as opposed to a subset of them.  
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4 The Complete Concept Account, 1686 
In §8 of the “Discourse on Metaphysics,” Leibniz offers an account of substances 
and their corresponding concepts: 
[W]e can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to 
have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce 
from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed.163  
Individual substances each have a notion or concept and that complete concept 
specifies all the predicates or features of the subject. This, in and of itself, is not a 
particularly robust philosophical principle. It is connected to God’s omniscience, for 
if we accept that a complete concept serves as God's representation of a substance in 
his intellect and God is omniscient, and thus knows all properties that will inhere in 
a substance, then the complete concept will specify all of the properties of a 
substance164 However, God's omniscience does not mandate the complete concept 
view, for one can accept that God knows everything about a substance—or all 
truths are represented in God's intellect about a substance—without the concept of 
the substance including all of those features. Instead, God could know all truths 
about a substance derived from some facts about the substance plus facts about the 
world the substance is in. Thus, there is no need to say that a substance’s concept 
must be complete in order for God's cognitive representation of that substance to be 
complete. What we will see, however, is that because worlds are composed of 
substances, knowledge about the world will supervene on knowledge about 
                                         
163 AG 41. 
164 “It could be said that it is not in virtue of this notion or idea that he must perform this 
action, since it pertains to him only because God knows everything” (“Discourse on 
Metaphysics” §12, AG 45). 
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substances. This is not an argument for the view, but an explanation of how it fits 
into Leibniz's system. What renders the complete concept theory a robust 
philosophical principle is that Leibniz claims that not only do substances have 
complete concepts but further those concepts account for that individual substances 
haecceity or thisness, or what makes that substance numerically distinct from other 
substances.  
God, seeing Alexander's individual notion or haecceity, sees in it at the same time the 
basis and reason for all the predicates which can be said truly of him, for example, 
that he vanquished Darius and Porus; he even knows a priori (and not by experience) 
whether he died a natural death or whether he was poisoned, something we can know 
only through history.165  
Leibniz commits himself to something even stronger than the claim that the 
complete concept accounts for a substances haeccetiy. For Leibniz identifies the 
haecceity of a substance with the whole complete concept, thus ruling out that a 
mere subset of predicates included in the concept account for the numerical 
uniqueness of a substance. He asserts that since all the properties are specified by a 
complete concept, a substance is numerically distinct from any other substance. The 
complete concept not only accounts for why a substance is an individual, it accounts 
for why the substance is that individual, i.e. has a specific identity. The complete 
concept spells out the identity of a substance by specifying all of the properties a 
substance must have. Leibniz’s complete concept account of substances includes 3 
principles regarding the character and role of substantial concepts: 
1. Complete: A substantial concept specifies all predicates that will ever be 
true of a substance. 
 
                                         
165 “Discourse on Metaphysics” §8, AG 41. 
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2. Individuation: A substantial concept accounts for the haecceity of a 
substance; a substance with a complete concept is numerically distinct from 
any other substance. 
 
3. Identity: A substantial concept specifies all the properties necessary and 
jointly sufficient in order to be that substance. Thus, for example, the 
concept of Adam specifies all the properties such that if some substance x 
lacks one of those properties, then x is not identical to Adam. Further if 
some substance has all the properties specified by Adam's concept, then 
that substance is identical to Adam.166  
 
These principles need not be accepted together (although accepting 3 entails 
accepting 2), and they serve as theses about the specificity of concepts, what makes 
a substance an individual and what makes a substance that particular individual. 
From these theses Leibniz concludes; 
[I]t follows that it is not true that two substances can resemble each other completely 
and differ only in number [solo numero], and that what Saint Thomas asserts on this 
point about angels or intelligences (that here every individual is a lowest species) is 
true of all substances...167 
                                         
166 This principle is composed of two theses that need not be accepted together. The first has 
to do with the necessary identity conditions, and the second with the sufficient identity 
conditions. One could accept that the concept specifies sufficient but not necessary 
conditions for identity. Leibniz seems to accept both these principles, in accordance with his 
view that jointly necessary conditions constitute a sufficient condition. 
167 “Discourse on Metaphysics” §9, AG 42. Thomas Aquinas defines ‘lowest species’ as a 
species that cannot be divided into further species: “...in order for things in the same genus 
to differ specifically they must have contrariety of differences while being undivided,” i.e., 
when they are not further divided into species, as the lowest species, “And these are said to 
be undivided inasmuch as they are not further divided formally. But particular things are 
said to be undivided inasmuch as they are not further divided either formally or materially” 
(Aquinas 1995, Lect. 10, 2123). According to Aquinas some individuals in the same species 
result from form applied to parcels of matter. However, this account of individuation does 
not work for angels because angels do not have a material component. Aquinas argues that 
angels are not individuals of the same species, but instead each their own species. I take 
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According to Leibniz, his complete concept view entails that no two numerically 
distinct substances can share all the same properties (or have the same complete 
concept).  
The complete concept view has other important implications for his metaphysics. 
Leibniz no longer thinks of substances as being spatiotemporally related to other 
substances, but instead thinks of a substance as a being that brings about the 
changes in its representation of the world.168 Individual substances are structured by 
the series of changes they undergo, which represents the series of things in the world.  
[I]t is very true that the perceptions or expression of all substances mutually 
correspond in such a way that each one, carefully following certain reasons or laws it 
has observed, coincides with others doing the same—in the same way that several 
people who have aged to meet in some place at some specified time can really do this 
if they so desire.169  
Each substance has not merely an aggregate of states, but a progression of states 
guided by the original state of the substance and the law of development of that 
substance.170  As an analogy, consider choreographed group dance.  Each dancer 
knows the series of moves, according to the music and timing, such that even if the 
group did not have time to practice together, each could follow their own script 
about their series of movements, and as the result dance together as a whole.  
                                                                                                                   
Leibniz to identify with Aquinas's view insofar as Leibniz claims that the concept of a 
substance cannot be realized or instantiated in multiple parcels of matter, thus you cannot 
have numerically distinct creatures with one and the same complete concept. 
168 Leibniz describes substances as perceiving the world from a particular point of view, but 
here I do not want to issue a decision regarding whether substances are fundamentally mind-
like, or whether there are corporeal substances as well.  For a discussion of these issues in 
connection to the complete concept view, see Garber 2009, 181-224. 
169 “Discourse on Metaphysics” §14, AG 47. 
170 The phrase ‘law of development’ is introduced by Sleigh 1990, 53. 
   
 
 
111
 
Leibniz thinks of substances in the same way, each proceeding according to their 
own script, which, like the dancers, can result in a coordinated effort even if no one 
substance is interacting with another.  The important question, the one that I will 
explore especially with respect to possible free decrees, is just how coordinated do 
the unfolding natures of substances have to be for them to form a world?   
 To start answering this question, it is important to recognize the role of laws 
in structuring the events that unfold as substances endure different states.  First, as 
noted above, each substance is an individual and differs in at least one feature from 
every other individual.  Leibniz explains that each individual experiences the world 
from their own perspective, constrained by the time and place of their body and 
subsequent perceptual experiences.  We all experience roughly the same world, but 
since we experience it in different ways, individual substances are not identical.  
Each substance has a unique developmental law, one that dictates every single 
feature that is part of their nature.   
Thus a thing not only remains in the state in which it is, insofar as it depends on 
itself, but also continues to change when it is in a state of change, always following one 
and the same law.  But in my opinion it is in nature of created substance to change 
continually following a certain order which leads it spontaneously…through all the 
states which it encounters, in such a way that he who sees all things sees all its past 
and future states in its present.  And this law of order, which constitutes the 
individuality of each particular substance, is in exact agreement with what occurs to 
every other substance and throughout the whole universe.171  
The law of development connects past and future states of a substance. The law of 
development for an individual constitutes its essence, and is thus per se necessary. 
The development law includes all things that the substance will undergo, including 
miracles or those events that go beyond the natural powers of the individual 
                                         
171 L 493. 
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substance.  There are two other important categories of laws.  First, there is the 
general law of order for a world, which includes a law for the series of things that 
occur at that world, including miracles. Leibniz explains that all substances must 
reflect this general law in their nature in order to “enter into this same universe.”172 
However, there are also laws of nature that are subsets of the general law of a 
universe. By reflecting the same general law, and subordinate laws, substances are 
coordinated with one another. For example, at this world our veridical perceptions 
of bodily motions indicate that they follow the law of conservation of momentum.173  
The transformation of Leibniz’s notion of substance has two important results for 
his accounts of modality. First, the complete concept view of substances renders per 
se modality problematic when applied to individual substances. If all features of a 
substance make up the essence or concept of that substance, then all features of a 
substance are per se necessary. In the “Confession”, Leibniz holds that only 
incomplete concepts specify essences. But in the 1680s, complete concepts of 
substances introduce an exception, for they specify the essence of individual 
substances. Thus, Alexander's kingship is per se necessary because it follows from 
the concept or essence of Alexander as an individual substance. Trying to make 
sense of our modal terminology in terms of the intrinsic features of a subject fails to 
                                         
172 LA 51. See also “Discourse on Metaphysics” §7, AG 40. 
173 See “Discourse on Metaphysics” §17, AG 49, for a discussion of the law of conservation of 
momentum.  There is much more to be said here about other laws of substances, including 
those that govern the correlation between physical and mental phenomena.  I am not yet 
decided on just how many laws must overlap for substances to be part of the same world, but 
it cannot be so strong that all of the subordinate laws overlap, for that leaves little room for 
there to be different amounts of harmony in different aggregations of substances.  These laws 
need not be restricted to physical laws but could include morality and other normative rules.   
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account for the distinction between the contingent and necessary properties of 
substances, or de re modality.   
The second result is that possible worlds are constituted by possible substances, 
and a transformation in the nature of substances has corresponding effects on the 
constitution of possible worlds.  In his early work, Leibniz treats worlds as “series of 
things”, so that events in a world are constituted by substances and their relations.  
When substances bear spatio-temporal relations to one another, it is clear how the 
existence of one (in a particular time and place) can exclude the existence of another 
(in that same time and place).  In the 1680s, instead of thinking of substances as 
entities that are causally related , Leibniz starts to think of created substances as 
causally isolated from other created substances.  This stems from the complete 
concept theory of substance, which entails that all of the features of a substance 
originate from its own nature, and not causally from other substances.  If a 
substance’s features depended on the causal activity of other substances, then the 
complete concept would make reference to other substances.  This is an 
unacceptable sort of dependence between substances for Leibniz, who claims that,  
[E]ach substance is like a world apart, independent of all other things, except for God; 
thus all our phenomena, that is, all the things that can ever happen to us, are only 
consequences of our being.174  
Call Leibniz’s claim about the independence of substances his world apart view. 175  
On this view, causal relations among objects are reinterpreted as grounded in 
individual substances perceiving the world as though there are relations between 
                                         
174 “Discourse on Metaphysics” §14, AG 47. 
175 I will offer a further interpretation of the World Apart claim when discussion possible free 
decrees and compossibility.  For further discussion of this doctrine see Sleigh 1990, 143-44.  
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these objects. There continue to be genuine causal relations in the world, but those 
relations are internal to substances and do not hold between substances. 
Accordingly, substances no longer depend on other substances for their properties. 
For example, a prince is not a prince in virtue of being born to a queen. A prince is 
a prince because he experiences the world as though he were born to a queen.  In 
this case, the prince does not causally depend on the queen for existence.  Or further 
consider having a conversation with the person operating the cash register at the 
grocery store.  According to Leibniz, the cashier does not place the change in your 
hand by transferring coins onto you palm, but instead, each of you experiences the 
interaction from your own perspective, with the appearance of coins in my palm the 
result of the series of events that follow from my very nature. The history and 
development of these changes in Leibniz's views are vexed in many ways, but the key 
insight introduced into Leibniz's metaphysics is the idea that the most fundamental 
units of reality are individual substances that have experiences as if there is a 
causally interacting material world.176  The features of a substance no longer depend 
upon other substances, and instead the explanation for the origins of those features 
must be internal to a substance (excepting their creation and conservation by God). 
Accordingly, the nature of a substance includes everything that will ever happen to 
that substance.  
Understanding substances as causally isolated changes the possible patterns of co-
existence, or co-instantiation, of substances in worlds.  According to Leibniz, 
patterns of co-instantiation are captured by what he calls compossibility.  Two 
                                         
176  See Mugnai 2004 for an enlightening discussion of the origin of Leibniz’s view of 
substances. 
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substances are compossible if they can co-exist.  Two substances are incompossible if 
the existence of one excludes or is incompatible with the existence of another.  
When Leibniz introduces a causally isolated version of substances, it seems to make 
room for the possibility that all substances are compossible.  If substances do not 
causally interact, and if spatio-temporal relations are grounded in features internal 
to substances, then it is not clear how the existence of one substance could exclude 
the existence of another.  This issue is of deep importance for understanding the 
structure of possible worlds, for worlds are shaped by compossibility relations.  
These questions about the structure of possible worlds are particularly acute 
because I will argue that Leibniz’s best account of quasi-contingency, possible free 
decrees, is based on the notion that the nature of substances is structured according 
to laws, and these laws vary from world to world. I will turn to Leibniz’s account of 
de re modality, to clarify his notion of substances and their de re properties, which, 
or so I will argue, depend upon variations in subordinate laws world-to-world.   
Once we clarify the quasi-modal features of substances we will return to the 
structure of possible worlds and the nature of compossibility.   
5 Leibniz’s Problematic Account of De re 
Modality 
5.1 Arnauld’s Worry 
In February of 1686, Leibniz sends Arnauld the titles of each section of the 
Discourse on Metaphysics. The title to §13 explains:  
Since the individual concept of each person contains once for all everything that will 
ever happen to him, one sees in it the a priori proofs or reasons for the truth of each 
event, or why one event has occurred rather than another. But these truths, though 
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certain, are nevertheless contingent, being based on the freewill of God and of 
creatures.177  
Arnauld worries that the complete concept account of substance precludes the 
distinction between necessary and contingent properties:  
But I find it merely strange that all human events are as necessary by hypothetical 
necessity from this single supposition that God wished to create Adam, as it is 
necessary by hypothetical necessity that there was in the world a nature capable of 
thought from the supposition alone that he wished to create me.178  
Arnauld's reservation is that the complete concept theory of substance undermines 
the modal difference between “Caeasar crosses the Rubicon” and “Caesar is a 
thinking thing” relative to Caesar's existence. Thus each of the following 
hypotheticals are necessary:  
 
If Caesar exists, then Caesar crosses the Rubicon. 
If Caesar exists, then Caesar is a thinking thing. 
 
Leibniz, in the Discourse acknowledges just this problem:  
And it is true that we are maintaining that everything that must happen to a person 
is already contained virtually in his nature or notion, just as the properties of a circle 
are contained in its definition; thus the difficulty still remains.179  
Here, “the difficulty” Leibniz is observing is that if we define necessary properties 
according to per se necessity, then all features of a substance are per se necessary 
because all features of a substance follow from the concept or essence. Leibniz's 
                                         
177 LA 5. 
178 Arnauld to Leibniz, LA 26. 
179 AG 45. 
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worry is not that all features of a substance are necessaryATC, for, on my view, he has 
already conceded that is true in virtue of necessitarianism. Instead, his worry is that 
he has failed to offer an account of whatever distinction we are tracking when we 
consider the contingent features of a substance. We can state this problem with 
respect to each: 
 
Version 1: Argument from Conceptual Containment180 
1. If a truth follows from the concept of a thing alone, then it's necessarily true. 
2. That Caesar crosses the Rubicon follows from Caesar's complete concept. 
3. Therefore it is necessary that Caesar crosses the Rubicon. 
 
Version 2: Argument from Essential Containment 
1. If a truth follows from the essence of a subject alone, then it is necessarily 
true. 
2. That Caesar crosses the Rubicon follows from Caesar's essence. 
3. Therefore it is necessary that Caesar crosses the Rubicon. 
 
The problem is that if we accept that the best account of what we mean by 
“contingency” is what is not intrinsic to the concept or essence of the subject, then 
there are no contingent features of substances.181 The per se proxy account thus fails 
to account for this distinction. Arnauld identifies a similar problem, not because 
                                         
180 In contemporary terms this is an argument from analyticity. If all truths are analytically 
true, and all analytic truths are necessary, then all truths are necessary. Thus if it's 
analytically true that Caesar crosses the Rubicon, then it is necessarily true. 
181 Except, perhaps, existence or non-existence. 
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Arnauld is directly committed to the per se view, but because he accepts that 
necessary truths are those that are entailed by conceptual containment. Arnauld 
worries about the necessary connection between being Arnauld and being a 
theologian, so that Arnauld’s being a theologian is hypothetically necessary relative 
to Arnauld’s existence.  Before turning to Leibniz's explanation of the sense in which 
it is not necessary that Caesar crosses the Rubicon, it is helpful to examine three 
proposed de re modal accounts that are inadequate for Leibniz's purposes: 
accounting for de re contingency via reduction to truth in a world, via counterparts, 
and via hypothetical necessity.  
5.2 Three Rejected Proposals 
5.2.1 Reduction to Truth in a World 
One way to differentiate properties modally is to identify essential properties as 
those properties that a substance has at every world that includes it. Accidental or 
contingent properties are thus those properties that a substance has in at least one 
world that includes it, but not at all such worlds. On this view Caesar's crossing the 
Rubicon is contingent because there are some worlds where Caesar crosses the 
Rubicon and there are other worlds where Caesar fails to cross the Rubicon.  
Leibniz cannot accept this solution because of his strict notion of identity of 
substances, according to which all properties included in the complete concept are 
requisites for being identical with that very substance. For example, Leibniz thinks 
that even free actions, including sinning, can form part of the identity of a 
substance.  
But someone else will say, why is it that [Judas] will assuredly commit this sin? The 
reply is easy: otherwise it would not be this man. For God sees from all time that 
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there will be a certain Judas whose notion or idea (which God has) contains his free 
and future action. Therefore only this question remains, why does such a Judas, the 
traitor, who is merely possible in God's idea, actually exist?182  
If the notion of crossing the Rubicon is contained in Caesar’s concept, then a 
substance that fails to cross the Rubicon is not Caesar. Thus Caesar crosses the 
Rubicon at all worlds that include Caesar. Treating de re contingency in terms of 
truth in a world does not yield a distinction between necessary and contingent 
properties. 
In the correspondence, Arnauld resists the idea that all features of a substance 
constitute its identity:  
Since it is impossible that I should not always have remained myself, whether I had 
married or lived in celibacy, the individual concept of myself contained neither of these 
two states...That is why, Sir, it seems to me that I must consider as contained in the 
individual concept of myself only that which is such that I should no longer be me if it 
were not in me...183  
Arnauld points out that Leibniz’s complete concept account of substance renders all 
of a substance’s properties essential for its identity. Leibniz does not recoil at this 
suggestion. Instead, he affirms that an individual cannot lack a single property and 
remain that very individual. Leibniz agrees with Arnauld that the concept of an 
individual specifies the very nature of that individual, and even further agrees that 
the nature of an individual includes all those features that an individual must have 
in order to exist. However, Leibniz claims that only all of an individual's properties 
meet this requirement.  
                                         
182 “Discourse on Metaphysics” §30, AG 61. 
183 LA 30. 
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5.2.2 Counterparts 
In his correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz countenances the idea that there 
are an infinite number of possible Adams: 
When one considers in Adam a part of his predicates, for instance that he is the first 
man, placed in a garden of pleasure, from whose rib God draws forth a woman, and 
similar things conceived in a general way[...]and that the person to whom these 
predicates are attributed is called Adam, all this is not enough to determine that 
individual, for there can be an infinite number of Adams, that is to say of possible 
people differing one from another, who fit that description.184  
If we employ an incomplete concept of Adam, holding fixed features like “first person 
placed in the garden of pleasure”, then we can subsequently identify different Adams 
included in other possible worlds. By treating the concept of Adam as incomplete, 
we can identify the sense in which Adam contingently sins by pointing to the fact 
that there is some substance in an alternative possible world that was placed in the 
garden of pleasure but (unlike the Adam under consideration) fails to sin. On this 
view, properties are contingent as long as there is some counterpart, picked out by 
an incomplete concept, that is part of some possible world and fails to have the 
property in question.  
This strategy is promising, not only because Leibniz employs incomplete concepts 
in his exchange with Arnauld, but also because those concepts seem to offer a 
plausible route to distinguish contingent properties from necessary ones.185 Leibniz 
does seem to accept that in some cases what we express by “Adam” is an incomplete 
                                         
184 LA 46. 
185 This account of contingency is defended in Mondadori 1973 and 1975. Mondadori focuses 
on Leibniz's later texts, including the Theodicy. Mondadori makes a compelling case, 
particularly in Leibniz's later texts, but Leibniz's comments in the Leibniz-Arnauld 
correspondence indicate that this is not the route Leibniz had in mind in the 1680s. 
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concept. However, Leibniz does not offer a counterpart theory to account for 
contingency. 
[M]y supposition is not simply that God wished to create an Adam of whom the 
concept is vague and incomplete, but that God wished to create a particular Adam 
sufficiently determinate for an individual. And this complete individual concept in my 
opinion embraces relationships with the whole succession of things…186 
Leibniz thus does not endorse the incomplete concept account of individual 
substances. He emphasizes that although we might treat the concept of a substance 
as incomplete in some contexts, the concept of a substance is complete and fully 
specific. Anaylizing substance-terms with incomplete concepts is a type of linguistic 
solution, according to which substance-terms in propositions are treated in terms of 
incomplete concepts for modal judgments. This offers the promise of a counterpart 
view, but this view does not address a deeper metaphysical question about just what 
it is about the properties of Caesar—as an individual whose nature and concept 
entail those properties—that makes them contingent in some cases and necessary in 
others. Pointing out that there is some substance similar to Caeser in another world 
that fails to have the relevant contingent property in question does not offer a full 
enough story about what differences there are, internal to Caesar's nature or 
concept, that grounds this difference.  
5.2.3 Hypothetical Necessity 
A third option is to notice that we can accept that the conditional, if Caesar 
exists, then Caesar crosses the Rubicon, is necessary without accepting that it is 
necessary that Caesar crosses the Rubicon. Whether this conclusion is necessary 
                                         
186 LA 39. 
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depends upon whether it is necessary that Caesar exists. If we can maintain that 
Caesar’s existence is contingent, then there is no need to accept the conclusion that 
it is necessary that Caesar crosses the Rubicon.187  
However, pointing to the mere hypothetical necessity of Caesar crossing the 
Rubicon does not secure the de re distinction Leibniz is searching for because it 
renders all properties of Caesar contingent. As Arnauld points out, Caesar's being 
capable of thought follows with equal necessity from his existence as Caesar's 
crossing the Rubicon does. If we establish that Caesar's existence is contingent, we 
have made room for de re contingency at the expense of accounting for de re 
necessity.  
5.3 Criteria for an Account of De re Contingency 
What these failed solutions reveal is what Leibniz's surrogate accounts of 
contingency must do in order to adequately account for the distinction between de re 
modalities:  
1. Render some properties of the substance contingent, including free actions such as 
Caesar's crossing the Rubicon. 
2. Render some properties of the substance necessary, such as Caesar's capacity for 
thought, and also for the necessity of identity statements such as Caesar is Caesar.  
3. Explain the relevant difference in properties by pointing to features internal to the 
substance or individual in question.  
                                         
187 See Curley 1972 for a discussion of existence as the root of contingency in Leibniz's 
thought. 
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In the “Discourse on Metaphysics,” Leibniz emphasizes that the connection 
between the subject and the predicate differs for necessary and contingent 
properties:  
To address it firmly, I assert that connection or following is of two kinds. The one 
whose contrary implies a contradiction is absolutely necessary; this deduction occurs 
in the eternal truths, for example, the truths of geometry. The other is necessary only 
hypothetically and, so to speak, accidentally, but is contingent in itself, since its 
contrary does not imply a contradiction. And this connection is not based on purely 
on ideas and God’s simple understanding, but on his free decrees and on the sequence 
of the universe.188  
As emphasized at the opening of the passage, the nature of the connection between 
a substance and its properties is a key aspect of a de re modal analysis.  An 
incomplete concept counterpart theory does not explain how these connections are 
both internal to the substance and account for de re modal distinctions. 
The above passage highlights two features of modality that Leibniz develops.  On 
the one hand, it emphasizes the fact that necessary truths involve deduction, or 
finite proof.  This sets up the infinite analysis view, where the distinction between 
necessary and “contingent” truth is understood as the difference between those 
truths that have finite proofs and those that do not.  On the other hand, it 
emphasizes that reality is structured according God’s possible free decrees (laws), 
and that contingent truths are conditioned by the laws that structure reality specific 
to a world.  This suggests the distinction between those truths that are true in 
virtue of the essences of species, or “God’s simple understanding,” and those that are 
additionally conditioned by the laws that hold at a world, which involve “[God’s] free 
decrees and on the sequence of the universe”. Using the criteria we have just 
                                         
188 “Discourse on Metaphysics” §13, AG 45. 
   
 
 
124
 
developed, we can compare the infinite analysis and possible free decree accounts of 
modality. I will conclude that the possible free decrees analysis a superior account of 
de re modality.   
6 Two New Modal Accounts 
In the mid-1680s, two new accounts of modality emerge. The infinite analysis 
view appears in “Discourse on Metaphysics,” “Necessary and Contingent Truths,” 
“Primary Truths,” and “On Freedom.” The possible free decrees view is mentioned in 
the “Discourse” and featured in Leibniz's correspondence with Arnauld, as well as 
“Necessary and Contingent Truths”. But the pressure to offer an account of de re 
modality is not restricted to the correspondence with Arnauld, since it also stems 
from the shortcomings of Leibniz's views in his early work. The rejection of the per 
se view, and the introduction of the possible free decrees and infinite analysis views 
is an opportunity to extract the principles that guide Leibniz in developing accounts 
of quasi-contingency. The per se view fails to track de re modal distinctions, and it 
turns out that the possible free decrees account is Leibniz’s most viable replacement.  
However, this is not to suggest that Leibniz’s infinite analysis account of quasi-
contingency plays a vestigial role in Leibniz’s system, I will turn to each of these 
accounts to establish their details.189  
6.1 Infinite Analysis 
Returning to “General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and Truths,” 
Leibniz explains:  
                                         
189 For example, in Chapter 3 I will argue that infinite analysis is an important component of 
voluntary human action.   
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A true necessary proposition can be proved by reduction to identical propositions, or 
by reduction of its opposite to contradictory propositions; hence its opposite is called 
‘impossible’.190  
In the same work, earlier, Leibniz defines truth in the same way, 
A ‘true proposition’ is one which…can be reduced to this primary truth. [an identity 
statement].191 
Leibniz is aware that this renders truth and necessary truth co-extensive, and so he 
distinguishes ways in which true propositions are proved 
That is true, therefore, which can be proved, i.e. of which a reason can be given by 
analysis; that is false of which the contrary holds.  That is necessary which is reduced 
by analysis to an identical term, that is impossible which I reduced by analysis to a 
contradictory term.  A term or a proposition is false if it contains opposites, however 
they are proved; it is impossible if it contains opposites which are proved by a 
reduction to finite terms.  Therefore A = AB, if the proof has been made by a finite 
analysis, must be distinguished from A = AB, if the proof has been made by an 
analysis ad infinitum, from which there arises what has been said about the necessary, 
possible impossible and contingent.192  
According to Leibniz's analysis account of modality, a truth is necessary if and 
only if it has a finite demonstration, whereas a truth is contingent if and only if 
there is no a priori demonstration of the truth because the analysis requires an 
infinite number of steps. According to Leibniz, analysis proceeds via the reduction of 
a proposition to an identity statement, or a statement that reveals that the concept 
of the predicate-term is contained in the concept of the subject-term. A priori 
demonstrations proceed via analysis, or the substitution of definiens (or analysans) 
for definiendum (or analysandum) until it is revealed that the subject and predicate 
coincide by being at least partially composed of the same basic components.  
                                         
190 P 77. 
191 P 59. 
192 P 77. 
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For to demonstrate is merely, by an analysis of the terms of a proposition and the 
substitution of the definition or a part of it, for the thing defined, to show a kind of 
equation or coincidence of predicate and subject in a reciprocal proposition, or, in 
other cases, at least an inclusion of the one in the other, so that what was concealed in 
the proposition or was contained in it only potentially is rendered evident or explicitly 
by the demonstration.193  
Leibniz's favorite examples of finite proofs are arithmetical. For example, the 
proposition that every multiple of twelve is a multiple of six is necessary because it 
has a finite proof. The definition of “multiple of twelve” is multiple of two and two 
and three. The definition of “multiple of six” is multiple of two and three. By 
substituting these definitions into the original proposition we can generate a 
proposition that reveals that “multiple of six” is contained in “multiple of twelve” 
because a multiple of two and two and three is a multiple of two and three. This not 
only demonstrates the proof of the truth of the proposition, but the method of proof 
(a finite analysis) shows that it is a necessary truth.194   
In the case of necessary truths, the containment of the predicate in the subject 
can be revealed in a finite number of steps. However, in the case of contingent 
                                         
193 “On Freedom,” L 264. 
194 “For example, if we understand by a ternary, a senary, and a duodenary, numbers divisible 
by 3, 6, and 12, respectively, we can demonstrate this proposition: Every duodenary is a 
senary. For every duodenary is a binary-binary-ternary, since this is the reduction of a 
duodenary into its prime factors, or the definition of a duodenary. But every binary-binary-
ternary is a binary-ternary (this is an identical proposition), and every binary-ternary is a 
senary (by the definition of a senary). Therefore every duodenary is a senary” (“On 
Freedom,”  L 265). A non-arithmetical, but nevertheless mathematical, example that Leibniz 
offers is a proof that “the whole is greater than its part”. He notes that the definition of “less”  
is that which is equal to a part of the other (the greater).  He argues as follows: “the part is 
equal to a part of the whole (a part is equal to itself, via the axiom of identity, that each and 
every thing is equal to itself), and what is equal to a part of a whole is less that the whole 
(from the definition of “less”).  Therefore the part is less than the whole.” (“Primary Truths,”  
AG 31). 
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truths, this sort of substitution procedure always has further steps required for the 
proof.  
Truth is containment of the predicate in the subject. It is shown by giving a reason 
[for the truth] through the analysis of both terms into common notions...if the analysis 
proceeds to infinity and never attains completion then the truth is contingent, one 
which involves an infinite number of reasons, but in such a way that there is always 
something that remains, for which we must, again, give some reason.195  
For our purposes there are three important observations to make about the infinite 
analysis view. First, it is not clear exactly how analyses of contingent truths begin, 
and furthermore, it is not clear what definitions are employed to reveal the 
containment of subject in predicate. Leibniz does not give a direct example, but 
instead a metaphor: “so the distinction between necessary and contingent truths is 
the same as that between lines which meet and asymptotes, or between 
commensurable and incommensurable numbers.” 196  Incommensurable numbers 
(irrational numbers) are those that cannot be represented as the ratio of rational 
numbers or fractions such as pi. Trying to render such numbers digit by digit results 
in an infinite process. In the same way, in explaining the reason for a contingent 
truth or the connection between the subject and predicate of such truths, there will 
always be some further feature that requires analysis.  
This mathematical analogy seems to hurt Leibniz's claim that there are no finite 
a priori proofs of contingent truths, for truths of mathematics are paradigmatic 
necessary truths. If truths about incommensurable numbers are necessary, then why 
not also truths infinitely complex features of the world? There are cases in which we 
                                         
195 “The Source of Contingent Truths,” AG 98-99. 
196 P 77. 
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can cognize infinite mathematical series in ways that allow us to demonstrate their 
features a priori. Leibniz acknowledges this: 
But a difficulty stands before us. We can prove that some line--namely an asymptote--
constantly approaches another and (also in the case of asymptotes) we can prove that 
two quantities are equal, by showing that will be the case if the progression is 
continued as far as one pleases; so human beings also will be able to comprehend 
contingent truths with certainty.197  
Similarly, we can calculate the sum of an infinite series, by finding the right rule 
relating the members of the series.  For example 1/1 + 1/3 + 1/6 + 1/10 + 1/15... 
is equal to 2, because the members are related by the function 2/t(t +1) for t > 0,198 
where t represents the position of the member in the series. Thus, mathematical 
examples, contrary to what Leibniz originally suggests, indicate that infinitely 
complex series can be understood by finding the right rule. What is it about the 
subject of contingent truths that renders such analyses infinite, where we are in 
principle incapable of offering an a priori proof?  
This question becomes particularly acute when we review how Leibniz describes 
substances and worlds in the “Discourse on Metaphysics.” Recall that worlds have an 
infinity of parts that express the laws of the world, and substances have an infinite 
number of states unified by an internal law of development. According to Leibniz, 
the mechanism by which a substance's states are produced is according to a law, so 
that subsequent states of a substance are produced by the previous states of the 
substance in accord with the internal law. If we had access to these laws and the 
right epistemic capacities, we could derive the features of the substances, just as we 
are able to know features of infinite series by employing the right rules that relate 
                                         
197 P 78. 
198 This example is from Levey 1998. 
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their members. Leibniz's mathematical analogy threatens this account of 
contingency if we cannot explain how the infinity of mathematics can be grappled 
with a priori while the infinite of substance drives analysis to infinity.  
Leibniz addresses this problem by maintaining that, while we can come to grasp 
the laws for infinite series, we can never grasp the laws that govern the internal 
production of states in substances.  
That this stone tends downwards when its support has been removed is not a 
necessary but a contingent proposition, nor can such an event be demonstrated from 
the notion of this stone by help of the universal notions which enter into it, and so 
God alone perceived this perfectly. For he alone knows whether he will suspend by a 
miracle that subordinate law of nature by which heavy things are driven downwards; 
for others neither understand the absolutely universal laws involved, nor can they 
perform the infinite analysis which is necessary to connect the notion of this stone 
with the notion of the whole universe, or with absolutely universal laws.199  
The “absolutely universal laws” dictate not only the states of the substance 
according to natural laws of physics; these laws also include miraculous events. 
Because the world is infinitely complex, and includes miracles, we cannot generalize 
from particulars to reach more general laws of nature by starting with inferences 
from the specific states of substances. Given that we cannot cognize the most 
general laws that govern the states of substances, the infinity of reasons that ground 
contingent truths cannot be cognized or employed in a priori proofs.  
The second important feature of the infinite analysis view is that Leibniz is not 
offering a purely epistemological account of modality, although it does have a 
number of implications for the epistemology of modality. Recall that in the 1686 
“General Inquiries,”  
                                         
199 “Necessary and Contingent Truths,” PW 100. 
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[E]very true proposition can be proved; for since…the predicate is in the subject, or, 
the concept of the predicate is involved in the concept of the subject when that 
concept is completely understood, then it must be possible for a truth to be shown by 
the analysis of terms into their values, i.e., those terms which they contain.200   
In both necessary and contingent truths, the concept of the predicate is contained in 
the concept of the subject, so that the denial of a truth contradicts the relevant 
concepts.  Leibniz treats both necessary and contingent truths as identities, where 
the identity can be made explicit for necessary truths, but for contingent truths 
analysis “constantly approaches identical propositions, but never reaches them.”201 
The length of the analysis, or the procedure through which we analyze a truth, is an 
epistemic feature relative to humans. 202   If all truths are based on identity 
statements, then denying the truth is contradictory, even if we cannot demonstrate 
the contradiction in a finite number of steps.  If contingent truths are covert identity 
statements then they couldn’t be otherwise, just as necessary truths couldn't be 
otherwise. Denying a truth involves a contradiction, even if finite minds cannot 
produce it via an analysis procedure in the finite number of steps.  This makes the 
infinite analysis account seem like an epistemological solution.  On the one hand, 
this is an upside of the view, for it offers a procedure by which we can identify and 
distinguish necessary from contingent truths. This is a procedure that Leibniz 
himself follows, for when he cannot offer a finite analysis of a truth he does not 
                                         
200 P 77. 
201 P 77.  See also “Primary Truths:” “The primary truths are those which assert the same 
thing of itself or deny the opposite of its opposite…all remaining truths are reduced to 
primary truths with the help of definitions, that is, through the resolution of notions; in this 
consists a priori proof, proof independent of experience” (AG 30-31).  
202 “In God, only the analysis of his own concepts is required, and in him, the whole of this 
occurs at once. So he knows even contingent truths, whose complete proof transcends every 
finite intellect” (P 77). 
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commit to its modal status as necessary.203  So the infinite analysis view offers a 
helpful suggestion about how we gain access to which truths are necessary and 
which are contingent.  However, on the face of it, it does not offer a deeper 
explanation of what constitutes de re modal distinctions.   
But the worry is that offering a superficial distinction is all it does, and indeed 
without further specification, it seems as though Leibniz is not offering an account 
of how contingent predicates are contained in the subject in a way that does not 
render them necessary.  My best suggestion as to the metaphysical ground for the 
infinite analysis view is that it is not having a finite proof itself that makes a truth 
necessary, it is the structure and type of reasons that render the proposition true.  
On this view, what makes a proposition contingently true is that it has an infinity of 
reasons that render it true: 
[N]or is there any truth of fact or any truth concerning individual things that does not 
depend upon the infinite series of reasons; whatever is in this series can be seen by 
God alone.204 
But if the analysis proceeds to infinity and never attains completion then the truth is 
contingent, one which involves an infinite number of reasons.205 
That the reasons for a truth are infinitely complex is an objective feature of the 
concepts of worlds and substances, and not relative to the epistemological 
                                         
203 For example, Garber offers an account of the modal status of the equality principle: the 
whole cause and the entire effect have the same power, from 1671-1715.  Garber explains 
that early on Leibniz was optimistic that the equality principle is necessary in virtue of the 
concepts of cause and effect.  However, Leibniz struggled to discover a finite proof of these 
truths.  This encouraged him to come to think of the equality principle as contingent, and 
based on divine choice.  See Garber 2009, 237-246.   
204 “On Freedom,” AG 95. 
205 “The Source of Contingent Truths,” AG 99; emphasis added.  
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perspective of humans with finite minds. Nor is whether there is an infinity of 
reasons contingent on Leibniz’s notion of a proof procedure.206  The infinite analysis 
view is not just a thesis about what we can prove, but it points to the structure of 
reasons or causes that ground a truth.  This structure or ground generates infinite 
proof when finite intellects offer a demonstration through analysis via definitions.  
Leibniz identifies three (non-equivalent) ways in which the analysis of a contingent 
truth requires an infinity of steps. First, because tracing the series of events in the 
world generates an infinite regress that involves all parts of the universe, and there is 
an infinity of parts in the universe. Second, explanation of the features of material 
bodies requires an analysis of all their parts and material bodies are infinitely 
divisible. Therefore, the analysis of any truth that depends on material facts will 
require an analysis of an infinity of parts. Third, some truths depend on the fact 
that God created this particular world, and that decision required comparing an 
infinity of possible worlds.  
These considerations are present when Leibniz analyzes the contingent 
proposition that the Sun is shining.  
                                         
206 Velasco 2013 offers a number of criticisms of Leibniz’s infinite analysis view, including 
that even if we update Leibniz’s notion of proof to include certain converging series, it 
renders certain mathematical truths contingent.  While I think that criticizing Leibniz’s 
account of a proof is a definitive blow to Leibniz’s account, if we can offer a metaphysical 
feature to ground the infinite proofs, then even if the notion of proof fails to yield the right 
distinction between necessary and contingent proofs, the hope is that the metaphysical 
feature can never the less do the work.  My suggestion is that having an infinite number if 
reasons is the metaphysical feature that grounds infinite analyses.  Moreover, it is a feature 
that holds true for both God and humans; there are an infinity of reasons for a contingent 
truth from God’s perspective too, but he need not engage in an infinite analysis to prove 
them.  
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[a.] For even if I say that the Sun is shining at this hour in our hemisphere because its 
previous motion was such that, granted its continuation, this event would certainly 
follow, yet (to say nothing of the fact that its obligation to continue is not necessary) 
the fact that its motion was previously such is similarly a contingent truth, for which 
again a reason must be sought. And this cannot be given in full except as a result of a 
perfect knowledge of all the parts of the universe---a task which surpasses all created 
powers.  
[b.] For there is no portion of matter which is not actually subdivided into others; so 
the parts of any body are actually infinite, and so neither the Sun nor any other body 
can be known perfectly by a creature. Much less can we arrive at the end of our 
analysis if we seek the mover of each body which is moved, and again the mover of 
this; for we shall always arrive at smaller bodies without end.  
[c.] God perceives the truth of all its accidents from its very notion, without calling in 
anything extrinsic; for each one in its way involves all others, and the whole 
universe.207  
This passage highlights three ways in which Leibniz thinks that infinity creeps into 
our analyses of contingent truths. In all cases Leibniz’s analysis traces the chain of 
reasons connecting the predicate to the subject, or in this particular case, connecting 
shining to the sun. The first suggestion (a) is that if we treat the Sun’s shining as a 
function of the sun’s position and previous movements, tracing the series of causes 
will involve an infinite regress that involves all of the parts of the universe. This is in 
part due to the fact that the movements of the sun alone are not sufficient to predict 
or necessitate its current states. Leibniz thus thinks that analyzing this truth 
requires examining the previous states of the sun to see how they lead up to and 
caused its current state. What's not totally clear from this suggestion, however, is 
why the chain of causes must be infinite. Leibniz is not committed to the eternality 
of the world, and allows it has a starting point temporally, so it's not clear why the 
chain of causes leading back to the start of the chain will require examining and 
infinity of causes.  
                                         
207 “Necessary and Contingent Truths,” PW 98. 
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Leibniz's next point (b) offers a further suggestion: the analysis has an infinite 
number of steps because the steps involve resolving bodies into their component 
parts. A full analysis of the whole involves a specification of all of the parts. Because 
matter is infinitely divisible, that specification will continue on indefinitely. Thus 
“because the parts of the body are actually infinite, so neither the sun nor any other 
body can be known perfectly by a creature.” But again, it's not clear why we must 
analyze all of the parts of the Sun in order to be able to grasp the reasons why it is 
in the position it is. If I can think about the sun as an approximation of an infinite 
number of parts and look for a finite number of causes to explain its current 
position, then it seems I could offer a demonstration of the truth that the Sun is 
shining. Moreover, this consideration renders contingency dependent on materiality, 
leaving it undetermined why the analysis of an immaterial subject leads to an 
infinite analysis (unless every contingent truth involves a body or corporeal facts). 
This tethers Leibniz’s account of infinite analysis to the materiality of the world 
(one way or another) being involved in all contingent propositions.   
Leibniz’s commitment to corporeal substance during this period is controversial, 
so it’s worthwhile to explore renderings of infinite analysis that do not require a 
commitment to corporeal substances. 208 Leibniz does offer the follow example of 
analyzing the proposition ‘Peter denies’: 
All existential propositions, though true, are not necessary, for they cannot be proved 
unless an infinity of propositions are used, i.e., unless an analysis is carried to infinity.  
That is, they can be proved only from the complete concept of an individual which 
involves infinite existents.  Thus if I say, ‘Peter denies’, understanding this of a certain 
                                         
208 Unfortunately, establishing that an a priori proof in fact requires the analysis of the 
physical parts of a body, for example, is problematic. For a further discussion see Carriero 
1995, and Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne 1999, 207. 
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time, then there is presupposed also the nature of that time, which also involves all 
that exists during that time.209   
If we treat ‘Peter denies’ as a covertly indexed to a time, Leibniz thinks that the 
nature of time will render the analysis infinite.  Here Leibniz could mean that time 
is composed of an infinity of moments, each of which must be analyzed step by step 
in a proof and these moments are internal to the nature of Peter.  Or, Leibniz could 
be thinking of moments or times as corresponding amongst substances in the same 
world.  In this way the proposition ‘Peter denies’ is not, strictly speaking, about the 
substance Peter, but about the representation of Peter in all substances—notice that 
Leibniz says existential propositions involve an “infinity of propositions” perhaps one 
for each substance.  So an analysis of the truth of this claim involves an infinity of 
substances via an infinity of propositions.  However, Leibniz thinks that even if 
‘Peter denies’ is not a temporal claim, the analysis of ‘Peter denies’ will be 
unending: 
If I say ‘Peter denies’ indefinitely, abstracting from time, then for this to be true—
whether he has denied, or is about to deny—it must nevertheless be proved from the 
concept of Peter.  But the concept of Peter is complete, and so involves infinite things; 
so one can never arrive at a perfect proof, but one always approaches it more and 
more, so that the different is less than any given difference.210   
Again, it’s not clear why Peter’s concept involves infinite things.  Perhaps because it 
represents a world that is infinitely complex, or maybe because even if we can trace 
the causal chains in a finite number of steps to understand the world, in order to 
explain why this world exists we will have to appeal to an infinity of substances, and 
compare this world to other worlds to demonstrate that it is the best.  Whatever the 
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source of infinity, because we cannot comprehend the laws that structure substances, 
and coordinate substances into worlds, seeking the reasons for contingent truths 
involves us in an infinite analysis. This is because worlds are made up of an infinity 
of substances, and which world exists depends upon a comparison of the qualities of 
an infinite number of worlds.  
 A second problem arises when we understand infinite analysis as a necessary 
and sufficient condition for contingent truth.  For, we have some positive reasons to 
think that in some cases the proof of a contingent truth is finite. This problem has 
come to be knows as the problem of the lucky proof.211  As Adams points out, in our 
analysis of a complete concept of Peter, for example, we might happen upon the 
predicate “denies” in a finite number of steps as we unpack Peter’s concept: 
Even if infinitely many properties and events are contained in the complete concept of 
Peter, at least one of them will be proved in the first step of any analysis. Why 
couldn’t it be Peter’s denial? Why couldn’t we begin to analyze Peter’s concept by 
saying, ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and...’ ? Presumably such a Lucky Proof must be 
ruled out by some sort of restriction on what counts as a step in an analysis of an 
individual concept, but so far as I know, Leibniz does not explain how this is to be 
done.212  
We might thus luck into a proof of a truth about Peter’s action, rendering Peter’s 
action necessary.  In fact, Rodriguez-Pereyra & Lodge 2011 argue that there is a related 
problem, what they call the problem of the guaranteed proof.213  For if an analysis proceeds 
step-by-step, at each step further sub-components of the subject or precidate concepts are 
revealed.  Even though a full analysis of a proposition will require an infinite number of steps 
                                         
211 See Adams 1994, 34; Cover and O'Leary Hawthorne 2000; Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge 
2011; Maher 1980. 
212 Adams 1994, 34. 
213 This problem is raised (although not termed ‘the problem of the guaranteed proof’) in 
Maher 1980.   
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to try to reach the primary unanalyzable notions of the infinitely complex notions, the 
containment of the predicate concept in the subject concept will be revealed in a finite 
(although possibly very large) number of steps: 
[A]lthough the full decomposition of the infinitely complex concept ‘Peter’ will not be 
completable in a finite number of steps, every concept composing ‘Peter’ can be found 
in ‘Peter’ after a finite number of steps.214 
Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge offer a solution to address both the problem of the lucky 
proof, and guaranteed proof.  They claim that proofs of contingent truths require infinite 
analyses because analysis requires a consistency proof of the subject-concept.  On this view, 
demonstrating that the predicate is contained in the subject is insufficient to demonstrate 
the truth of a proposition.  Additionally, it must be shown that the subject-term is internally 
consistent.  This solves the problem of the Lucky Proof and Guaranteed Proof because if we 
unpack the predicate from the concept of the subject in a finite number of steps, the analysis 
is yet incomplete because it has not been demonstrated that the subject-concept is 
inconsistency free.215  This explanation of why contingent truths must generate infinite 
analyses is derived from Leibniz’s treatment of the ontological argument for the existence of 
God.216  Leibniz explains that showing that God essentially exists is only part of a successful 
argument for God’s existence, and that the remaining part is a demonstration that the 
notion of God is consistent.  Thus, according to Leibniz, the ontological argument for the 
existence of God not only shows that existence follows from the very nature of God, but that 
                                         
214 Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge 2011, 223. 
215 This text strongly suggests that the analysis has not ended until it has been shown that 
the analysans are consistent (“possible”), and therefore it suggests that Leibniz’s answer to 
the problems of the Lucky Proof and Guaranteed Proof would have been that there cannot 
be such things since, no matter at what point in the analysis the concept in question shows 
up, the consistency of the analysandum will not yet have been established” (Rodriguez-
Pereyra and Lodge 2011, 277). 
216 See “General inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and of Truths,” P 63. 
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further it requires an analysis of the very concept of God as the most perfect being to show 
that God is at least a possibly existing being.  This yields the suggestion that because all 
proofs presuppose the consistency of their definitions, no proof is complete until it includes a 
completed analysis of the relevant subject-term.   
 Even though Leibniz does emphasize that the ontological argument for God’s 
existence requires a consistency proof, I do not think this shows that the proofs relevant for 
modal considerations require consistency proofs too.  For although such proofs might 
presuppose the consistency of their terms, Leibniz does not commit himself to the view that 
a proof is incomplete for the purpose of establishing the modal status of a truth if it does not 
include a consistency proof.  In fact, there is reason for Leibniz to resist this suggestion, for 
it renders identity statements, such as Caesar = Caesar, contingent because the analysis of 
Caesar will require an infinite consistency proof.  Because identities of the form Caesar = 
Caesar are paradigmatic necessary truths for Leibniz, I take this to be good evidence that 
whatever guarantees that the proof of a contingent truth is infinite, it is not that a 
consistency proof is a requisite of an a priori demonstration of a truth.   
My suggestion is that the basis of the infinite analysis view is the existence of an 
infinite number of reasons helps address the problem of the Lucky Proof and 
Guaranteed Proof.  This is because a proof will start with a proposition to be proved and 
proceed step by step until the total sufficient cause of that feature’s being produced in 
connection to the subject is revealed. Each step offers another sufficient reason, and the 
proof is not completed until all of the sufficient reasons are enumerated. So we might reach a 
point where we see that denying is contained in Peter’s concept because that’s what 
appeared best to Peter, but the proof is not complete because we do not have a sufficient 
reason for why that appeared best to Peter, which will further appeal to Peter’s constitution 
and his background experiences, which will themselves have sufficient reasons. So we 
approach but never reach identities because we enumerate more and more sufficient reasons, 
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but cannot traverse the totality of reasons. What’s important about this view is that it’s a 
mistake to treat any sufficient reason we’ve reached in a finite number of steps as proved in 
a finite number of steps, for we have not proved it until we have a complete set of sufficient 
reasons. Thus the best response the problem of the Lucky Proof and Guaranteed Proof is 
that they hinge on a notion of analysis that we want to eschew. Discovering the containment 
of the predicate in the subject is not sufficient to demonstrate the truth of a proposition 
because it does not engage the full sufficient reason.  This account also does not require that 
the concept subject-term of contingent propositions be infinitely complex, for example in the 
case of laws of nature.  As long as a the full set of sufficient reasons for the truth of a 
proposition is infinitely complex, the proof itself will be too.217  
Edwin Curley offers a decisive objection against the infinite analysis view.  Even 
if finite and infinite analysis divide necessary and contingent properties accurately, 
the infinite analysis view leaves a gap in offering a deeper explanation as to why, 
exactly, infinity is an essential feature of contingency. Curley emphasizes that 
infinite analysis seems beside the point when we consider contingency.218   
But just because the concept of any possible individual is a complete concept, its 
analysis involves infinites…That is one way in which infinite processes occur, and it 
seems to be completely irrelevant to the problem of contingency.219 
Imagine there were only a finite number of worlds in the mind of God, each of 
which is finitely complex.   Additionally, suppose that God selects one of these 
                                         
217 Cover and O'Leary Hawthorne offer a similar solution, but focus specifically on the 
infinite complexity of the will, and the key role of the will in bringing about states of 
individual substances.  There is some textual evidence in support of this view in Leibniz’s 
later correspondence with Clarke, as well as in the “Monadology”.  However, as Rodriguez-
Pereyra and Lodge point out, the evidence for this view in the middle period is scant 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge 2011, 225-26). 
218 Curley 1972, 94. 
219 Curley 1972, 94. 
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worlds—the best one—to exist.  What makes the existence of that world contingent 
and not necessary is that which of those possible worlds exists depends on God's 
goals for creation and that there is an array of worlds to select from (albeit a finite 
array). Notice, however, that on this scenario there could be a finite proof of which 
world exists, or is the best in accordance with God’s nature.  Dependence on God’s 
choice and nature seems to be at the heart of Leibniz’s account of quasi-contingency, 
and the connection between this notion and an infinity of reasons does not capture 
that aspect of quasi-contingency. It seems only accidently true that those things that 
are contingent require infinite analyses.   
In response, Leibniz can insist that it is necessary that there is an infinity of 
worlds, that is, that what depends on God’s good will and what has an infinite of 
reasons are necessarily co-extensive.  So generating an infinite analysis is necessary 
and sufficient for depending on God’s good will:  
It must be understood, then, that all created beings have a certain mark of the divine 
infinite impressed upon them and that this is the source of many wonderful matters 
which astound the human mind. For example, there is no portion of matter, however 
tiny, in which there is not a world of creatures, infinite in number. And there is not 
created substance, however imperfect, which does not act upon all the others and 
suffer action from all the others, and whose complex concept as this exists in the 
divine mind does not contain the whole universe, with all that ever is, has been, and 
will be. And there is not truth of fact or of individual things which does not depend 
upon and infinite series of reasons, though God alone can see everything in that series. 
This is the cause, too, why only God knows the contingent truths a priori and sees 
their infallibility otherwise than by experience.220  
However, what Curley's point emphasizes is that the connection between infinity 
and contingency is not illuminating, even if it is guaranteed. Even if infinite analysis 
cleaves so-called necessary and contingent propositions in the right way, it is 
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surprising to learn that what we meant by contingency is infinite analysis.  Leibniz 
could draw on his necessitarianism here to point out that because God’s 
understanding of possible worlds could not be otherwise, it is necessary that so-
called contingent truths depend on an infinity of reasons. But what that gets us is 
the guaranteed co-incidence of two notions, without further insight as to their 
relation.  Despite the drawbacks of the infinite analysis view in illuminating the 
nature of quasi-contingent properties, it does nevertheless offer a good 
epistemological procedure by which we can identify some contingent truths.221 
6.2 Possible Free Decrees 
In his Correspondence with Arnauld, “Discourse on Metaphysics” and “On 
Necessary and Contingent Truths,” Leibniz comments that contingent truths are 
dependent on the possible free decrees God issues when he creates a world. Leibniz 
explains: 
[J]ust as necessary truths involve only the divine intellect, so contingent truths involve 
the decrees of the will.222  
For the possibilities of individuals or of contingent truths contain in their concept the 
possibility of their causes, that is, of the free decrees of God in which they differ from 
the possibilities of species or eternal truths.223 
I conceive that there was an infinite number of possible ways of creating the world 
according to the different plans that God could form, and that each possible world 
depends upon certain of God’s principal plans or ends, which are peculiar to him, that 
is to say upon certain primary free decrees or laws of general order.224 
                                         
221 I will emphasize this aspect in connection with human freedom in the next chapter. 
222 PW 104. See also LA 43. 
223 LA 51. 
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Although possible worlds are respresented in the mind of God before creation, they 
include various laws, and Leibniz thinks of those laws as the possible divine decrees 
of God, were God to actualize that world.  Leibniz distinguishes contingent de re 
features as those that depend on God’s free decrees from necessary de re truths, 
which do not depend on possible free decrees.  Recall from the “Discourse on 
Metaphysics” Leibniz treats substances and worlds as structured according to laws 
that dictate how properties of substances follow from one another. He notes that 
these laws mediate the connections between substances and their properties. This 
emphasizes a different strand of Leibniz’s thought regarding definition, where a 
definition need not only include information about the essence of the definiendum, 
but also about the generation or production of the definiendum. 
But the concept of a circle put forward by Euclid---namely, that it is the figure 
described by the motion of a straight line in a plane about one fixed end---does afford 
a real definition, for it is clear that such a figure is possible. It is useful, therefore, to 
have definitions which involve the generation of a thing, or failing that, at least its 
constitution, i.e. a way in which it appears to be either producible or at least 
possible.225  
The states of substances are produced in accord with the development law that 
constitutes very nature of individual substances. The law of a substance is thus part 
of what constitutes them as a unique individual, because it helps generate the states 
that ultimately distinguish that substance not only from other actual substances but 
other possible substances as well.  
Understanding how laws play a role in worlds is complicated because Leibniz 
distinguishes different relevant laws. 226   First, each substance has a law of 
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development that includes every state and change it will undergo, from its own 
perspective.  This law is unique to each substance.  Dependence on this law is not 
sufficient to render a property contingent, because this law constitutes the essence of 
the substance as an individual and does not distinguish necessary from contingent 
properties relative to the substance.  Moreover, each world has a general law of the 
series, which characterizes the events and changes that are common to all substances 
(including miracles).  This law of the series is included in the concepts of all 
substances that are part of that world: 
[The] laws of the general order of that possible universe…[is that] whose concept they 
determine, as well as the concepts of all the individual substances which must enter 
into this same universe: since everything, even miracles, belongs to order, although 
miracles are contrary to some subordinate maxims or laws of nature.227 
There are also subordinate laws that govern physical and mental phenomena (and 
the correspondence between the two), and these govern the changes in a substance’s 
phenomena (for example when two billiard balls collide and change direction and 
velicity,228 when the apparent good of an outcome moves me to act,229 or when injury 
to my hand causes me to feel pain 230 ).  Some truths about substances are 
conditioned by these subordinate laws, while other truths follow directly from the 
essence of species-concepts and laws of logic (all features ultimately follow from the 
developmental law). The concept of a world includes a general law, as well as 
specifies all of the individuals that exist at that world.  A truth is contingent if it 
follows from the general law of the series, or one of the subordinate laws of nature.  
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228 Governed by the physical laws of nature. 
229 Governed by maxims of the will and action. 
230 According to laws of mind-body interaction. 
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What makes these laws not only possible but also contingent is that they hold at 
some possible worlds, but not all possible worlds.  So contingent features of 
substances are those that follow from laws that vary between worlds.  This contrasts 
with essential features, whose natures do not vary world to world. On this view, if 
the property of a substance depends upon or is conditioned by a law that does not 
hold at all worlds, then it is contingent. However, truths that do not depend on such 
laws are truths that are necessary. We can understand possible worlds as possible 
plans for world creation, each with different laws that structure the states of 
substances.  
[A]s the idea of a building results from the aims or plans of the man who takes it in 
hand, and the idea or concept of this world is a result of those plans of God considered 
as possibilities. For everything must be explained by its cause, and the cause of the 
universe is God’s aims. Now each individual substance in my opinion is an expression 
of the whole universe in accordance with a certain viewpoint, and consequently it is 
also an expression of the miracles mentioned above.231  
Laws, as possible decrees of God, vary world to world, 
For instance, if this world were only possible, the individual concept of a body in this 
world, containing certain movements as possibilities, would also contain our laws of 
motion (which are free decrees of God) but also as mere possibilities. For as there 
exists an infinite number of possible worlds, there exists also an infinite number of 
laws, some peculiar to one world, some to another, and each possible individual of any 
one world contains in the concept of him the laws of his world.232  
Although the possible worlds are represented in full detail in God's understanding 
before he creates, these world-plans include what he would will were he to create 
that world. Because each of the plans of the worlds differ, we can treat the 
contingency of the laws in terms of the fact that they condition some but not all 
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worlds. Contingent de re modal claims pick out the features of a substance 
conditioned by the laws. Even though there is no world where Caesar exists and fails 
to cross the Rubicon, it is contingent that Caesar crosses the Rubicon because it is 
dependent on which laws God enacts, and those will vary depending on the world. 
The upshot of this view is that it gets the de re distinction right, i.e., Caesar's 
crossing the Rubicon depends on the laws of the world, but Caesar being identical to 
Caesar or Caesar’s being rational is not dependent on the laws. Moreover, it points 
to a relevant difference in the connection between subject and predicate, where 
contingent properties are connected to subjects via laws, or possible free decrees of 
God, that could be otherwise in the sense that a different set of laws would hold if a 
different world exists. Thus Leibniz can affirm that everything that ever happens to 
a substance is essential to or intrinsic to that substance’s nature, but the nature of a 
substance, even considered as a mere possibility in the mind of God, is structured 
according to laws that may or may not hold, depending on God’s plans for creation.  
Robert Sleigh, in his detailed study of the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence 
expresses reservations about the viability of the possible free decrees view. Sleigh 
argues that the possible free decree view needs a further account of what makes 
God's decrees contingent.  
I am not suggesting that the doctrine of infinite analysis replaced the free decree 
defense in the sense that Leibniz affirmed the former and rejected the latter. I believe 
that Leibniz saw the doctrine of infinite analysis as putting the free decree defense on 
firm, noncircular footing.233  
Sleigh worries that grounding the contingency of de re features in God’s possible free 
decrees pushes back the question of contingency one step futher, to God’s decrees, 
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without explaining what makes those decrees contingent.  If we appeal to the 
contingency of the features of the concepts we have a circular explanation, where 
contingency of free actions, for example, stems from God’s free decrees, which are 
free because they decree about things that are contingent.  Sleigh appeals to the 
infinite analysis view to explain why God’s decrees are contingent: they are 
contingent because it would take an infinite proof to demonstrate their truth.    
However, I do not think Leibniz needs to appeal to the infinite analysis view to 
secure the contingency of God's decrees. What Leibniz needs is a viable distinction 
between the ways in which concepts of “contingent” and “necessary” features of 
substances are included in the concepts of those substances. The infinite analysis 
view is not well-suited to offering a sound metaphysical basis for this view because it 
leaves unexplained the unintuitive connection between that which is “contingent” and 
that which has an infinity of reasons. My suggestion is that array of worlds that are 
possible are those with coherent concepts, excluding considerations of God’s good 
will.  Accordingly there are an infinity of different ways of structing worlds, each 
with its own value.  These worlds differ according to the general laws that hold at 
each, and the substances that are part of them. We can explain why free decrees are 
possible without appealing circularly to the contingency of the features of 
substances. There is an infinity of internally coherent possible worlds and which one 
exists depends upon the character of God's will. The “contingency” of the laws comes 
part-in-parcel with the fact that they vary world-to-world amongst the array of 
options, that are options insofar as one is selected to exist according to the moral 
character of God’s will.   
Sleigh denies that Leibniz employs possible worlds to account for de re modality: 
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[W]hat matters for us…is Leibniz’s treatment of de re modalities, where the issue is 
the modality of the connection between a substance and one of its properties.  In our 
time period,  Leibniz did not use the structure of possible worlds to account for de re 
modalities.   He used it primarily as a vehicle to discuss creation and attendant 
theological matters, which explains why, on Leibniz’s scheme God is not in any 
possible world.  So it would be a mistake to look for an explanation of Leibniz’s 
metaphysical commitments in his de re modal semantics.234  
But the reason Sleigh denies that Leibniz employs possible worlds in his account of 
de re modality is because Sleigh is thinking of a solution that employs incomplete 
concepts as counterparts for substances, and offers a counterpart theory of modality.  
I agree with Sleigh that Leibniz does not offer a counterpart theory to account for de 
re modality.  This was evidenced in Leibniz’s correspondence with Arnauld when 
Leibniz insists that incomplete concepts do not get to the heart of the matter when 
considering the modal properties of substances, which have complete concepts.  
However, my reading of Leibniz’s possible free decrees account of de re modality 
employs Leibniz’s notion of possible worlds without offering a counterpart theory of 
substances.  We can distinguish types of connections internal to a substance by 
considering whether the connection is mediated by general or subordinate laws of 
nature.  The suggestion of employing possible free decrees account of de re 
contingency appeals to possible worlds, and the variation in laws between those 
worlds, but without offering a counterpart theory of modality. 
The possible free decrees view, as I have presented it, hinges on there being an 
array of worlds, one of which God selects to actualize while the rest remain non-
actual.  This is consistent with Leibniz’s emphasis on the importance of an array of 
possible worlds for God’s choice to create one, 
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And if one wanted totally to reject purely possible things, one would be destroying 
contingency and liberty; for if nothing were possible except what God in fact creates, 
what God creates would be necessary, and God wanting to create something, could 
create nothing but that, without having freedom of choice.235 
Of course, on my necessitarian all things considered reading, the existence of the 
actual world is necessary all things considered.  But this is consistent with Leibniz’s 
views as long as we understand possible worlds as those coherent options that God 
applies his will to, and that Leibniz sketches a notion of “contingency” out of this 
array.   
However, there is a worry that Leibniz’s notion of substance undermines the 
array of possible worlds even for God’s choice. The worry is that if all substances are 
compossible, then there is a possible world that includes all substances.  In fact, if 
worlds are individuated by which substances they include, and all substances are 
compossible, then if the array of worlds God chooses from are completely full of 
substances then there is only one world.  A key feature of the possible free decrees 
view is that there are non-actual possibles for God’s rational choice so I will turn to 
this issue, and the questions about the nature of compossibility now.    
Hacking 1982 emphasizes a comment that Leibniz makes regarding minds to 
argue that all substances are compossible: 
The immortality of the mind must be taken to be proved at once by my method, 
because it is possible within itself and compossible with all other things, that is to say 
it does not impede the course of things.  For minds have no volume.236   
If “immortal mind” here is read not just as cognitive faculties but as a substance, 
then Leibniz seems to be suggesting that all substances are compossible.  Hacking 
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does not think that compossibility is a matter of logical inconsistency, because if it 
were the incompatibility would have to be built into the very concepts of substances.  
But Hacking reads the above passage as Leibniz claiming there is nothing built into 
substances that could logically preclude the existence of other substances. If we take 
worlds to be maximal sets of compossible substances, and all substances are 
compossible, then there is only one world and it contains all substances.  This is 
clearly not Leibniz’s view, for Leibniz affirms in many places that not only are there 
non-actual substances but non-actual worlds, and he ascribes this in part to the fact 
that substances are incompossible with one another. 
It is clear that Leibniz is committed to the incompossibility of substances in his 
early work in the 1670s.  Leibniz explains “It is not useless to discuss the vacuum of 
forms, in order to show that not all possibles per se can exist along with others; 
otherwise many absurdities would follow.”237 And also, “[my]] principle, namely, is 
that whatever can exist and is compatible with other things does exist, because the 
reason for existing in preference to other possibles cannot be limited by any other 
consideration than that not all things are compatible.”238 The constitution of possible 
worlds is shaped by patterns of compossibility.  In fact, which world exists according 
to God’s choice also seems to be an instance of compossibility, for alternative worlds 
that are not the best are incompossible with an all-powerful, all-good, and all-
knowing God.239  Leibniz is assured that patterns of incompossibility shape the 
structure and order of worlds, but he also confesses at different moments that he is 
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239  There is at least one passage where Leibniz explicitly affirms that this sort of 
incompatibility (the incompatibility of incompossibility) amounts to logical inconsistency: 
“Compossible is what, when taken with another does not imply a contradiction” (Grua 325).   
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not sure of the origin of compossibility.  It is in part the result of the nature or 
essences of things which dictate which properties can be instantiated together.  But 
when considering the nature of God, and that all of God’s perfections are 
compossible, and necessarily so, he remarks: 
It is yet unknown to me what is the reason of the incompossibility of things, or how it 
is that different essences can be opposed to each other, seeing that all purely positive 
terms seem to be compatible.240   
This passage is from Leibniz’s early work, and the introduction of causally isolated 
substances only exacerbates the question of the origin of compossibility relations, 
because if substances are not causally related to one another, how does the existence 
of one exclude or conflict with the existence of another?  However, it is clear that 
Leibniz, particularly in his late work, continued to embrace a notion of 
incompossibilty that fundamentally shapes the range of possible worlds:  
I do not agree that “in order to know of the romance if ‘Astrea’ is possible, it is 
necessary to know its connections with the rest of the universe”.  It would indeed be 
necessary to know this if it is to be compossible with the universe, and as a 
consequence to know if this romance has taken place, is taking place, or will take place 
in some corner of the world, for surely there would be not place for it without such 
connections.  And it is very true that what is not, never has been, and never will be is 
not possible, if we take possible in the sense of compossible, as I have just said.241  
Thus even in his later work Leibniz claims that there are non-actualized possibles 
because they are not compossible with what God created.  This is Leibniz’s 
explanation, on my view, for how some feature of the world are “contingent.”  
If one considers the universe as a collection, one cannot say that there could be many 
worlds in it.  This would be true if the universe were a collection of all possibles, but it 
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is not, since all possible are not compossible.  Thus the universe is a collection of a 
certain order of compossibles only, and the actual universe is a collection of all the 
possibles which exist, that is to say, which form the richest composite.  And since 
there are different combinations of possibilities, some of them better than others, there 
are many possible universes, each collection of compossible making up one of them.242   
Leibniz clearly maintains that certain substances and aggregates of substances 
are incompossible with one another, even after his introduction of the world apart 
view in the 1680s.  Recall that the world apart view says that a substance would 
have all of its properties, and could even exist, without the existence of any other 
substances except for God.  What we will explore now is what the best explanation 
for the origin of compossibility relations between substances is, given the causal 
isolation of substances in Leibniz’s 1686 work.  So the question is how do we account 
for the fact that, on the one hand, substances can exist without any other created 
substances, but on the other hand the existence of substances precludes the 
existence of other substances.  Hacking’s own solution is that compossibility is 
something imposed by God on substances through laws. 243   On this view 
incompossibility is not about the co-existence of substances being contradictory, but 
instead the co-existence of substances is incompatible with the laws God sets out.  
Because I am arguing that Leibniz is a necessitarian, where necessity is what would 
imply a contradiction if it were otherwise, it is important for my view that 
incompossibility relations can be understood as logical incompatibility.  Accordingly, 
the question is what is it about substances that make them logically incompatible to 
exist together?   
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Mates and Rescher each offer an account of compossibility as logical consistency 
between complete concepts of substances that are worldmates.244  They build in 
compossibility relations directly into the substances by including information about 
which substances are worldmates.  In this case, a non-existent but possible substance 
is incompossible with existing substances because it is part of its very nature that it 
only exists in conjunction with other substances.  It is thus part of Caesar’s nature 
that Caesar belong to a world with Cleopatra because it is included in Caesar’s 
complete concept that he inhabit a world with Cleopatra.   
This approach to compossibility does explain the origin of compossibility 
relations, but it is not consistent with what Leibniz says about the independence of 
substances, or the world apart view.  First, if it is part of the complete concept of 
Caesar that if Caesar exists so does Cleopatra, then Caesar and Cleopatra seem 
dependent on one another for existence. This is particularly clear in the case of the 
passages where Leibniz explains the independence of substances in terms of the fact 
that God could create those substances in the absence of all other substances: 
[E]ach substance is like a world apart, independent of all other things, except for God; 
thus all our phenomena, that is, all the things that can ever happen to us, are only 
consequences of our being.245  
Leibniz explains that the states of a substance will unfold in accordance with their 
compete concept regardless of what other substances exist: “this would never fail, 
and it would happen to me regardless, even if everything outside of me were 
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destroyed, provided there remained only God and me.”246  Rescher and Mates’s view 
offers an account of compossibility relations and how substances enter into them, 
but their explanation does so at the interpretive cost of rejecting Leibniz’s claims 
that my substance would have all of the same features, even if no other created 
substances exist.  If Cleopatra’s existence is part of Caesar’s concept, then God 
cannot destroy all other substances except for Caesar without rendering one of the 
features contained in Caesar’s concept false.   
Appealing to features of a substance, included in its complete concept, that 
render its existence logically inconsistent with other substances seems like the best 
strategy for capturing compossibility on Leibniz’s view. 247   But encoding that 
information as information specifically about what other substances exist violates 
the independence of substances.  I suspect that Leibniz had not fully decided which 
key features of substances ground compossibility in the 1680s.  In 1697 he offers the 
following analogy: 
                                         
246 “Discourse on Metaphysics” §14, AG 47. Similarly, in his correspondence with Des Bosses 
in 1715 Des Bosses suggests that if God creates one of the substances that exists, then God 
must have created all the rest that constitute the same world.  In reply Leibniz says “He can 
do it absolutely; he cannot do it hypothetically, because he has decreed that all things should 
function most wisely and harmoniously.  There would be no deception of rational creatures, 
however, even if everything outside of them did not correspond exactly to their experiences, 
or indeed if nothing did, just as if there were only one mind; because everything would 
happen just as if all other things existed, and this mind, in acting with reason, would not 
charge itself with any fault.” (To Des Bosses, L 610).   
247 Partially because of Leibniz’s comment about compossibility in terms of contradiction.  
Messina and Rutherford comment that this one passage seems like scant evidence  to base 
the logical interpretation on (Messina and Rutherford 964-5).  However, there is some further 
evidence from our discussion of Leibniz’s modal notions.  Leibniz claims that some things are 
impossible in virtue of being incompatible with God.  In light of the fact that impossibility is 
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It is obvious that of the infinite combinations of possibilities and possible series, that 
one that exists is the one through which the most essence or possibility is brought into 
existence…the situation is like that in certain games, in which all places on the board 
are supposed to be filled in accordance with certain rules, where at the end, blocked 
by certain spaces, you will be forced to leave more places empty than you could have 
or wanted to, unless you used some trick…it follows that there would be as much as 
the possible can be, given the capacity of time and space (that is, the capacity of the 
order of possible existence; in a word, it is just like tiles laid own so as to contain as 
many as possible in a given area.248 
If we think of substances being combined into worlds as tiles being combined in a 
game, the question is what is analogous to the shape of the tiles and spaces such 
that one substance could “block by certain spaces” another substance.249  
As emphasized in my above discussion of possible free decrees, I think that 
Leibniz emphasizes the role of laws in regulating the states of substances when he 
introduces his complete concept notion.250  Instead of building information about 
what other substances exist into the very concept of a substance, information of the 
laws that hold are built into the substance, such that two substances are 
incompossible if they do not share certain laws.  Now what I think Leibniz is unclear 
about, perhaps because he is uncertain, is precisely which laws substances must 
share in order to be compossible, or possible world-mates.  One good candidate is 
the subordinate set of laws regulating the physical and moral realms.  Two 
substances, for example, are incompossible if one includes the law of conservation of 
momentum while the other includes a different law about momentum.  The 
suggestion is that the laws are encoded into the very being of substances, and those 
laws exclude co-instantiation with substances with other laws.  On this view the law 
                                         
248 “On the Ultimate Origination of Things,” AG 150. 
249 See McDonough’s 2010 detailed discussion both of this passage and of the Mates and 
Rescher approach to compossibity.   
250 Russell 1937, 66-67, and Wilson 1993 both argue for similar accounts of compossibility, 
where it is a matter of logical incompatibility of laws.   
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of conservation of momentum cannot both hold and not hold in the same way, in 
two different substances.  The benefit of treating laws as the features that logically 
exclude the existence of particular other substances is that they do not violate the 
independence of substances.  Laws exclude the possibility of certain co-
instantiations, but they do not require that particular other substances exist in order 
for any other substance to exist.  So Caesar can exist without Cleopatra because 
subtracting Cleopatra from a world does not introduce an incompossibility.  
Substances are incompossible in virtue of the laws built into their complete concepts.  
These laws do not require that certain substances exist together (unlike the 
Mates/Rescher view), but they guarantee that certain substances cannot exist 
together.  By analogy, we can think of compossible substances as akin to waltz 
partners.  Each of the partners could complete the motions of the dance without the 
other, so one partner dancing does not guarantee the presence of the other partner.  
But what it does exclude is an alternative dance, for example with one partner 
waltzing and the other doing the cha cha.251   
Worlds, or series of things, are thus individuated not only by the laws that all 
their substances share, and the series of events that occur in the world, but which 
substances exist at that world.  Because there are laws distinctive to each world, the 
incompossibility of worlds is (at least partially) explained by the incompatibility of 
laws. 252  By offering an account of compossibility, we can see how Leibniz can 
                                         
251 I take this to be an extension of Margaret Wilson’s suggestion.  Messina and Rutherford 
2009 criticize Wilson’s view insofar as it suffers from similar problems as the Mates/Rescher 
view.  But the main problems Messina and Rutherford highlight are world apart problems, 
and Wilson’s view is not susceptible to those criticisms.   
252 I say only ‘partially’ explained because even worlds that share laws are incompatible in 
virtue of not containing the same set of substances.   
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maintain that the substances and their combinations form alternative worlds in 
God’s understanding before he selects one to exist.253 
6 Necessitarianism  
The evidence in Leibniz’s middle period for his commitment to necessitarianism 
all things considered is more scant than in his early texts, but there is at least one 
passage I take to be definitive and important.  In his Correspondence with Arnauld, 
he and Arnauld discuss the modal status of the claim that Leibniz goes on a 
journey, given that going on that journey is contained in Leibniz’s concept. 254  
Leibniz explains: 
Since it is certain that I shall take [the journey], there must indeed be some connexion 
between me, who am the subject, and the accomplishment of the journey, which is the 
predicate, for in a true proposition the concept of the predicate is always present in 
the subject.  A falsity would therefore exist, if I did not take it, which would destroy 
the individual or complete concept of me, or what God conceived or conceived of me 
even before deciding to create me…255 
Although the possible free decrees view offers a way to distinguish how taking the 
journey is connected to Leibniz’s concept from necessary connections according to 
eternal truths, it does not offer an account of genuine contingency that explains how 
Leibniz’s features could be otherwise.  In fact, Leibniz notes that not taking the 
                                         
253 McDonough 2010 further examines the question of whether a world that includes all 
compatible substances entails that God does not have a set of worlds to choose from.  He 
convincingly argues that even if there is one such world, there are alternative worlds that do 
not include all substances.  On this view, God has a choice about which world to create, 
either the one with all of the substances, or a world that is merely a subset of them.  So even 
if Leibniz is committed to the view that there is a worlds with all possible substances, there 
are still non-actual worlds because God could have instantiated fewer substances. 
254 LA 52. 
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journey, if contained in his concept, would destroy it and create a falsity.  We can 
see why Leibniz would be committed to this, given that God’s knowledge of 
possibilities is contained in the realm of eternal truths, and those cannot be 
otherwise.  What’s more, it confirms that the infinite analysis view is 
epistemological in the sense that when Leibniz says that denying a contingent truth 
does not entail a contradiction, he must mean one that we cannot arrive at via 
analysis.  He is not denying that the denial of a contingent truth contradicts the 
concept of a substance, for he conceded above that it does.  This is not quite 
necessity all things considered, because it is necessity all features of a complete 
concept considered.  But it does show a continued amenability to the idea that 
propositions he claims are “contingent” are necessarily false all things considered. 
One other important observation to make, before moving to the later texts, is 
that I have emphasized the superiority of the possible free decrees view over the 
infinite analysis view, but it is less clear whether this was Leibniz’s own preferred 
view.  For even if it offers an account of the de re truths about substances, there is 
an important passage where Leibniz defuses the necessitarian argument using 
infinite analysis.  Here he examines a necessitarian argument of the same form as 
the necessitarian argument from God’s perfection that we examined in Chapter 1. 
He considers whether the necessity of If p has greater reason for being true256, then p 
is true, entails the necessity of p.257  He responds, 
[I]f by definition a necessary proposition is one whose truth can be demonstrated with 
geometrical rigor, then indeed it could be the case that this proposition is 
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demonstrable… “God always acts with the highest wisdom.”  But from this one cannot 
demonstrate the proposition “contingent proposition A has greater reason [for being 
true]” or “contingent proposition A is in conformity with divine wisdom.” And 
therefore it does not follow that contingent proposition A is necessary.  So, although 
one can concede that it is necessary for God to choose the best, or that the best is 
necessary, it does not follow that what is chosen is necessary, since there is no 
demonstration that it is the best.258 
What Leibniz is denying here is that necessity, understood as demonstrable in a 
finite number of steps, is closed under entailment.  Even if we can demonstrate in a 
finite number of steps that God chooses the best, and God choosing the best entails 
the some proposition p is true, it does not follow that p is necessarily true, because p 
might have an infinite analysis.  Thus “although one can concede that it is necessary 
for God to choose the best…it does not follow that what is chosen is necessary [e.g. 
the existence of this world], since there is no demonstration that it is the best.” This 
certainly is suggestive that Leibniz’s preferred quasi-modal account in the middle 
period is infinite analysis.  Perhaps part of the issue is that possible free decrees 
offers an account of de re quasi-modality for substances, but because possible free 
decrees do not condition God’s essence they cannot be employed to consider whether 
it is necessary that God choose the best.  Here we will need a broader notion of 
quasi-modality, that can be used to understand the “contingency” involved in God’s 
free choice.  We will see that in the Theodicy in the next Chapter Leibniz does just 
this.  Moreover, the “bestness” of the world is a function of a balance between 
“simplicity of the ways” events change in the world with a “balance with the richness 
of effects.”259 Although it is not totally clear what Leibniz has in mind here, he 
thinks that free decrees influence the “simplicity of the ways” in which the world 
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comes about.  Thus the bestness of the world is in some sense a function of the laws 
of the world.  So bestness, as a de re property of a world, is contingent on the 
possible free decrees account as well.  Even if the possible free decrees view is not 
Leibniz’s preferred account, it does seem superior given Leibniz’s own goals to 
articulate an account of “contingent” properties that is in some way related to what 
he thinks is intuitive about the notion of contingency, it’s connection to what God 
does freely. 
7  Conclusion 
In Ways a World Might Be, Robert Stalnaker describes Leibniz's de re modal 
account: 
According to [Leibniz], every property of every individual is constitutive of its essence, 
and hence only existence is contingent. A modern descendant of this kind of anti-
essentialism is David Lewis`s counterpart theory. According to Lewis’s theory, 
individuals have counterparts--things that resemble them more than anything else—in 
other possible worlds, but each individual itself exists in only on possible world. Hence 
no individual can have accidental properties in the sense defined above: properties that 
it lacks in some other possible world.260 
The preceding discussion shows us that this picture is almost accurate: Leibniz does 
not think that a substance could exist at another possible world and lack any 
property specified by its complete concept. And, while David Lewis's counterpart 
theory bears resemblance to Leibniz's account of incomplete concepts, Leibniz does 
not offer a counterpart theory in service of de re terminology. Lastly, Leibniz's 
complete concept account of substances renders every property of every individual 
constitutive of its essence or identity. However, it does not follow that only existence 
                                         
260 Stalnaker 2003, 72. Essentialism is the view that there is a distinction between the 
accidental and essential properties of objects. 
   
 
 
160
 
is contingent. In one sense, even existence is necessary, since Leibniz is a 
necessitarian. On the other hand, if we are considering the surrogate account of 
contingency with respect to de re modality, then many other properties beyond 
existence are “contingent'”, including the laws of nature and free actions of 
substances. Leibniz adheres to the claim that there is a meaningful way to 
distinguish necessary from contingent properties even for an individual substance 
with a complete concept. The distinction between “contingent'' and “necessary” 
properties is the dependency on the possible free decrees of God. The infinite 
analysis account of contingency can be understood as an epistemic thesis about how 
to explain the relationship between things that depend on God's will, and truths 
that do not admit of a finite a priori demonstration. But dependency on God's 
possible free decrees is Leibniz's best explanation of what deeper metaphysical 
feature internal to individual substances we are tracking when we make de re modal 
distinctions.  
 
 
   
 
 
161
 
Chapter 3: Necessitarianism & 
Modality 1700-1716 
Absolute Necessity, Moral Necessity, and Freedom 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter is a study of the modal notions of Theodicy along with a defense of 
my reading Leibniz as a necessitarianATC (all things considered).  This is a 
challenging text for reading Leibniz as a necessitarian because it includes a number 
of passages and arguments that seem distinctly anti-necessitarian. For one thing, 
Leibniz develops a notion of freedom that includes contingency as a requisite 
condition, emphasizing “freedom is exempt not only from constraint but also from 
real necessity.”261 He affirms that both human agents and God are in fact free; thus, 
he seems committed to the view that some propositions (about free actions) are 
contingently true. Secondly, Leibniz explicitly distances himself from Abelard, 
Wycliffe, Hobbes, and Spinoza who are all recognized (and publicly criticized) for 
endorsing necessitarian claims, including the claim that the actual world is the only 
possible world, and that all non-actual worlds are impossible.262 Third, Leibniz shifts 
his language from “sufficient” reasons to “determinate” reasons,263 emphasizing that 
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“reasons incline without necessitating.”264  If the reasons involved in choice are not 
necessitating, then perhaps Leibniz comes to understand free choice as a source of 
contingency. 265   Fourth, Leibniz explains that contingent truths are only 
hypothetically and morally necessary. Leibniz notes that moral necessity “has the 
name by analogy only: it becomes effective…through the will of God.”266  Moreover, 
he describes the contingency involved in freedom as “non-necessity.”267 So at the very 
least it is not clear from Leibniz’s choice in terminology that he endorses a variant of 
necessitarianism. 
To build a case for reading Leibniz as a necessitarianATC, I will first offer 
sophisticated versions of the necessitarian argument we first encountered in the 
“Confession”—one based on God’s omniscience and one on God’s perfection.  
Although Leibniz does not consider this argument directly in the Theodicy, I will 
show how each of the premises is supported by claims in the text.  Moreover, I will 
argue that hypothetical and moral necessity are contrasted with absolute necessity, 
all of which can be understood by employing notions of quasi-contingency developed 
from the possible free decrees and infinite analysis accounts considered in Chapter 2. 
Although, Leibniz identifies “real necessity” with absolute necessity,268 I will argue 
that hypothetical necessity and moral necessity do not conflict with necessity all 
things considered.  The distinction between absolute necessity and moral necessity is 
not a distinction between genuine metaphysical contingency and necessity all things 
considered.  Further, I will argue that the contingency involved in freedom is 
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explicated using notions of quasi-contingency.  On this view, possible free decrees 
play a distinctive role in God’s freedom, while both infinite analysis and possible 
free decrees are involved in creaturely freedom.  These discussions of freedom offer 
the opportunity to understand how reasons can “incline without necessitating” even 
in a necessitarian framework.  Lastly, I will review Leibniz’s discussion of Hobbes, 
Wycliffe, Spinoza, and Abelard to show that the ways Leibniz distances himself from 
these thinkers does not require the rejection of necessitarianismATC.  With respect to 
Hobbes, Wycliffe, and Abelard, Leibniz emphasizes that his dispute with them is 
terminological, and that they have the resources to accept the view that God’s 
choice to create the actual world does not render non-actual worlds impossible.  
Leibniz does reject Spinoza’s “blind necessitarianism,” according to which God’s 
creation is not a deliberative choice.  However, Leibniz’s dispute with Spinoza 
concerns not the claim that God necessitates the existence of the actual world, but 
how God necessitates the existence of the actual world.269   
Bertrand Russell criticized Leibniz’s views in the Theodicy, describing them as 
both illogical and unrepresentative of Leibniz’s genuine philosophical system.270  This 
view is in encouraged by the observation that Leibnizian doctrines, such as the 
                                         
269 H 67.   
270 “What [Leibniz] published was designed to win the approbation of princes and princesses.  
The consequence is that there are two systems of philosophy which may be regarded as 
representing Leibniz: one, which he proclaimed, was optimistic, orthodox, fantastic, and 
shallow; the other, which has been slowly unearthed from his manuscripts by fairly recent 
editors, was profound, coherent, largely Spinozistic, and amazingly logical.  It was the 
popular Leibniz who invented the doctrine that this is the best of all possible worlds (to 
which F.H. Bradley added the sardonic comment “and everything in it is a necessary evil”); it 
was this Leibniz whom Voltaire caricatured as Doctor Pangloss.  It would be unhistorical to 
ignore this Leibniz, but the other is of far greater philosophical importance” (Russell 1946, 
581). 
   
 
 
164
 
complete concept theory of substance, receive no mention in the Theodicy.  Thus 
before I turn to the sophisticated necessitarian argument, I will justify the treatment 
of the Theodicy as a representative text of Leibniz’s modal theorizing, and clarify the 
relevant modal terminology central to the Theodicy: absolute, moral, and 
hypothetical necessity.   
 
2 Background: The Theodicy and Being a 
Cautious Metaphysician 
Leibniz’s work from 1700-1716 includes many of his most influential texts, 
including the “New Essays on Human Understanding,” Theodicy, “Monadology,” and 
Correspondence with Clarke.  The Theodicy, the only of these texts published 
antemortem, is the main focus of this Chapter.  The focus on the Theodicy mandates 
comment because this is a period with so many seminal works.  First, I have selected 
this text because Leibniz identifies it as a statement of his metaphysical views.  In a 
1710 letter to Burnett, Leibniz describes the Theodicy as addressing “many issues of 
general philosophy and natural theology, where I claim that everything can be 
determined demonstratively and provide the means of doing so.” 271   Also, the 
Theodicy is a natural culmination of Leibniz’s life work, returning to many of the 
issues we witnessed in his discussion of the “Confession”.  Leibniz understands God’s 
creation of the world to be a free action, and there is a resulting tension between 
God’s goodness and choice to create this world, and the existence of evil in this 
world.  The Theodicy thus includes themes Leibniz returned to throughout his life, 
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including the origin of sin, the compatibility of God’s goodness with evil, and divine 
and human freedom.  
In the Theodicy, Leibniz acknowledges the connection between addressing the 
problem of evil, and ensuring that freedom is not threatened by necessitarian 
commitments: 
There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray: one concerns 
the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all in the production and the 
origin of Evil; the other consists in the discussion of continuity and of the indivisibles 
which appear to be the elements thereof, and where the consideration of the infinite 
must enter in. The first perplexes almost all the human race, the other exercises 
philosophers only.272  
As we saw in the “Confession” the production of evil, in the context of the 
production of the world, raises questions about how God’s necessary existence could 
fail to render the world, and all truths, necessary as well.  Leibniz takes this issue to 
not just be relevant for philosophers, but “almost all the human race.” 
The Theodicy emerged through Leibniz’s discussion of Pierre Bayle’s Dictionary 
with Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia. Bayle’s Dictionary is a relentless 
commentary and philosophical critique, engaging contemporary and historical 
intellectual figures and debates.  Bayle’s emphasis throughout is on the fact that 
there is no rational solution to the problem of evil.273 Leibniz aims to refute Bayle’s 
position by offering a rational solution.274  The Theodicy is a unique opportunity to 
understand Leibniz’s own views in relation to his contemporaries and important 
                                         
272 H 53. 
273 For a discussion of Bayle’s treatment of this issue, see Hickson 2013. 
274 See H 63. 
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intellectual traditions.275  And yet, at the key moments where Leibniz offers his own 
views, his distinctive doctrines are absent.  For example, his theory of substances as 
monads with complete concepts receives scant direct attention.  Instead of 
metaphysical doctrines that explicitly appear in other later texts, including 
“Monadology,” Leibniz offers metaphors and analogies for the reader to unpack.276   
The elusiveness of Leibnizian central doctrines in the Theodicy is what Bertrand 
Russell interprets as disingenuousness in Leibniz’s public presentations of his 
philosophy.  In his Preface to the second edition of The Philosophy of Leibniz, 
Russell laments Leibniz’s “general duality,” according to which “he had a good 
philosophy which (after Arnauld’s criticism) he kept to himself, and a bad 
philosophy which he published with a view of fame and money” (vi). This duality is 
increasingly entrenched, according to Russell, as we arrive at Leibniz’s later texts: 
“…as he grew older he forgot the good philosophy which he had kept to himself, and 
remembered the vulgarized version by which he won the admiration of Princes and 
(even more) of Princesses” (vi).  On Russell’s view, when we examine Leibniz’s 
unpublished manuscripts we can see that he “fell into Spinozism whenever he allowed 
himself to be logical; in his published works, accordingly, he took care to be illogical” 
(vii).  Leibniz’s Theodicy is arguably one of the pieces Russell had in mind when 
thinking about Leibniz’s public, disingenuous, pandering texts (particularly because 
                                         
275 Leibniz describes the development of the Theodicy as the result of correspondence with 
Sophie Charlotte Queen of Prussia and reaction to Bayle’s Dictionary in the preface to the 
Theodicy. 
276 See, for example, the laden boat analogy for God’s concurrence with creatures H §30, 141, 
the prince who rules over his citizens as God rules over humans H §125, 199, and drawing a 
straight line and God decreeing the best world exist see H §196, 249. 
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of its origin in correspondence Princess Sophie Charlotte.) 277  The absence of 
Leibniz’s particular doctrines might bolster Russell’s views about Leibniz’s duality, 
encouraging a reading of Leibniz as reverting to more traditional terminology and 
less controversial approaches in published works.  Antognazza, for example, notes 
that Leibniz’s treatment of modal notions in terms of absolute and hypothetical 
necessity in the Theodicy evidences Leibniz’s desire to “play down any talk which 
could ring suspiciously of necessitarianism.”278 Antognazza is not endorsing Russell’s 
view, but points to Leibniz’s desire to hide some of the more controversial aspects of 
his views for the purpose of first introducing readers to his system. 279  In a 1710 
letter, Leibniz notes that in the Theodicy “some of my views cannot be presented in 
a straightforward manner, since people are liable to misunderstand them, not in 
relation to religion (which is strongly supported) but in relation to the senses.”280 
Leibniz is worried about counterintuitive aspects of his views that might prevent 
audiences from engaging his work and considering it seriously.  His concern is not 
with respect to the theological implications of his views, but their coherence with 
how we perceive the world.  As we saw in Leibniz’s middle texts, his account of 
                                         
277 Antognazza 2009, 480. 
278 Antognazza 2009, 483. 
279 Whipple 2013 argues that we should distinguish esoteric and exoteric presentations of 
Leibniz’s philosophy.  Esoteric presentations make definitions explicit, are fully rigorous, and 
presented in a more geometric-style.  Exoteric presentations target terminology, and less 
rigorous presentations to adapt to targeted audiences.  Whipple identifies different ways 
Leibniz adapts his language and approach exoterically, in some cases to conform to Cartesian 
intellectual scholarship and at other times to offer popularized versions of his work.  Given 
the Theodicy’s  development as a reaction to Bayle’s Dictionary, I suspect Leibniz was 
hoping to reach a broader audience than philosophers and theologians, and is exoteric in 
employing traditional terminology like ‘moral necessity’ and ‘hypothetical necessity’. 
280 G III 680, as translated in Antognazza 2009, 482. 
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substances as causally isolated, and apparent instances of causation as mere 
correlation, might strike people as counterintuitive (as evidenced by Arnauld’s 
reaction to Leibniz’s account of substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics).  
Accordingly, Leibniz might have deemphasized his theory of substances so as to 
avoid various initial resistance to counterintuitive aspects of his view.  I am 
sympathetic to Antognzza’s suggestion that Leibniz wanted to present intuitive 
aspects of his system first, before presenting otherwise counterintuitive metaphysical 
views.  He was, contra Russell, trying to help people understand his view and agree 
with him, not placate the opinions of royalty.   
Leibniz, like many intellectuals dependent on the patronage and good favor of 
the powerful and wealthy, is certainly concerned about the reception of his views.  
But the result is not a public incoherent philosophy and a private systematic view 
(as Russell suggests).  Leibniz worries about the best way to present his views to his 
audience, but in doing so I do not think that he presents an incoherent view in the 
Theodicy.  In fact, the Theodicy includes many of Leibniz’s views that lead to 
necessitarianism, and by examining the Theodicy with these features in mind, we 
will see how we can make sense of the Theodicy in light of Leibniz’s necessitarianism 
and his notions of quasi-modalities.   
That said, I do think necessitarianism is one of the views that Leibniz thought 
was too controversial to present up front.  In the 1670s Leibniz expressed 
reservations about presenting fully formed and controversial metaphysical views: 
Metaphysics should be written with accurate definitions and demonstrations, but 
nothing should be demonstrated in it that conflicts too much with received opinions.  
For thus this metaphysics will be able to be received.  If it is once approved, then 
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afterwards if any examine it more profoundly, they will draw the necessary 
consequences themselves.”281 
We should interpret Leibniz as a cautious metaphysician who encourages the reader 
to draw out the consequences of his view for themselves.  Consider an astronomer 
who endorses the heliocentric understanding of the cosmos.  It is wise, and cautious, 
to avoid presenting their view as “the view that denies the sun rises everyday,” for 
this is seemingly in direct conflict with our experience.  But a heliocentric view does 
not deny the phenomena of the sun apparently traversing the sky. Instead, it 
indicates that this apparent movement of the sun is the result of the movement of 
the earth.  Such a view can describe the sun as “rising” if we understand this event 
in terms of the rotation of the earth.  Similarly, Leibniz does not present his account 
of modality as the view that everything is necessary.   Instead, he aims to present 
his system in its most initially plausible light, so that even if it seems to diverge 
from our experiences of the world, we can be receptive to Leibniz’s explanation of 
our experiences.  Even if all propositions are necessary in some sense, he wants to 
make sense of our notions of “contingency”.   
Leibniz wants to present his system in the most plausible way so that his 
audience can come to appreciate why accepting something like necessitarianism all 
things considered is plausible.282  Further, in endorsing necessitarianism, Leibniz is 
not falling into Spinozism, for he devotes significant effort to successfully 
distinguishing Spinoza’s views from his own.  Accordingly I will work to interpret 
and connect Leibniz’s treatment of metaphysical and moral necessity in terms of the 
                                         
281 A VI.iii 573. 
282 Furthermore, the emphasis on traditional terminology might also be an effort to articulate 
how is views compare and contrast to those of his contemporaries.   
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quasi-modal notions we encounter in Leibniz’s earlier work, and emphasize the sense 
in which Leibniz rejects necessitarianism and the sense in which he does not. 
3 Varieties of Necessity: Absolute, 
Hypothetical, and Moral 
Leibniz distinguishes absolute necessity (which he also identifies as “logical” 
“metaphysical,” or “geometrical”) from moral necessity and hypothetical necessity.   
Leibniz contrasts absolute necessity and moral necessity with respect to the types of 
causes involved: “[there is] an absolute necessity, metaphysical or geometrical, which 
may be called blind, and which does not depend upon any but efficient causes; in 
the second place, a moral necessity, which comes from the free choice of wisdom in 
relation to final causes.” 283  Absolutely necessary truths are those that do not 
depend, in any way, on the will of a human or divine agent.  A truth is morally 
necessary when one of its reasons is that the will is inclined to the best (in the case 
of God) or apparent best (in the case of creatures).  Leibniz thinks of the inclination 
of the will as a matter of doing something for the sake of the best, so that free 
action involves final causation.   
A truth is hypothetically necessary when it follows from the truth of another 
proposition. 284   So if B is hypothetically necessary given A, A’s being true is 
sufficient for B’s being true.  Leibniz identifies this type of necessity as necessity of 
the consequence: if the antecedent of the conditional is true it is impossible for the 
                                         
283H §349, 334. 
284H §37, 144.  Leibniz explains that hypothetical necessity is the necessity of the consequence 
given a particular supposition (in H §37, 144,  he applies this specifically to God’s 
foreknowledge).  Also, see the Appendix to the Theodicy, H 381. 
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consequent to be false.285  Moral necessity is a type of hypothetical necessity that 
results from conditional statements whose antecedent make a statement about choice 
or will. 
[I]t must be admitted that God…is prompted to the best by a moral necessity. It must 
be admitted also that one is necessitated to the choice by a hypothetical necessity, 
when one actually makes the choice…These hypothetical necessities do no harm [to 
God’s freedom]. I have spoken sufficiently on this point already.286  
Thus examples of statements of moral necessity include; 
Given the hypothesis that the divine will chooses the best…only that which as in fact 
been produced could have been produced.287  
For example: it was necessary for Judas to sin…supposing that Judas believed that it 
would be best.288   
It can be said that things have some sort of necessity, which is hypothetical, …i.e., the 
necessity of things arises from the will of God, not from their essence: for, God’s 
decrees once posited, everything is necessary289 
Leibniz’s notion of hypothetical necessity also allows Leibniz to articulate a notion of 
hypothetical (and moral) impossibility; 
Certainly this series can be understood or conceived, but its actual existence is 
impossible by a hypothetical impossibility, not because it implies a contradiction in 
terms but because it is incompatible with the presupposed existence of God, whose 
perfection (from which his justice follows) cannot allow such a thing.290  
                                         
285 AG 139; H 396. On this view necessity applies to the conditional, so B is hypothetically 
necessary given A can be summarized as necessarily (if A, then B).  
286 H §132, 203. 
287 “Comments on Spinoza,” G II 20. 
288 CP 119. 
289 Grua 300. 
290 CP 119. 
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A proposition is hypothetically impossible if its falsity is guaranteed by the truth of 
another proposition. For example, the existence of non-actual worlds is 
hypothetically (and morally) impossible given God’s good will. Moreover, as the 
above passage suggests, when Leibniz contrasts absolute necessity and hypothetical 
necessity, he sometimes emphasizes that absolutely necessary truths are those whose 
denial entails a contradiction.291  Absolute necessity is a complex notion in the 
Theodicy because what is central to the notion is that absolutely necessary truths do 
not depend on the truth of other propositions, and instead are true in virtue of the 
conceptual relations internal to the proposition.292   This is why Leibniz includes 
truths of mathematics as examples of absolutely necessary truths and emphasizes 
that the denial of an absolutely necessary implies a contradiction.293  It is not just 
that the denial of absolutely necessary propositions implies a contradiction, but does 
so in a finite number of steps: 
Nevertheless, when in making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it 
depending upon truths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it is 
absolutely necessary. But when, while pressing the analysis to the furthest extent, one 
can never attain to such elements of the given truth, one must say that it is 
                                         
291 H §2, 74, H §20 87, H §37 144, H §§173-74 275, H §224 267. I will argue that absolute 
necessity is not equivalent to necessityATC  because necessityATC  includes considerations of the 
will and moral goodness.  If something is absolutely necessary, then it is necessaryATC.  
However being necessaryATC does not guarantee that something is absolutely necessary.  More 
needs to be said here to distinguish these two notions, both of whose denial entails a 
contradiction. For now I want to broadly introduce absolute, moral, and hypothetical 
necessity.   
292 Spelling out what it is for a proposition to be true in itself as opposed to what is true in 
virtue of other propositions will be taken up shortly. 
293 H 395.  Truths of mathematics do not rely on efficient causes, which is why absolute 
necessity cannot just be a matter of efficient causation. What is central here is that whatever 
the reasons for the truth of an absolutely necessary truth, those reasons are not dependent 
on the truths of other propositions, including ones about choices. 
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contingent, and that it originates from a prevailing reason which inclines without 
necessitating.294  
  I read this as a signal that Leibniz is employing his infinite analysis view of 
contingency in offering the distinction between absolute necessity, on the one hand, 
and hypothetical and moral necessity on the other.  Reading finite analysis as part 
of Leibniz’s notion of absolute necessity makes sense of many of his claims about 
which denials entail contradictions:  
It is true that there would have been no contradiction in the supposition that Spinoza 
died in [Leiden] and not at The Hague; there would have been nothing so possible...295  
But as we saw in Chapter 2, Spinoza’s complete concept contains the concept of 
dying at The Hague (because it is true Spinoza died at The Hague), and we cannot 
include dying in Leiden in Spinoza’s complete concept without “destroying the 
concept” of Spinoza. 296   There, we remarked that Spinoza dying in Leyden 
contradicts his complete concept, but it is a contradiction that cannot be arrived at 
in a finite number of steps.  That Leibniz is assuming the infinite analysis view in 
the Theodicy explains why he claims that it is possible Spinoza died in Leyden 
without retracting the view of substance he develops in the middle period.297   
                                         
294 H §14, 419.  This text “Concerning the Origin of Evil” one of three appendices Leibniz 
prepared to accompany the Theodicy. It is a commentary on “De Origine Mali,” (1702) 
written by William King.  Therein King defends the view that freedom involves indifference, 
a view that Leibniz does not accept without great qualification.  
295 H §174, 235. 
296 LA 53, 41. 
297 Why not think Leibniz changes his view?  In other texts from the same period as the 
Theodicy we find Leibniz affirming that all features of a substance arise from its own nature, 
see “Monadology,” §60.  
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Thus Leibniz’s notion of “absolutely necessary” comes to include those truths 
whose sufficient reasons exclude considerations of the will and final causes and whose 
denial entails a contradiction via a finite analysis. This contrasts with (merely) 
hypothetically necessary truths, whose full sufficient reasons include some reasons 
beyond the concepts contained in the consequent.298 
Hypothetical necessity is not restricted to moral necessity. Leibniz also considers 
the hypothetical necessity that follows from God’s knowledge: 
[I]t was necessary that Judas would sin, on the supposition that God had foreseen it.299 
Hypothetical necessity is when a thing can be understood to be otherwise in itself, but, 
per accidens, because of other things already presupposed outside itself it is necessarily 
such and such.  For example: it was necessary for Judas to sin, supposing that God 
foresaw it…300   
These passages are from Leibniz’s early work, where “Judas sins” is per se contingent 
because Judas’s essence as a human, included in his specific concept, does not 
include sinning, and does not include not sinning.  However, if God knows that 
Judas sins, then it is true that Judas sins.  Because God is infallible and knows all 
truths, God’s knowing a truth entails that truth, so all truths are hypothetically 
necessary relative to God’s knowledge.301  In the Theodicy Leibniz is particularly 
focused on two types of hypothetically necessary claims, those that follow on the 
                                         
298 I added the ‘merely’ here because absolute truths can be hypothetically necessary too, for 
example 2 + 3 = 5 is absolutely necessary, and is hypothetically on the assumption that 2 + 
3 = 5.  Being the consequent of a hypothetically necessary truth does not automatically 
make something hypothetically necessary in the way relevant for the sorts of modal 
considerations Leibniz is interested in above.   
299 “Conversation with Steno on Freedom,” CP 123. 
300 CP 119. 
301 The developments of complete concepts in the middle period adds further necessitarian 
considerations, which we will consider shortly.  
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supposition of God’s good will (these are morally necessary), and those that follow 
on the supposition of God’s knowledge (these are a type of hypothetical necessity).  
The consequences of God’s knowledge and good will are contrasted with those truths 
that are absolutely necessary.   
Leibniz identifies absolute necessity as the problematic notion of necessity insofar 
as this sort of necessity must be banished from our notion of freedom. Absolute 
necessity, or real necessity, 
would destroy the freedom of the will, so essential to the morality of action: for justice 
and injustice, praise and blame, punishment and reward cannot attach to necessary 
action, and nobody will be under obligation to do the impossible or to abstain from 
doing what is absolutely necessary.302  
With respect to God, if his actions are absolutely necessary, it “would open the door 
to impiety, whether through the impunity one could thence infer or the hopelessness 
of any attempt to resist a torrent that sweeps everything along with it.”303   If action 
were constrained by absolute necessity, there would be no justification for praise and 
blame, and we would not have moral duties to act in certain ways.  Moreover, God’s 
action, insofar as he created the world, would not be praiseworthy, for it would not 
be a function of his good will, but instead some unreflective process.  Leibniz 
continues “it is important to note the different degrees of necessity, and to show that 
there are some which cannot do harm, as there are others which cannot be admitted 
without giving rise to evil consequences.”304  The degrees of necessity, according to 
Leibniz, that can do no harm are moral and hypothetical necessity.   
                                         
302 H 57. 
303 H 57. 
304 H 57. 
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But is Leibniz right about that?  Leibniz is right that moral and hypothetical 
necessity do not prevent humans and God from being free, but, or so I will argue 
these notions of necessity are part of his commitment to necessitarianism all things 
considered.  To start to piece this together, it’s important to see how hypothetical 
necessity is related to necessityATC.  Necessity of the consequence guarantees that if 
the antecedent is true, then the consequent is true too.  But it does more than this: 
it transfers the modal quality of the antecedent to the consequent.305  Thus if B is 
hypothetically necessary relative to A, and A couldn’t fail to be true, then B 
couldn’t fail to be true.  Put another way, if we accept: necessary (if A, then B) and 
necessary (A), then we are committed to necessary (B). 306   Championing 
hypothetical and moral necessity as ways of resisting necessitarianism is only 
effective if the antecedents of those conditionals are not themselves necessary, or if 
they are necessary it is not through a necessity that is transferred via necessity of 
the consequence.  One of the upshots of absolute necessity is that it is not 
transferred via necessity of the consequence.  For example, according to Leibniz it is 
necessary that if God is perfect, then the (the actual) world exists. God’s perfection 
is absolutely necessary (it can be demonstrated in a finite number of steps as part of 
the very definition of God), but it does not follow that the existence of the world 
                                         
305 Or so it does in the case of necessitarianismATC.  As Leibniz emphasized in the “Confession 
of a Philosopher,” per se necessity is not transferred via necessity of the consequence.  
Leibniz makes similar comments with respect to infinite analysis and demonstration in “On 
Contingency,” AG 30. 
306 This is a version of the necessitarian argument offered in the “Confession,” but instead of 
the truths at issue being those that follow from God’s existence, the worry is specifically the 
status of truths that follow from God’s good will, God’s knowledge, and the human will.   
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can be demonstrated in a finite number of steps.307  Thus the key question, for 
Leibniz, is the modal status of the antecedents of hypothetical involving human and 
divine goodness, and whether that kind of modality is transferred from antecedent 
to consequent.   
I will argue that all things considered, the antecedents of these hypotheticals are 
necessary, so that all things considered so are their consequents. Leibniz employs 
infinite analysis and possible free decrees to block the necessity of the consequent, 
but these are quasi-modal notions that do not undermine the basic fundamental 
claim that things could not be otherwise.   
The two types of hypothetically necessary statements Leibniz’s considers in the 
Theodicy are those based on God’s will and those based on his knowledge. Each 
generate necessitarian arguments, first the argument from God’s omniscience and 
the second the argument from God’s goodness.  I am going to argue for two claims 
specifically: first, that when Leibniz resists the arguments of (fellow) necessitarians, 
he is resisting the claim that all truths are necessary absolutely, or necessaryABS.  
Secondly, he resists the claim that the hypothetical necessity of truths given God’s 
omniscience commits us to necessitarianismABS and this argument offers the 
possibility of a line of resistance to necessitarianismATC.  Resisting necessitarianismATC 
from the argument from God’s Omniscience hangs on the argument for 
necessitarianismATC  from God’s goodness or perfection.  I will argue that Leibniz 
does not have the resources to resist this second argument, and thus is committed to 
                                         
307 Here it is important that analysis does not employ conditionals, or else the finite analysis 
of the antecedent plus the conditional would give us a proof in a finite number of steps.  
Leibniz employs this reasoning in “On Contingency,” AG 30. 
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necessitarianismATC.  First, I will examine each of these arguments, and then I will 
turn to Leibniz’s criticisms of his contemporary necessitarians.   
 
4  The Necessitarian Argument from 
Omniscience. 
Leibniz denies that the hypothetical necessity of truths given God’s knowledge of 
them is sufficient for the necessity of those truths.  Consider, for example, that 
Judas sinning is hypothetically necessary given that God knows Judas sins.  First, 
this is insufficient to conclude the necessityABS of Judas’s sinning, for its denial does 
not entail a contradiction in a finite number of steps.  But a worry remains.  For 
since God is infallible and unchanging, it seems that if God knows that Judas sins, 
“Judas sins” couldn’t fail to be true.308   
Leibniz considers this worry; 
It is agreed that foreknowledge in itself does not make truth more determinate; truth 
is foreseen because it is determinate, because it is true; but it is not true because it is 
foreseen: and therein the knowledge of the future has nothing that is not also in the 
knowledge of the past or of the present. But here is what an opponent will be able to 
say: I grant you that foreknowledge in itself does not make truth more determinate, 
but it is the cause of the foreknowledge that makes it so. For it needs must be that the 
foreknowledge of God have its foundation in the nature of things, and this foundation, 
making the truth predeterminate, will prevent it from being contingent and free.309 
Leibniz’s point here is that although God’s knowledge of p entails the truth of p, 
God’s knowledge is itself dependent on the reasons that render that proposition 
true; thus he “grant[s] that foreknowledge in itself does not make truth more 
                                         
308 Recall that Leibniz raises similar worries in the “Omniscience and Omnipotence of God 
and Human Freedom,” and the “Confession of a Philosopher,” CP 9-17, 27, 125, 131-33. 
309 H §38, 144; emphasis added.   
   
 
 
179
 
determinate, but it is the cause of the foreknowledge that makes it so.”  What 
foreknowledge is grounded in, according to the above passage, is the nature of 
things.  The modal status of God’s knowledge is thus dependent on the modal status 
of the nature of the objects of God’s knowledge.  If the natures of things are not 
necessaryATC then Leibniz is not committed to necessitarianismATC via the argument 
from omniscience.   
Here is a summery of the argument from omniscience: 
1. It is necessaryATC that if God knows p, then p is true. 
2. It is necessaryATC that God knows p. 
3. Therefore, p is necessaryATC.  
However, Leibniz can resist premise 2 by arguing that although God couldn’t fail to 
be omniscient, the nature of the object known could, in fact, be otherwise.  The 
necessity of God’s knowledge is dependent both on the features of God, and the 
modal features of the natures of things.  If the natures of things are not 
necessaryATC, then God’s knowledge of them is not necessary all things considered.  
This is particularly important in cases where God’s knowledge is of the free actions 
of humans.  Whether God’s knowledge of Judas’s sin is necessary thus depends upon 
whether it is necessary that Judas sins.   
I have argued in the first and second Chapters that according to both the per se 
view and necessityATC it is necessary that Judas sins.  But my point here is that 
someone resisting this view can hightlight that for all Leibniz has said in the 
Theodicy, the modal status of the natures of creatures, all things considered, is 
unclear.  But I think that Leibniz continues to be committed to the view that all 
things considered the natures of those creatures, and all truths about them, are 
necessary.  Moreover, I think the passages in which Leibniz describes the natures of 
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things as contingent, he is appealing to accounts of quasi-modal notions.  We have 
already seen the role of the infinite analysis view in his account of absolute necessity.  
In response to the above question, what is the basis for God’s knowledge of p 
Leibniz offers the following answer: 
For this result [an answer to this question] I resort to my principle of an infinitude of 
possible worlds, represented in the region of eternal verities, that is, in the object of 
the divine intelligence, where all conditional futurities must be comprised…Thus we 
have a principle for the certain knowledge of contingent futurities, whether they 
happen actually or must happen in a certain case…God would see them as they are in 
the region of the possibles, before he decrees to admit them into existence.310 
So the basis for God’s knowledge of true propositions is his understanding of 
different ways essences, substances, and worlds can come about.  He goes on to 
emphasize: 
But if the foreknowledge of God has nothing to do with the dependence or 
independence of our free actions, it is not so with the foreordinance of God, his 
decrees, and the sequence of causes which, as I believe, always contribute to the 
determination of the will.311 
Here Leibniz is affirming the importance of God’s possible free decrees as 
structuring possible worlds in his understanding.  But what’s more is that the 
possible free decrees account, which I still take to be more fundamental than the 
infinite analysis view, is important for spelling out how creatures and God have 
‘contingent’ features and are free.  Leibniz’s answer about the nature of things, that 
determines the modal status of the content of God’s knowledge, depends upon the 
modal status of God’s free decrees.  In Chapter 2 we examined the possible free 
decrees view specifically as a theory of de re claims about substances.  We need to 
                                         
310 H §42, 146-47. 
311 H §43, 147. 
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examine Leibniz’s account why God’s possible free decrees are contingent. First, I 
look at a few passages that evidence that Leibniz continued to affirm this view in 
the Theodicy.  This will confirm that the modal status of the content of God’s 
knowledge is “contingent” according to the possible free decrees view.  Whether those 
decrees themselves are contingent will depend on the contingency of God’s will.  
This, in turn, depends on the success of the second necessitarian argument from 
God’s perfection or goodness.   
5 Possible Free Decrees in the Theodicy 
Early in the Theodicy Leibniz distinguishes mathematical truths from truths 
about laws of nature:  
[T]he one kind is of those called the ‘Eternal Verities’…, which are altogether 
necessary, so that the opposite implies a contradiction.  Such are the truths whose 
necessity is logical, metaphysical or geometrical, which one cannot deny without being 
led into absurdities.  There are…laws which it has pleased God to give Nature, or 
because they depend upon those.  We learn them either by experience, that is, a 
posteriori, or by reason and a priori, that is, by considerations of the fitness of things 
which have caused their choice.312   
God’s possible free decrees constitute and condition those features of the world that 
are not absolutely necessary: 
This fitness of things has also its rules and reasons, but it is the free choice of God, 
and not a geometrical necessity, which causes preference for what is fitting and brings 
it into existence. Thus one may say that physical necessity is founded on moral 
                                         
312 Even though we can glean some of the laws a priori we cannot understand their reasons 
via analysis, so I take this view to be consistent with Leibniz’s view in the middle period 
that we cannot offer an a priori proof of the possible free decrees.  What’s interesting here is 
that Leibniz thinks that we can a priori reason to the truth of some laws based on God’s 
perfection.  A further examination of the nature of this sort of a priori reasoning would take 
us too far afield of this discussion. 
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necessity, that is, on the wise one's choice which is worthy of his wisdom; and that 
both of these ought to be distinguished from geometrical necessity.313  
Leibniz is connecting the array of options for different worlds and laws to God’s will 
and his selection of one based on his good will and the bestness (or fittingness) of 
the world.  Because which laws hold vary world to world, and which world God 
makes actual depends on his good will, the results of the actual free decrees, and the 
actual decrees themselves, are morally necessary.  The possibility of free decrees 
helps to explain what Leibniz means when he claims that moral necessity creates no 
contradiction in the objects of what God wills: 
Nevertheless, although his will is always indefectible and always tends towards the 
best, the evil or the lesser good which he rejects will still be possible in itself. 
Otherwise the necessity of good would be geometrical (so to speak) or metaphysical, 
and altogether absolute; the contingency of things would be destroyed, and there 
would be no choice.314 
The notion of possibility in itself is key for Leibniz’s account of contingency in terms 
of possible free decrees.  The idea is that something is possible in itself if it has a 
coherent nature or concept, but what makes a proposition contingent is that its 
truth results not just from reasons internal to the concept of its subject but reasons 
external to it that selected it as one of many coherent options.  Here, there being an 
array of coherent differing options, one of which is selected by a criteria not dictated 
by their own natures, is what renders God’s free decrees possible. So the reality of 
God’s choice (having an array of options where one of which is selected accord to the 
nature of the will) is preserved.  The variations among the options, via the laws, are 
                                         
313 H §2, 74.   
314 H 387.  This passage is from one of the three Appendices of the Theodicy, specifically 
“Summary of the Controversy Reduced to Formal Arguments,” in which Leibniz formulates 
objections (as syllogisms) and responds to each of them.   
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contingent features of the worlds.  This is how the possible free decrees account 
offers an account not only of contingent propositions about, for example, Caesar, but 
also about worlds, including which is best (which results from a comparison of 
worlds) and which exists (which results from the selection of one of those worlds). 
The possible in itself view, treating possibles as coherent objects in an array of 
options, helps to explain Leibniz’s notion of moral necessity.  For Leibniz says that a 
key feature of moral necessity is that “[n]ecessity of this kind [moral necessity], which 
does not destroy the possibility of the contrary, has the name by analogy only: it 
becomes effective not through the mere essence of things, but through that which is 
outside them and above them, that is, through the will of God.”315  The reason why 
moral necessity “does not destroy the possibility of the contrary” is that non-selected 
options continue to be options, excluding information about which option is selected.  
One option becomes actual, not because some feature of that option alone is 
sufficient to guarantee it is actual, but because something external to the options 
eliminates all but one.  This process of elimination does not change the status of the 
options as options, but it renders one selected, and the rest rejected.  What is 
important for defending my necessitarian view of Leibniz in the Theodicy is that the 
contingency of God’s possible free decrees stems from variations in possible worlds, 
and not from the fact that God’s will, which selects one of those worlds, is not 
necessitated all things considered.   
I have been pushing for the view that God’s free decrees are contingent because 
of features of the object of God’s choice, but someone might try to argue that 
Leibniz thinks that God’s will itself is not necessitated, and this is the origin of the 
                                         
315 H 387. 
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contingency of the decrees.  The key question is whether Leibniz has identified the 
will of God as a source of genuine contingency that could be otherwise.  If this is 
what Leibniz has in mind, then he has, in fact, rejected necessitarianismATC.  In the 
next section, I will make the case that Leibniz is not rejecting necessitarianismATC by 
starting with an argument from God’s perfection and goodness to the conclusion 
that all truths are necessaryATC..   
6 The Necessitarian Argument from God’s 
Perfection 
The necessitarian argument from God’s perfection is a reconstruction of 
Leibniz’s commitments in the Theodicy. It shares structural features with the 
necessitarian argument from the “Confession of a Philosopher,” although it is more 
complex.  Moreover, Leibniz does not engage this argument explicitly, but his 
discussion in the Theodicy evidences endorsement of the premises and the 
conclusion. I’ll call the argument in the Theodicy the argument from God’s 
perfection. 316 
1. It is necessaryATC that God exists.317  
2. It is necessaryATC that if God exists, God wills what is best.318 
3. This world is necessarilyATC the best.319 
                                         
316 This version of Leibniz’s argument is adapted from Blumenfeld 1982.  Blumenfeld does 
not use the all things considered terminology.  Although perfection does not play an obvious 
role in the premises as summarized here, God’s perfection is central to Leibniz’s commitment 
to the premises of the argument.   
317 God’s perfect essence guarantees this via the ontological argument for God’s existence. 
318 Demonstrated by the discussion below of God not failing to will what is best.  Because 
God is essentially good God wills according the principle of the best, such that if God wills, 
God wills what’s best.  Leibniz also assumes that God cannot fail to create, for it is essential 
to God’s goodness that he express that goodness through creation.  
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4. It is necessaryATC that if God exists, God actualizes this world.320   
5. It is necessaryATC, that this world exists.321  
6. Thus everything that occurs, occurs necessarilyATC. 
Thus all truths are necessarilyATC  true.   
Premises 2 and 3 are the most controversial, particularly because Leibniz denies 
them by applying quasi-notions to the necessity operators.  However, or so I argue, 
Leibniz is committed to premises 2 and 3 with respect to all things considered 
necessity.   
6.1 Premise 3: This World is NecessarilyATC the Best. 
The necessity of the bestness of the actual world brings us back to the key 
question in the argument from God’s omniscience in relation to the necessitarian 
argument from God’s perfection.  What is the modal status of the features of worlds 
and natures of substances?  The worlds are sets of compossible substances, where 
each substance has its nature or essence fully specified by its complete concept in 
God’s mind.  As we saw in the Correspondence with Arnauld, those concepts could 
not be different without destroying the nature of the creature.  Similarly, each world 
                                                                                                                   
319 This follows from the fact that worlds are aggregates of substances that couldn’t be 
otherwise.  Substances cannot be otherwise because their natures are a function of essences 
and laws, and although those laws do not hold at all worlds, they could not be otherwise 
given that substance and world.  Put another way, Leibniz acknowledges that possible 
worlds, in all their details, exist in God’s understanding and could not be otherwise.  A 
world cannot have properties other than it has, so it’s good-making qualities are necessary 
relative to that world.  Further, the array of possible worlds could not be otherwise, so which 
world is the best cannot be otherwise.   
320 From premises 2 & 3. 
321 From premises 3 & 4. 
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is a unique set of compossible substance(s), where if one thing were different it 
would no longer be that world.  
We saw from our earlier discussion that it is necessary that if God creates, God 
creates the best.  Leibniz goes on to explain that the essences of creatures are not 
dependent on God’s will: 
God was able to create matter, a man, a circle, or leave them in nothingness, but he 
was not able to produce them without giving them their essential properties.  He had 
of necessity to make a man a rational animal and to give the round shape to a circle, 
since, according to his eternal ideas, independent of the free decrees of his will, the 
essence of man lay in the properties of being animal and rational, and since the 
essence of the circle lay in having a circumference equally distant from the center as to 
all its parts.322  
The essences couldn't be otherwise, which is not to say that in themselves they 
guarantee that they exist, but that it is impossible for there to be a circle whose 
radius varies.  Leibniz affirms that  
These essences and these truths emanate from the same necessity of nature as the 
knowledge of God.  Since therefore it is by the nature of things323 that God exists, that 
he is all-powerful, and that he has perfect knowledge of all things, it is also be the 
nature of things that matter, the triangle, man and certain actions of man, etc., have 
such and such properties essentially.  God saw from all eternity and in all necessity the 
essential relations of numbers and the identity of the subject in the propositions that 
contain the essence of each thing.324  
The same necessity that render’s God’s existence and nature necessary is the very 
same necessity involved in the essences of creatures.325  If God understands all 
                                         
322 H §183, 242. 
323 Here I take Leibniz to mean in virtue of essences, specifically God’s essence. 
324 H §183, 242. 
325 Leibniz goes on to explain that this includes the essence of goodness itself; see H §183, 
242-43.  Leibniz discusses the immutable nature of goodness earlier too: “But that is 
exactly what is meant by being essential to good music: for those rules belong already in 
the ideal state, even when none yet things of singing, since it is known that they must of 
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possibilities before creation, and those possibilities are represented in his 
understanding as possible worlds, then those structures, those possibilities, are 
necessarily possible.326 Leibniz affirms this view earlier in the Theodicy: “God leaves 
them just as they were in the state of mere possibility, that is, changing nothing 
either in their essence or nature, or even in their accidents, which are represented 
perfectly already in the idea of this possible world.”327  They are necessarily possible 
in that they have coherent essences and couldn’t be otherwise.  Because the nature 
of goodness couldn’t be otherwise, the structures of worlds couldn’t be otherwise, 
and which one is best couldn't be otherwise, it is necessary that this world is the 
best all things considered.  
Worlds are structured according to possible free decrees and those decrees 
influence the bestness of the world, which is a function of the simplicity of the laws 
and fecundity of the phenomena, but they are also internal to the nature of the 
world.  My suggestion from Chapter 2 is that to understand contingency in the 
worlds as a function of those subordinate laws that vary world to world, those laws 
                                                                                                                   
necessity belong to it as soon as one shall sing.  In the same way virtues belong to the 
ideal state of the rational creature before God decrees to create it; and it is for that very 
reason we maintain that virtues are good by their nature” (H §181, 240). 
326 Even though Leibniz does not mention individual substances directly in these passages, 
early in the Theodicy he notes “and each thing as an idea has contributed, before its 
existence to the resolution that has been made upon the existence of all things; so that 
nothing can be changed in the universe (any more than in a number) save its essence or, if 
you will, save its numerical individuality. Thus if the smallest evil that comes to pass in the 
world were missing in it, it would no longer be this world…” (H §9, 129).  Worlds are 
aggregates of substances, but like substances they are individuated by all of their features, 
were one thing changed we would have an alternative world.    
327 H §52, 151. I read “accidents” as features of a substance that derive from laws of nature 
(either exclusively, or in addition to truths about essences).  Thus I read accidents as 
properties that result from God’s possible free decrees. 
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are possible because they vary both world to world.  Those laws are not contingent 
relative to a world-concept, they are contingent once we appreciate that they vary in 
a set of options from which God chooses.  Because laws are intrinsic to the nature of 
the world, and those laws determine the bestness of the world in comparison to 
other worlds, the bestness of the world couldn’t be otherwise. Put another way, the 
world couldn’t have different features, and the range of options couldn’t be different. 
So the natures of worlds or substances can be understood as ‘contingent’ via the 
possible free decrees account, since possible free decrees ‘contingency’ is only quasi-
modal, it does not conflict with necessityATC.328  So the answer to the argument from 
God’s omniscience is that Leibniz can reject the necessity of the nature of things 
known by God via the quasi-modality and laws, but this does not yield contingency 
all things considered.   
6.2  God Necessarily Chooses the Best World  
The point of the above discussion is to show that even though possible free 
decrees condition what is “contingently” true of the world, those decrees are intrinsic 
to the nature of the world. A defender of the view that Leibniz admits genuine 
contingency into his system in the Theodicy might argue that even if the possible 
free decrees of God are essential to the world, or a particular plan of action, which 
world God wills is nevertheless not necessary.  However, I think that Leibniz 
endorses the view that all things considered God necessarily chooses the best world.   
                                         
328 Similarly, the infinite analysis account can be deployed as a quasi-modal account to 
explain the contingency of the bestness of this world, but the infinite analysis does not yield 
the conclusion that the bestness of the world is contingent all things considered. 
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The Theodicy emphasizes an aspect of Leibniz’s philosophy that is closely related 
to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason and necessitarianismATC.  In 
Leibniz’s texts he emphasizes that God cannot act arbitrarily.329  The centrality of 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason ensures that there is always a reason for God’s 
actions, and thus that divine action is never arbitrary.  The principle  
of the sufficient reason, which states that there is no true enunciation whose reason 
could not be seen by one possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete 
understanding. [This principle] must hold not only in necessary but also in contingent 
truths; and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reason should not 
exist. For one may say in a sense [this] principle[ is] contained in the definition of the 
true and the false.330  
In the case of God’s actions, Leibniz emphasizes the link between perfection and 
acting for reasons, so that God’s perfection guarantees both that there is a reason 
for why he does just what he does, and that his goodness, or that the reason why he 
does just is the best one. The reconciliation of God’s good reason for the creation of 
the world and the existence of evil is a core component of the Theodicy and an 
excellent context in which to frame the importance of Leibniz’s modal notions.  
The connection between non-arbitrariness and God’s perfection and its relation 
to necessaitarianism is clearest in an Appendix to the Theodicy, where Leibniz 
considers objections to his views in the form of syllogisms: 
                                         
329 For example, this appears in Leibniz’s early work “If God wills something without reason, 
it follows that he acts and wills imperfectly because every intelligent substance, insofar as it 
does not act from intelligence, acts imperfectly” (CP 129). In the “Discourse on Metaphysics” 
Leibniz explains “to act with less perfection than one is capable is to act imperfectly” (§3, 
AG 37). 
330 H §14, 419.   
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Objection VIII331  
1. Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free.  
2. God cannot fail to choose the best.   
3. Therefore God is not free. 
 
Because asserting that creation is a free act of God is a central claim of Leibniz’s 
natural theology, he cannot accept the conclusion of this argument. Leibniz’s 
response here is important for two reasons: he rejects premise 1, and he accepts 
premise 2.332  He accepts that God cannot fail to choose the best, but thinks that 
this does not undermine God’s freedom (and thus rejects premise 1). 
Leibniz offers an insightful argument as to why God cannot fail to choose the 
best, which ultimately shows that it is necessary that God choose the best.333  First, 
because God is essentially good and perfect, God’s will is guided by the principle of 
the best.  The principle of the best dictates that the best of all options be selected, 
because actions are undertaken for the sake of what is best.  Leibniz explains that “if 
the will of God had not as its rule the principle of the best, it would tend towards 
evil, which would be worst of all; or else it would be indifferent somehow to good 
and evil, and guided by chance.”334  If the principle of the best does not guide God’s 
                                         
331 H 386. 
332 “I deny the major of this argument”  (H 386). 
333 This is particularly important because it helps establish that for Leibniz it is necessary all 
things considered that God will the best.  This is a controversial point in the literature.  
Robert Adams notes that the Theodicy offers evidence of the contrary, “If the Theodicy were 
the only source for Leibniz’s opinions, I think we would find noting incompatible with the 
impression that Leibniz thinks it contingent, de dicto, that God chooses what is best” 
(Adams  1994, 37). 
334 H 387. 
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will, then either some other (worse) principle guides God’s will (e.g., the principle of 
the second best), or there is no principle that guides God’s will (and the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason is violated).  In the first case, God’s creative activity would be 
“malicious,” and in the second case, where there is no principle, God’s creative 
activity would be “absurd.”335  But neither of these is possible for an essentially 
perfect God, because acting without a reason would render God “no less imperfect 
than the object of his choice.”336  This would undermine our reasons for loving and 
worshiping God: “then he would not deserve absolute trust; he would act without 
reason in such a case, and the government of the universe would be like certain 
games equally divided between reasons and luck.”337   
Elsewhere in the Theodicy, Leibniz also defends the claim that God cannot fail to 
choose the best. Thus he endorses the claim that it is necessary that God create the 
best of all worlds, because God’s failing to create the best of all worlds entails a 
contradiction.  Leibniz explains that a being that creates something other than the 
best “deprive[s] God of the designation good”338   
The true God is always the same: natural religion itself demands that he be essentially 
as good and wise as he is powerful.  It is scarcely more contrary to reason and piety to 
say that God acts without cognition, than to maintain that he has cognition which 
does not find the eternal rules of goodness and justice among its objects, or again to 
say that he has a will such as heeds not these rules.339 
                                         
335 H 387. 
336 H 388.  Leibniz also notes that “indifference with regard to good and evil would indicate a 
lack of goodness or of wisdom” (H §174, 236). 
337 H 388. 
338 H §176, 236. 
339 H §177, 238. 
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This passage confirms that God is essentially good, and God’s goodness cannot be 
otherwise because then it would be contrary to reason.340  For the same reason, 
Leibniz condemns the suggestion that the nature of goodness itself is contingent or 
could be otherwise.   
[W]hen we reduce goodness to the most general abstraction, we find therein the will to 
do good.  Divide and subdivide into as many kinds as you shall please this general 
goodness, into infinite goodness, finite goodness, kingly goodness, goodness of another, 
goodness of a husband, goodness of a master, you will find in each, an inseparable 
attribute, the will to do good.”341 
Being good is essential to God’s nature, and essential to goodness is the will to do 
good.  This grounds the principle of perfection that guides God’s will in his essential 
nature.  So God’s will could not be otherwise, it could not fail to be guided by the 
principle of the best and thus God cannot fail to create the best.   
This is a particularly important point against the view that Leibniz has 
stipulated a genuine sort of contingency that issues from God’s will.  On this view, 
when Leibniz says God cannot fail to do what is best, Leibniz is saying that God 
will not fail to do what is best, but it is not necessary that God does what is best.  
However, I think that all Leibniz needs for the freedom of God’s choice is the 
internal consistency of the objects of God’s choice, one of which is selected as a 
function of God’s moral character.  To go further and say that God has the ability 
to select what is other than the best would erode God’s perfection, which is not 
                                         
340 Further, Leibniz connects these notions to necessity when discussing Bayle’s view: “[‘God 
can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he has for his wisdom’] is self-
evident, for one can do nothing whereof the opposite is necessary” (H §236, 273). 
341 H §179, 238-39. 
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possible.  God cannot be otherwise in the strongest modal sense, all things 
considered. 
Before moving on, there are a few passages that may seem to cut against my 
suggestion that God wills the best all things considered.  These passages are 
particularly important because Leibniz is considering Bayle’s argument  that God’s 
nature necessitates God’s choice:  
The love that God bears to himself is essential to him, but the love for his glory, or 
the will to acquire his glory, is not so by any means: the love he has for himself did 
not impel him by necessity to actions without; they were free; and since there were 
possible plans whereby the first parents should not sin, their sin was therefore not 
necessary.342 
Leibniz seems to be rejecting Bayle’s reasoning, which accordingly means that 
Leibniz seems to be rejecting the reasoning I just committed him to.  However, I 
think that he is not rejecting the claims that God will the best necessarily all things 
considered.  Instead I read Leibniz as saying that it is not from the love of himself 
alone that he creates but the love for himself and the love for what he creates. He is 
claiming that God does not will a particular world or create any world just based on 
considerations of his own essence, so I read the above passage as follows: 
the love that God bear to himself is essential to him but the love for his glory [what he 
creates in specific], or the will to acquire his glory [i.e. to create at all], is not so [not 
essential to God] by any means: the love he has for himself did not impel him by 
necessity [because it was not the sole cause] to his actions without [because they also 
depend on his love of his creation]. 
The mistake Bayle is making, on my reading of Leibniz, is to think that the total 
sufficient cause of the creation of a particular world is necessitated by the essence of 
God.  Leibniz is saying that it is a combination of the essence of God and the 
                                         
342 H §233, 271.  
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essential nature of the possible worlds available.  This maintains necessityATC because 
all (God’s essences and the natures of worlds) things considered God creates the 
best of all worlds.  So Leibniz is not denying the de dicto claim that God must 
create the best, he is denying the de re claim of the actual world that God must 
create it, just based on the perfection of God.  Notice too how the above passage 
ends: “and since there were possible plans whereby the first parents should not sin, 
their sin was therefore not necessary.”  Leibniz is not appealing to God’s freedom to 
account for this necessity, he is appealing to variations amongst worlds.  However, 
Leibniz continues in response to Bayle: 
God chose between different courses all possible: thus, metaphysically speaking he 
could have chosen or done what was not best; but he could not morally speaking have 
done so.343  
Again, when Leibniz says that “metaphysically speaking” God could have chosen or 
done what is not the best, he is not denying the necessityATC of God choosing what is 
best.  First, recall that metaphysical necessity is identified with absolute necessity in 
the Theodicy.  Leibniz might very well be repeating the claim that one cannot 
demonstrate that God selects this world amongst the infinite options in a finite 
number of steps.  Notice, moreover, that Leibniz affirms that morally speaking God 
could not have done what is not best.  That is, relative to the principle of the best 
God could not have done differently. Here I read Leibniz as explaining that the array 
of possible worlds from which God chooses includes worlds that are not the best, 
and that per impossible, God would choose one of them if God did not act according 
                                         
343 H §234, 272. 
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to the principle of the best.  Lastly, Leibniz closes out this section with the following 
comment: 
[I]t implies no contradiction that God should will—directly and permissively—a thing 
not implying a contradiction, and in this sense it is permitted to say that God can will 
it.344  
If non-actual worlds do not imply a contradiction, then this above passage appears 
to confirm that God can will them, it is not contradictory for God to will them. 
This goes against my suggestion that it is necessary that God wills the best.  
However, I do not think this passage should be read this way.  This passage is a bit 
more complicated because a proper reading of it involves Leibniz’s theory of 
antecedent versus consequent will.  Early in the Theodicy Leibniz explains; 
But in relation to God nothing is open to question, nothing can be opposed to the rule 
of the best, which suffers neither exception nor dispensation. It is in this sense that 
God permits sin: for he would fail in what he owes to himself, in what he owes to his 
wisdom, his goodness, his perfection, if he followed not the grand result of all his 
tendencies to good, and if he chose not that which is absolutely the best, 
notwithstanding the evil of guilt, which is involved therein by the supreme necessity of 
the eternal verities. Hence the conclusion that God wills all good in himself 
antecedently, that he wills the best consequently as an end, that he wills what is 
indifferent, and physical evil, sometimes as a means, but that he will only permit 
moral evil as the sine quo non or as a hypothetical necessity which connects it with 
the best. Therefore the consequent will of God, which has sin for its object, is 
only permissive.345 
Leibniz thinks of God’s will as inclined towards all things with good qualities, that 
is, God is antecedently inclined to will all worlds insofar as each is good, but his 
inclination is in proportion to their goodness, and he ultimately wills the one that is 
the best, or the one toward which he is most inclined.  Denying of the consequent 
                                         
344 H §234, 272. 
345 H §25, 138. 
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will of God that God wills the best is contradictory.  Put another way, in the 
original passage Leibniz is trying to make sense of what we mean when we say God 
can will something.  If it has a coherent concept, Leibniz thinks God can will it, but 
as we include more and more considerations we limit more and more what God can 
will, until we reach what God can will all things considered, and that is the best.  
We can say God can will that the second-best of all worlds exist, either in the sense 
that it was among the options before he chose according to the best, or it would 
take an infinite demonstration to show that world is second best.  So it is in a 
qualified sense that thinking of God as failing to do what is best does not imply a 
contradiction.   
The strategy with respect to all of these passages is to show that when Leibniz 
claims it is possible that God fails to will what is best, he has restricted the range of 
sufficient reasons we are considering in one way or another, either by just 
considering God’s essence, or the world’s essence, or the range of worlds, but not all 
things considered.   
That God cannot fail to choose the best is not the only important claim gleaned 
from Leibniz’s response Objection VIII.  Recall the objection reads: 346 
1. Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free.  
2. God cannot fail to choose the best.   
3. Therefore God is not free. 
 
So far I have focused on Leibniz’s acceptance of 2, but Leibniz’s rejection of 1 is of 
utmost importance for this views in the Theodicy, for I take most of his apparent 
                                         
346 H 386. 
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rejections of necessitarianism as rejections of views that undermine our freedom.  
Necessity all things considered does not undermine our freedom, and in what follows 
I will examine Leibniz’s notion of freedom so that we can see how the notions of 
contingency involved are notions of quasi-contingency.   
7 Freedom: Spontaneous, Intelligent, and 
Contingent Action 
In the “Confession” Leibniz offers an account of freedom that requires both 
spontaneity and deliberation, such that free action originates from the agent via the 
will guided by understanding.347  Leibniz returns to this account in the Theodicy: 
Aristotle has already observed that there are two things in freedom, to wit, 
spontaneity and choice, and therein lies our mastery over our actions. When we act 
freely we are not being forced, as would happen if we were pushed on to a precipice 
and thrown from top to bottom; and we are not prevented from having the mind free 
when we deliberate, as would happen if we were given a draught to deprive us of 
discernment. There is contingency in a thousand actions of Nature; but when there is 
no judgment in him who acts there is no freedom. And if we had judgment not 
accompanied by any inclination to act, our soul would be an understanding without 
will.348  
However, Leibniz adds contingency as a third requirement of free action: 
Up to this point I have expounded the two conditions of freedom mentioned by 
Aristotle, that is, spontaneity and intelligence, which are found united in us in 
deliberation, whereas beasts lack the second condition.  But the Schoolmen demand 
yet a third, which they call indifference.  And indeed one must admit it, if indifference 
signifies as much as ‘contingency’; for I have already said here that freedom must 
exclude an absolute and metaphysical or logical necessity.349  
I will argue that Leibniz’s further analysis of contingency does not make room for 
events to happen otherwise (it is not a rejection of necessity all things considered), 
                                         
347 CP 69 and 123. 
348 H §34, 93. 
349 H §302, 310. 
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but instead employs notions of quasi-modality—possible free decrees and infinite 
analysis.  Leibniz’s inclusion of contingency as a requisite for freedom is thus not the 
rejection of necessitarianismATC. 
7.1  Divine Freedom 
Leibniz argues that even though God cannot fail to do what is best, God is 
nevertheless free.  To do so, he calls upon his notion of the possibility of God’s free 
decrees.  He notes that because God chooses amongst things that are possible in 
themselves, or internally consistent worlds represented his mind, the fact that he 
could not choose otherwise does not undermine his freedom: 
[I]n willing [God] always follows the tendency of his own nature, and all other things 
always follow his will…Nevertheless, although his will is always indefectible and always 
tends towards the best, the evil or the lesser good which he rejects will still be possible 
in itself.  Otherwise the necessity of good would be geometrical (so to speak) or 
metaphysical, and altogether absolute; the contingency of things would be destroyed, 
and there would be no choice.350   
Part of the reason why God’s free actions are not absolutely necessary is that they 
come about according to final causes, where God acts for the sake of what is best. 
Leibniz’s notion of freedom is that of deliberative choice.  The fact that God must 
act for the sake of what is best does not undermine God’s freedom.  
There is nothing less servile and more befitting the highest degree of freedom than to 
be always led towards the good, and always by one’s own inclination, without any 
constraint and without any displeasure…when [God] had set before him an end, that 
of exercising his goodness, his wisdom determined him to choose the means most 
appropriate for obtaining this end.351 
                                         
350 H 387. 
351 H 386. 
   
 
 
199
 
Here contingency, as a necessary condition for God’s freedom, is best understood as 
there being an array of internally consistent worlds God considers to actualize. What 
does, in fact, actualize one of those worlds is God’s will, determined by what is best.  
That is, God’s creation of the actual world is free because God is the cause of the 
action, through a reflective and deliberative process whereby he considers the 
infinite ways worlds that can be (each possible in themselves) and then selects the 
best to create. It is contingent that this world is actual because its own nature is not 
sufficient to bring it into existence and how it does come to be is a matter of being 
chosen among many.  God’s action is free because it is a choice that is neither 
guaranteed by God’s nature alone, nor by the nature of the object of choice alone.   
Possible worlds are important for God’s free choice for two reasons. First, the 
array of genuinely possible sets of circumstances, all of which God could create but 
only one of which he will create, evidences God’s power. Which outcomes are 
available for contemplation when choosing are a function of what we are capable of 
doing (excluding considerations of which world is best). An array of possible worlds 
is important for characterizing the options that God could at least in principle 
exercise his power over.  Omnipotence is the power to bring about any logically 
possible states of affairs.  Thus God’s power, considered independent of his willing 
the best, is in part understood in terms of the options available to him amongst 
which to choose. 
Power and will are different faculties, whose objects are also different; it is confusing 
them to say that God can do only that which he wills. On the contrary, among various 
possible, he wills only that which he finds the best. For all possibles are regarded as 
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objects of power, but actual an existing things are regarded as objects decretory 
will.352  
The sort of threat of necessity Leibniz is concerned with is one that deems non-
actual worlds impossible or contradictory. If these worlds are contradictory, then 
God cannot exercise power over them. The threat of necessity is a threat to God’s 
power when choosing, and is a threat to freedom in that respect. Possible worlds are 
the objects of God’s choice, and limiting the array of those objects limits God’s 
power. 
Second, the existence of possible worlds in God’s understanding is important to 
ensure that God’s productive activity is intentional, aiming at creating the world 
that brings about the most amount of goodness. In order to understand one’s choice, 
one must understand the objects of choice, and God’s understanding of ways the 
world could be, constitute is understanding of the objects of his choice. Possible 
worlds are the objects of God’s understanding, and God’s willing that something be 
the case does not render his objects of knowledge contradictory. I take Leibniz’s 
main point to be that the objects of God’s power and understanding are internally 
consistent worlds and God’s willing one of these to exist cannot render the natures 
of those worlds internally contradictory. The claim that Leibniz is really aiming to 
exclude is that possible but non-actual worlds are impossible, where impossible 
means entailing a contradiction internal to the world; 
…but it does not compel him, for his choice creates no impossibility in that which is 
distinct from the best; it causes no implication of contradiction in that which God 
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refrains from doing. There is therefore in God a freedom that is exempt not only from 
constraint but also from necessity.353  
This decree does not change the nature of the objects: it does not render necessary 
that which was contingent in itself, or impossible that which as possible.354  
Worlds are possible existents, before their relative goodness and the character of 
God’s will determines which one exists.  The contingency involved in God’s free 
choice is that God’s will does not render a possible world necessary in itself or 
impossible in itself.  
For God chooses among the possible, and for that very reason he chooses freely, and is 
not compelled; there would neither be choice nor freedom if there were but one course 
possible.355  
The thing indeed would imply no contradiction in itself if the effect did not follow; 
and therein lies contingency.356  
God fails not to choose the best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is 
no necessity in the object of God's choice, for another sequence of things is equally 
possible. For that very reason the choice is free and independent of necessity, because 
it is made between several possibles, and the will is determined only by the 
preponderating goodness of the object.357  
The contingency condition in divine free will is met by acknowledging that the 
sufficient reasons that necessitate the existence of this world are neither exclusive to 
God’s nature nor to the nature of what is chosen.  The extent to which each world is 
good is essential to each world, but which one is best is a function of a comparison 
of all the worlds, and even then that does not guarantee existence for God must 
create according to the principle of what is best.  The objects of God’s choice are 
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distinct from God’s nature, and as long as he is presented with an array of options 
in willing one to exist, the act of creation is free.  The possible-in-itself view explains 
why the existence of the world is not necessitated by the nature of the world alone.  
This is not to say, however, that God’s free choice is not necessary all things 
considered, for considering all things, God’s nature, the nature of worlds, and 
comparative goodness, a contradiction would arise if a different, non-best, world 
exists.358 
7.2 Human Freedom 
Leibniz offers the same general account of freedom for creatures as divine agents, 
that is, free action is spontaneous, intelligent, and contingent.  However, one 
important lesson from our examination of per se modality in Leibniz’s middle period 
is that per se modality does not distinguish contingent from necessary properties in 
substances or worlds. Thus instead of analyzing contingency in terms of per se 
modality for non-divine creatures, I think Leibniz employed the infinite analysis and 
possible free decrees accounts of quasi-contingency to spell out his notion of human 
freedom.359  Though Leibniz does not explicitly discuss the infinite analysis account 
in the Theodicy, he is committed to the view that contingent truths are not 
demonstrable:  
                                         
358  The infinite analysis view could also be used to show that which world exists is 
contingent.  But God’s free choice depending on an infinity of reasons, that God himself does 
not require in order to cognize worlds seems less on point in the context of these passages. 
359 Although Caesar’s free action is contingent in both the possible free decrees sense and the 
infinite analysis account, the infinite analysis ensures an important epistemic feature of free 
actions.   
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Nevertheless, when in making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it 
depending upon truths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it is 
absolutely necessary. But when, while pressing the analysis to the furthest extent, one 
can never attain to such elements of the given truth, one must say that it is 
contingent...360  
Consider Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon.  In order for this to count as a free action, 
for Leibniz, Caesar must deliberate and act in accordance with his will.  Human 
actions differ from divine actions in that God’s will is not influenced by passions in 
addition to means-ends reasoning.   
 …we do not always follow the latest judgment of practical understanding when we 
resolve to will; but we always follow, in our willing, the result of all the inclinations 
that come from the direction both of reasons and passions, and this often happens 
without an express judgment of the understanding.361  
Thus our will, even in free actions, is not merely subject to deliberative reasons.362 
What exactly does contingency add to his account of human freedom?  Leibniz 
accounts for the contingency of the truth Caesar crossed the Rubicon by appealing 
to the contingent connection between crossing the Rubicon and Caesar, which, as we 
saw last chapter, is both a function of God’s possible free decrees, or laws that vary 
world to world, and the fact that such decrees require an infinite analysis to 
demonstrate.  That is, an a priori demonstration that Caesar crossed the Rubicon 
would involve a nonterminating process, or an infinite number of reasons or causes. 
We can never determine, in a finite number of steps, that crossing the Rubicon is 
contained in Caesar’s concept, just as we cannot show that supposing that Caesar 
did not cross the Rubicon entails a contradiction.  
                                         
360 Appendix to the Theodicy, Concerning “The Origin of Evil,” H §14, 419. 
361 H §151, 51. 
362 I’m setting aside issues of just how much influence the passions can have before an action 
is no longer free and voluntary.   
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Importantly, this is true for Caesar too.  In order for Caesar to act for the sake 
of what appears best, he must apply his will.  But if we can cognize from our own 
natures what action we will take, instead of taking that action because it is the 
apparent best, our freedom will be undermined.  Acting voluntarily is a matter of 
having a set of options within one’s power,363 and willing one of those options by 
deciding which is best.  I think Leibniz thinks that we can act voluntarily even 
though we do not have the power to do otherwise, as long as our reason for acting, 
and what influences the will, is our reasoning about what is best, and not what we 
foresee our inclinations will lead us to.  The infinite analysis view ensures that there 
is no way to a priori predict how I will behave and what I will will.  Making 
deliberation about which action within my means will bring, the best outcome 
relevant.   
Leibniz wants to account for the sense it which it feels like we could have done 
otherwise when we act.  
When we present a choice to ourselves, for example, whether to leave or not to leave, 
given all the internal or external circumstances, motives, perceptions, dispositions, 
impressions, passions, inclinations taken together, there is a question as to whether I 
am still in a state of contingency, or whether I make the choice to leave, for example, 
by necessity—that is, whether in fact this true and determined proposition, that in all 
these circumstances taken together I will choose to leave, is contingent or necessary. I 
reply that it is contingent, because neither I nor any other more enlightened mind 
could demonstrate that the opposite of this truth implies a contradiction. And 
assuming that by freedom of indifference we understand a freedom as opposed to 
necessity (as I have just explained), I agree about this freedom.364  
The proposition “in all these circumstances taken together I will choose to leave” is 
contingent. A complete analysis of all of the determining factors that render my 
                                         
363 Or at least, of it not being demonstratively false that we have a set of options. 
364 “Letter to Coste on Human Freedom,” AG 194; emphasis added. 
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choice cannot be completed in a finite number of steps, so my choice is contingent. 
The upside of this sort of contingency is that it explains how there is a sort of 
indifference in free actions, without rejecting the Principle of Sufficient Reason. So 
Leibniz thinks his analysis of freedom is complete because it captures the sense in 
which our actions are determined but not necessary, for even if we assume all of the 
events leading up to our action, we cannot derive a contradiction through analysis. 
There is a contingent connection between all events leading up to Caesar’s decision 
and his action. 
But the freedom of the mind which is contrasted with necessity pertains to the bare 
will, in so far as this is distinguished from the understanding.  It is what is known as 
‘free will’ [le franc arbiter]: it consists in the view that the strongest reasons or 
impressions which the understanding presents to the will do not prevent the act of the 
will from being contingent, and do not confer upon it an absolute or (so to speak) 
metaphysical necessity.”365  
My will is genuinely efficacious in bringing about future states, but would not be if I 
could just cognize what my future states will be like and how my willing follows 
from those inclinations. The infinite analysis aspect of modality thus ensures that 
it’s in principle impossible for an agent to act on a priori reasons and circumvent 
the will.   
Thus freedom is a matter of considering a set of options, appreciating which is 
best, and then willing accordingly.  A free choice is a matter of considering an array 
of options, one of which is selected according to the nature of the will.  In the case 
of God, the array of options are internally consistent worlds, one of which is the 
best, which God subsequently wills to exist.  God cannot fail to create the best of 
these worlds, or fail to property understand which is the best, or fail to will what is 
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best.  What renders his creation of the world contingent is that the determining 
factor in which world exists is his good will.  So what is key to God’s free choice to 
create the world is an array of possible worlds. 
However, human beings are not presented with a genuine array of options, 
because which option we choose is already contained in our very concept and nature.  
There is a sense in which the objects of our choice are internal to our being.  
However, because of our epistemic limitations we do not know what the outcome of 
our choice will be, we cannot a priori know what we will choose.  Because of our 
epistemic limitations, we are presented with an array of ‘possible’ actions or 
outcomes, each of which is genuine in that we cannot demonstrate it will not be 
chosen.  Because we do not have this epistemic access into what we are determined 
by our constitution to choose, we can engage in the process of considering which 
outcome is best, or appears best, and will accordingly.  The contingency in God’s 
freedom is guaranteed by the separate objects of his choice, but and the contingency 
of human freedom is supported by the indemonstrability of what we are determined 
to choose.   
8 Inclining ‘without Necessitating’ 
After Leibniz outlines his compatibilist view of free will, he explains that 
reconciling determinism with free will does not answer all of the threats to freedom: 
Yet one must confess that the cylinder of Chrysippus does not answer the objection of 
necessity. He ought to have added, in the first place, that it is by the free choice of 
God that some of the possibles exist; secondly, that rational creatures act freely also, 
in accordance with their original nature, which existed already in the eternal ideas; 
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and lastly, that the motive power of good inclines the will without compelling [or 
necessitating] it.366  
 The cylinder of Chrysippus is a metaphor for the human will. Leibniz notes that 
just as the rolling motion of a cylinder is in part caused by whatever pushes the 
cylinder it but is also a function of the shape of the cylinder’s surface, the action of 
free agents is the result of determining factors external to the agent (including God’s 
creative activity) but also factors internal to the agent (for example their character). 
The cylinder of Chrysippus is meant to render Leibniz’s compatibilist view more 
plausible.  What is important about this example is that even if he employs the 
cylinder of Chrysippus analogy to explicate his compatibilist view of the will, he 
thinks that he has not addressed “the objection of necessity”.  According to Leibniz, 
in order to answer this objection one must spell out the free choice of God to create, 
and how rational creatures freely act. The last component, that reasons incline 
without necessitating, is that final component to explain.  
Leibniz claims the reasons incline without necessitating both for God and 
humans. 367   The role of reasons is important for moral necessity, because reasons 
must be of such a nature that they leave room for our will to bring things about as a 
function of our character, or what appears best.  Leibniz often claims that reasons 
incline without necessitating, which is certainly suggestive of an anti-necessitarian 
sentiment. For if reasons can incline without necessitating, then there can be 
sufficient reasons that do not necessitate, even if those reasons are themselves 
necessary.  In his review of Michael Griffin’s necessitarian reading of Leibniz, 
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Michael Futch emphasizes that inclination without necessitation offers a compelling 
reason against reading Leibniz as a necessitarian: 
…Leibniz also writes often of “reasons that incline without necessitating,” another part 
of his theories of contingency enlisted to establish that there is no metaphysical 
necessity in God creating this world: “I say that motives incline without necessitating 
and there is…not an absolute necessity in contingent things” (Leibniz’s fifth letter to 
Clarke, section 9). Again, some have found in this, especially when integrated into 
Leibniz theory of infinite analysis, an attempt to show that the world’s existence is not 
metaphysically necessary, even if by that we mean extrinsically necessary. Griffin 
critically addresses neither Leibniz’s writing on this score nor the available scholarly 
literature.368 
Making sense of “inclination without necessitation” within a necessitarian framework 
is an important part of defending a necessitarian reading of Leibniz.  Possibility in 
itself, and the array of options involved in choice are two key notions for spelling out 
inclining without necessitating in a necessitarian framework.  What someone 
ultimately wills is the result of a weighing of different reasons in favor of different 
possible outcomes.  As we saw above, however, in the case of humans these reasons 
often include the influence of passions (and perhaps also our indistinct perceptions 
of the world).  When Leibniz says that reasons incline without necessitating, he is 
saying that no one reason, considered in itself, is sufficient to guarantee an action.  
There are no necessary connections between having a certain reason and acting a 
certain way.  When we consider any one reason we are only considering a partial 
cause of our action, or a portion of the reasons sufficient to cause action. For 
example, being as thirsty as one could possibly be does not necessitate drinking a 
glass of water, whether we will to drink with depend on whether we have stronger 
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countervailing reasons not to drink, like we think the water is poison.  I think this is 
what Leibniz has in mind when he notes: 
So the predetermination of events by their causes is precisely what contributes to 
morality instead of destroying it, and the causes incline the will without necessitating 
it. For this reason the determination we are concerned with is not a necessitation. It is 
certain (to him who knows all) that the effect will follow this inclination; but this 
effect does not follow thence by a consequence, which is necessary, that is, whose 
contrary implies contradiction; and it is also by such an inward inclination that the 
will is determined, without the presence of necessity. Suppose that one has the 
greatest possible passion (for example, a great thirst), you will admit that the soul can 
find some reason for resisting it, even if it were only that of displaying its power. Thus 
though one may never have complete indifference of equipoise, and there is always a 
predominance of inclination for the course adopted, that predominance does not 
render absolutely necessary the resolution taken.369  
I take Leibniz’s point to be that there is not an immediate contradiction that follows 
from an agent having reason to drink, and yet not drinking.  However, this need not 
entail rejecting the claim that all things considered (including the prevailing reasons) 
a particular action is necessary. The “predominance does not render absolutely 
necessary the resolution taken” because those reasons, considered by themselves and 
not in comparison to other reasons, do not necessitate that course of action.  
Similarly with respect to God’s choice to create the world, the goodness of each 
world inclines God will towards creating it, but the features of no one world, 
considered by itself, is sufficient to necessitate God’s will, because it is not just 
goodness that inclines God’s will, but bestness (or being the most good).  Leibniz 
further emphasizes that the fact that the will resolves itself to do that which it is 
strongest inclined towards is a law that is imposed externally to the will.   
[A]s for the connexion between causes and effects, it only inclined, without 
necessitating, the free agency, as I have just explained; thus it does not produce even a 
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hypothetical necessity, save in conjunction with something from outside, to wit, this 
very maxim, that the prevailing inclination always triumphs.370  
So that having the strongest reason to will something only necessitates it with the 
additional requirement that the will resolves to do what it has strongest reason to 
do.  Again, this is consistent with all things considered necessitarianism if we read 
Leibniz as making these claims under a restricted conception of reasons.  If we 
restrict ourselves just to the reasons, those reasons in themselves are not sufficient to 
guarantee the resolution of the will.  Thus they do not necessitate the will.  But the 
outcome is guaranteed, nevertheless, all things considered.   
So Leibniz’s account of freedom, his claims about the power of reasons to incline 
without necessitating, and his emphasis on moral necessity can all be understood 
consistently in an all things considered necessitarian framework.  What evidences 
that Leibniz was aware of this commitment, and is not merely inconsistent in his 
modal theorizing, is that when he discusses other necessitarian views, he does not 
distance himself as much as it might first appear.  He notes that many of his 
disputes with necessitarians are terminological, and in light of the necessitarian 
argument from God’s perfection, I think we have good reason to think that Leibniz 
was knowingly committed to necessitarianism all things considered.   
9 Leibniz’s discussion of other Necessitarians 
Both Abelard and Wycliffe’s works were censured for versions of 
necessitarianism.371  Leibniz acknowledges that both Abelard and Wycliffe’s views 
are problematic, but what Leibniz identifies as problematic is not the endorsing of 
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necessitarianismATC.  Instead, Leibniz finds their terminology, or lack thereof to 
capture claims about contingency, problematic.  Abelard’s problematic claim is that 
God can only do that which God in fact does.372 Leibniz explains that “it appears 
that this author was a little too much inclined to speak and think differently from 
others: for in reality this was only a dispute about words: he was changing the use of 
terms.”373 Leibniz does not reject Abelard’s view, but claims that Abelard uses terms 
differently than Leibniz does.  When discussing what God can do, we might be 
discussing the range of options within his power (possible worlds) or what God does, 
in fact, do given God’s essential and perfectly good will.  “Power and will are 
different faculties, whose objects are also different; it is confusing them to say that 
God can do only that which he wills…For all possibles are regarded as objects of 
power, but actual existing things are regarded as the objects of his decretory will.”374 
Leibniz identifies, and endorses, Abelard’s view, which very closely resembles 
Leibniz’s own modal variantism: “It may indeed be said that this man can be saved 
in respect of the possibility of human nature, which is capable of salvation: but it 
may not be said that God can save him in respect of God himself, because it is 
impossible that God should do that which he must not do.”375  
Leibniz offers a similar diagnosis of Wycliffe’s position, noting that “men of 
talent do wrong to truth and to themselves when, without reason, they bring into 
use new and displeasing expressions.”376  Leibniz, as a cautious metaphysician, aims 
to present his views with pleasing expressions.  According to Wycliffe’s problematic 
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phrasing, which Hobbes also fell prey to according to Leibniz, non-actual worlds are 
impossible. Here Leibniz notes that some things remain possible, even though their 
requisites (or reasons) never come about.377  Leibniz does not reject the views of 
Abelard and Wycliffe, but notes that some of their claims are misleading.  Non-
actual worlds are impossible and God can only do what he does relative to God’s 
perfectly good will.  If we restrict the considerations of sufficient reasons to exclude 
God’s good will, we can offer accounts of quasi-contingency and affirm that there are 
non-actual possible worlds. Leibniz’s amendments to their views are thus not 
tantamount to rejection necessitarianismATC. 
Leibniz then turns his attention to Spinoza.  Unlike his treatment of Abelard, 
Wycliffe, and Hobbes, Leibniz outright rejects a tenet of Spinoza’s view. Leibniz 
explains that he rejects Blind Necessitarianism.  According to blind necessitarianism 
all truths are necessitated by God’s nature, but not by choice: “Spinoza went further: 
he appears to have explicitly taught a blind necessity…he acknowledges no goodness 
in God, properly speaking, and he teaches that all things exist through the necessity 
of the divine nature, without any act of choice by God.”378 Leibniz explains that he 
rejects this view because he believes that there are “possible…things that imply no 
contradiction.”379  I read these passages by interpreting “implies a contradiction” as 
limiting itself to more or less restricted subsets of reasons all things considered. 
                                         
377 Leibniz’s discussion here is a bit misleading, for he says that we can say that “their 
requisite conditions can exist although they do not exist”.  Here he must mean the essential 
features of the world, or world concept is coherent, for he cannot mean that God could fail to 
be good (and thus bring a world into existence that is less than the best).    
378 H §173, 234. 
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Leibniz’s rejection of Blind Necessitarianism ensures that God is supplied with a will 
and understanding such that God’s creative activity can be an intentional outcome 
of choice and willing according to what is best.  Leibniz thus criticizes the absence of 
final causes in Spinoza’s explanation of God’s creation of the world. 
The rejection of Blind Necessitarianism does not require the rejection of 
necessitarianismATC because Leibniz’s account of worlds as possible in themselves is 
sufficient to represent God’s choice in creating the world.  Leibniz does not object to 
the view that all things considered the world necessarily exists, but instead objects 
to the idea that it is not necessitated by God’s goodness in combination with the 
natures of created substance.  
10  Conclusion 
At the opening of this Chapter I introduced four aspects in which Leibniz’s 
views in the Theodicy seem anti-necessitarian: his view that reasons incline but do 
not necessitate, the inclusion of contingency as a requisite for freedom, the emphasis 
on contingency in terms of moral necessity and God’s freedom, and Leibniz 
criticisms of the necessitarian views of Hobbes, Wycliffe, Spinoza and Abelard.  I 
argued that each of these features are consistent with Leibniz being a necessitarian 
all things considered, because the relevant notions of contingency can be spelled out 
in terms of quasi-modality extended from the views in Chapter 2.  All absolutely 
necessary truths are necessaryATC but not all truths necessaryATC are absolutely 
necessary.  Moreover, although all truths are necessaryATC so that all morally 
necessary truths are necessaryATC, this further fact holds in virtue of Leibniz’s views 
about God’s will and the nature of substances.  Emphasizing the importance of 
God’s choice is not a way of injecting contingency into his system, but instead a way 
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of showing that despite being necessitated by one’s nature, freedom is possible.  
Leibniz is thus trying to show that freedom is compatible with necessitarianism all 
things considered.  
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Conclusion 
 
I have argued that we should not interpret Leibniz’s suggestions about 
contingency as reductive analyses that uniformly apply to all contingent 
propositions.  When Leibniz presents his per se, infinite analysis, and possible free 
decrees accounts, he is not offering a general theory of contingency.  Because Leibniz 
is committed to necessitarianism all things considered, no truths are contingently 
true at a deep level.  This gives way to the suggestion that Leibniz offers so many 
modal theories because he is trying to account for the meaning of “contingency” in 
different contexts within a necessitarian framework.  In his early work, the relevant 
modal issue is whether God’s creation of the world is an act of will guided by choice, 
which requires an array of possible worlds or outcomes one of which is actualized by 
God’s will.  Leibniz also highlights the importance of analyzing the meaning of our 
modal terms, which vary according to how we conceive of the terms in our 
propositions.  In cases in which we speak of contingency, Leibniz emphasizes the 
distinction between essential and accidental properties.  Although all truths are 
necessary all things considered, not all propositions are true in virtue of the 
essentiality of properties, allowing us to distinguish a type of quasi-contingency.   
However, between 1676-1686 Leibniz fundamentally revises his notion of 
individual substance.  His complete concept theory of substance renders all features 
of a substance essential, so that whatever distinction we want to make between 
necessary and contingent properties, it cannot be explained in terms of essential 
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features or features the substance has per se.  This change in his notion of substance 
also raises questions about the composition of worlds, and how, exactly, the 
compatibility of substances shapes the landscape of possibility and possible worlds.  
In treating compossibility and de re modality, I have emphasized the importance of 
laws of nature and their role in constituting the nature of a substance.  These laws, 
understood as God’s possible free decrees, form the foundation for what I think is 
Leibniz’s most successful account of de re modality, as well as explain how 
substances are mutually incompossible.   
The accounts of quasi-contingency that Leibniz develops in his middle period 
become central to vindicating divine and human freedom in his later work.  Central 
to the notion of “contingency”, is the presence of a range of options that are all 
possible in that they are internally consistent, one of which is selected according to 
the goals or values of an agent.  This account of freedom, developed in conjunction 
with Leibniz’s notion of moral necessity, is perfectly consistent with Leibniz’s 
necessitarianism all things considered.  We can arrive at this conclusion by 
considering Leibniz’s account of substances and God in the Theodicy. Because the 
nature of goodness couldn’t be otherwise, the structures of worlds couldn’t be 
otherwise, which world is best couldn't be otherwise, and God’s good nature 
couldn’t be otherwise, all things considered no truths could be otherwise.   
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Appendix: List of Key Works 
 
The following is a list, ordered alphabetically, of Leibniz’s main works and their 
estimated dates of authorship.  Those texts with disputed or questionable 
authorship dates are marked “?”.   
 
 “Comments on Spinoza” 1677 
 “The Confession of a Philosopher” 1672-73 
 “Conversation with Steno Concerning Freedom” 1677 
 “Correspondence with Arnauld” 1686-87 
 “Correspondence with Clarke” 1715-16 
 “De Conditionibus” 1665 
 “Dialogue on Human Freedom and the Origin of Evil” 1695 
 “Discourse on Metaphysics” 1686 
 “An Example of Demonstrations About the Nature of Corporeal Things,   
Drawn from Phenomena”  
 
1671 
 “General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and Truths” 1686 
 “Le Cause de Dieu” 1716 
 “Letter to Burnett” 1710 
 “Letter to Coste On Human Freedom” 1707 
 “Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf” 1671 
 “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas” 1684 
 “Metaphysical Definitions and Reflections” 1680 
 “Middle Knowledge” 1677 
 “The Monadology” 1714 
 “Necessary and Contingent Truths” 1686 
 “New Essays on Human Understanding” 1704 
 “Notes on Metaphysics”  1676 
 “On Body, Space, and the Continuum” 1676 
 “On Contingency” 1686? 
 “On the Demonstration of Primary Propositions” 1671-2 
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 “On Freedom” 1689? 
 “On Freedom and Possibility” 1680-82? 
 “On the Infinite” 1676? 
 “On Mind, the Universe and God” 1675 
 “On the Omnipotence of Omniscience of God and Human Freedom” 1670-71 
 “On Spinoza’s Ethics”  1676? 
 “On Truths, the Mind, God, and the Universe” 1676 
 “On What Is Independent of Sense and Matter” (Letter to Queen Sophie  
Charlotte of Prussia)   
 
1702   
 “Primary Truths” 1686? 
 “The Radical Origination of Things” 1712 
 “The Source of Contingent Truths” 1685-89 
 “Specimen Juris” 1669 
 Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom on Man and the   
Origin of Evil 
1710 
 “Whatever Can Exist Exists” 1676 
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